DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION

1993
REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT
July 1, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are pleased to submit the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense, together with the Commission's recommendations for closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

The Commission scrutinized thousands of pages of testimony and written documentation. We held 17 hearings across the United States, visited over 125 military activities, and met with hundreds of community representatives. The Commission heard from many expert witnesses, including Members of Congress and officials representing the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Congressional Budget Office. Our hearings, deliberations, and records were open to the public.

Every installation recommended for closure or realignment enjoys a proud history of service to the nation. We recognize that closing a base creates economic hardship for communities that have offered our nation a priceless service by hosting a military facility. Nevertheless, continuing budget constraints mandated by Congress along with changing national security requirements compel the United States to reduce and realign its military forces. This report reflects the fiercely independent judgment of the Commission's seven members. While not one of our decisions was easy, we are convinced our recommendations were not only fair but will strengthen this country's ability to meet its domestic and international responsibilities with more limited resources.

Respectfully yours,

Jim Courter
Chairman

[Signatures of Commissioners]
DEFENSE
BASE CLOSURE
AND
REALIGNMENT
COMMISSION

1993
REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT
Major Base Closures and Realignments

NAS Barbers Point, HI
NAS Agana, Guam

Note: “Major” = loss of at least 300 military/civilian jobs
MAJOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

1. Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York
2. Griffiss Air Force Base, New York
3. Naval Education and Training Center Newport, Rhode Island
4. Naval Station Staten Island, New York
5. Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton, New Jersey
7. National Capital Region (NCR) Activities
   - Naval Electronics Security Systems Engineering Center, Washington, DC
   - Bureau Navy Personnel, Arlington
   - Military Manpower Management Arlington
   - Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington
   - Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria
   - Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington
   - Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington
   - Defense Printing Office, Alexandria
   - Security Group Command, Potomac, Washington, DC
   - Security Group Station and Detachment Potomac, Washington, DC
   - Tactical Support Office, Arlington
8. Naval Surface Warfare Center–White Oak Detachment, Maryland
9. Vint Hills Farm, Virginia
10. Fort Belvoir, Virginia
11. Norfolk Area, Virginia
    - Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk
    - Naval Undersea Warfare Center Norfolk
    - Naval Electronics Engineering Center Portsmouth
    - Naval Surface Warfare Center Virginia Beach
12. Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina
    Naval Shipyard Charleston, South Carolina
13. Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida
14. Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
    Naval Hospital Orlando, Florida
15. Homestead Air Force Base, Florida
16. Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, Florida
17. Naval Station Mobile, Alabama
18. Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas
19. Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee
20. Gentile Air Force Station, Ohio
    Defense Electronics Supply Center, Ohio
21. Newark Air Force Base, Ohio
22. Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan
23. O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station Chicago, Illinois
24. Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois
25. K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan
26. Tooele Army Depot, Utah
27. San Francisco Bay Area, California
    - Mare Island Naval Shipyards, Vallejo
    - Naval Air Station Alameda
    - Naval Aviation Depot Alameda
    - Naval Hospital Oakland
    - Public Works Center, San Francisco
    - Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco
28. Presidio of Monterey Annex, California
29. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory Port Hueneme, California
30. Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California
31. March Air Force Base, California
32. Naval Training Center San Diego, California

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam
On November 5, 1990, President George Bush signed Public Law 101-510, which established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission “to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.” Public Law 101-510 (Title XXIX, as amended) required the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission by March 15, 1993 (see Appendix A). The statute also required the Secretary of Defense to base all recommendations on a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department’s FY 1994 budget request and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress.

Upon the Commission’s receipt of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations, PL 101-510 required the Commission to hold public hearings to discuss the recommendations before it made any findings. To change any of the Secretary’s recommendations, the law required the Commission to find substantial deviation from the Secretary’s force-structure plan and the final criteria approved by Congress.

The Commission’s process was a model of open government. Its recommendations resulted from an independent review of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations, absent political or partisan influence. As part of its review and analysis process, the Commission solicited information from a wide variety of sources. Most important, communities were given a seat at the table. The Commission held investigative hearings, conducted over 125 fact-finding visits to activities at each major candidate installation, held 17 regional hearings nationwide to hear from affected communities, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress and responded to the hundreds of thousands of letters from concerned citizens from across the country. The Commission staff members maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with communities, and met throughout the process with community representatives at the Commission offices, during base visits, and during regional hearings.

The Commission also held seven investigative hearings in Washington, DC, to question Military Department representatives directly responsible for the Secretary’s recommendations. Several defense and base closure experts within the federal government, private sector, and academia provided an independent assessment of the base-closure process and the potential impacts of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. All of the Commission’s hearings and deliberations were held in public. Most were broadcast on national television (see Appendices F and G).

Based on the Commission’s review and analysis, alternatives and additions to the Secretary’s list were considered and voted upon. On March 29, 1993, and on May 21, 1993, the Commission voted to add a total of 73 installations for further consideration as alternatives and additions to the 165 bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense (see Appendix E).

Communities that contributed to our country’s national security by hosting a military facility for many years should rest assured their pleas were heard, and did not go unnoticed. The Commission would also like to reassure communities there can be life after a base is closed. However, economic recovery is in large part dependent upon a concerted community effort to look towards the future. The same dedicated effort expended by communities over the last several months to save their bases should be redirected towards building and implementing a reuse plan that will revitalize the community and the economy.

The Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) was established to help communities affected by base closures, as well as other defense program changes. The OEA’s principal objective is to help the communities
Executive Summary

affected by base closures to maintain or restore economic stability. According to an OEA survey, approximately 158,000 new jobs were created between 1961 and 1992 to replace nearly 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures. The OEA has also been working with 47 communities located near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 and 1991 Commissions, and has provided $20 million in grants to help communities develop reuse plans.

The commissioners selected for the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in public service, business, and the military (see Appendix H). In accordance with the base-closure statute, four commissioners were nominated in consultation with the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and two commissioners with the advice of the House and Senate Minority Leaders. The remaining two nominations were made independently by the President, who also designated one of the eight commissioners to serve as the Chairman.

The Commission staff included experts detailed from several government agencies, including the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration as well as the Department of Defense (see Appendix I). Nine professional staff members were detailed by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to serve full-time on the Commission’s Review and Analysis staff. All detailees fully participated in all phases of the review and analysis effort; they verified data, visited candidate bases, participated in local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its public hearings.

Based on the Commission’s review-and-analysis and deliberative processes, the Commission recommends to the President 130 bases be closed and 45 bases be realigned. These actions will result in FY 1994-99 net savings of approximately $3.8 billion after one-time costs of approximately $7.43 billion. The savings from these actions will total approximately $2.33 billion annually. The following list summarizes the closure and realignment recommendations of the 1993 Commission:

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

#### Initial Entry Training/Branch School

- (O) Fort McClellan, AL (major)
- **Commodity Oriented**
  - (R) Fort Monmouth, NJ (major)
  - (C) Vint Hill Farms, VA (major)
- **Depots**
  - (R) Anniston Army Depot, AL (minor)
  - (O) Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (major)
  - (R) Red River Army Depot, TX (major)
  - (R) Tooele Army Depot, UT (major)
- **Command/Control**
  - (R) Fort Belvoir, VA (major)

#### Professional Schools

- (R) Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA (major)

#### Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

- (R) Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems Integration Management Activity - East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA vice Rock Island, IL) (major)
- (R) Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO) (major)
- (R) Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL) (major)
- (R) Pueblo Army Depot, CO (Redirects supply mission from Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT, to new location within the Defense Distribution Depot System.) (minor)

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

#### Shipyards

- (C) Charleston Naval Shipyards, SC (major)
- (C) Mare Island Naval Shipyards, Vallejo, CA (major)
Operational Air Stations

(C) Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA (major)
(C) Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI (major)
(C) Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL (major)
(C) Naval Air Station Agana, GU (major)
(C) Naval Air Facility Midway Island (minor)

Training Air Stations

(R) Naval Air Station Memphis, TN (major)
(O) Naval Air Station Meridian, MS (major)

Reserve Air Stations

(C) Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI (major)
(C) Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV (minor)
(C) Naval Air Station Dallas, TX (major)
(C) Naval Air Station Glenview, IL (major)
(O) Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA (major)
(R) Joint Armed Forces Aviation Facility Johnstown, PA (minor)

Naval Bases

(R) Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI (major)
(C) Naval Station Charleston, SC (major)
(C) Naval Station Mobile, AL (major)
(C) Naval Station Staten Island, NY (major)
(O) Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT (major)
(C) Naval Air Station Alameda, CA (major)
(iC) Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA (major)

Naval Training Center

(C) Naval Training Center Orlando, FL (major)
(C) Naval Training Center San Diego, CA (major)

Inventory Control

(O) Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA (major)

Depots

(C) Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA (major)
(C) Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA (major)
(C) Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL (major)

Naval Weapons Stations

(R) Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA (minor)

Technical Centers (SPAWAR)

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division, Trenton, NJ (major)
(O) Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA (minor)
(C) Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, CA (major)
(R) Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, St. Inigoes, MD (minor)
(C) Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center, Washington, DC (major)
(O) Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, SC (major)
(C) Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD (minor)
(C) Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, VA (minor)
(C) Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth, VA (major)

Technical Centers (NAVSEA)

(R) Naval Surface Warfare Center–Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD (major)
(O) Naval Surface Warfare Center–Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD (major)
(R) Naval Surface Warfare Center–Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA (major)
(R) Naval Undersea Warfare Center–Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, VA (major)
(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (CV), Bremerton, WA (minor)
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(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA (minor)
(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA (minor)
(C) Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA (minor)
(C) Sea Automated Data Systems Activity, Indian Head, MD (minor)
(C) Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, and Procurement, Portsmouth, NH (minor)

Supply Centers

(O) Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC (major)
(O) Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA (major)
(C) Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL (major)

Marine Corps Logistics Base

(R) Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA (minor)

National Capital Region (NCR) Activities

(R) Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA (Including the Office of Military Manpower Management, Arlington, VA) (major)
(R) Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA (major)
(R) Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria, VA (major)
(R) Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA (major)
(R) Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA (major)
(R) Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA (minor)

Other Bases

(O) 1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, NY (minor)
(C) Department of Defense Family Housing Office, Niagara Falls, NY (minor)
(C) Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Engineering Field Division, San Bruno, CA (minor)
(C) Public Works Center San Francisco, CA (major)

Reserve Activities

NAVAL RESERVE CENTERS AT:

(C) Gadsden, AL (minor)
(C) Montgomery, AL (minor)
(C) Fayetteville, AR (minor)
(C) Fort Smith, AR (minor)
(C) Pacific Grove, CA (minor)
(C) Macon, GA (minor)
(C) Terre Haute, IN (minor)
(C) Hutchinson, KS (minor)
(C) Monroe, LA (minor)
(C) New Bedford, MA (minor)

NAVAL RESERVE CENTERS AT:

(C) Pittsfield, MA (minor)
(C) Joplin, MO (minor)
(C) St. Joseph, MO (minor)
(C) Great Falls, MT (minor)
(C) Missoula, MT (minor)
(C) Atlantic City, NJ (minor)
(C) Perth Amboy, NJ (minor)
(C) Jamestown, NY (minor)
(C) Poughkeepsie, NY (minor)
(C) Altoona, PA (minor)
(C) Kingsport, TN (minor)
(C) Memphis, TN (minor)
(C) Ogden, UT (minor)
(C) Staunton, VA (minor)
(C) Parkersburg, WV (minor)
(C) Chicopee, MA (minor)
(C) Quincy, MA (minor)
NAVAL RESERVE FACILITIES AT:
(C) Alexandria, LA (minor)
(C) Midland, TX (minor)

NAVY/MARINE CORPS RESERVE CENTERS AT:
(C) Fort Wayne, IN (minor)
(C) Lawrence, MA (minor)
(O) Billings, MT (minor)
(C) Abilene, TX (minor)

READINESS COMMAND REGIONS AT:
(C) Olathe, KN (Region 18) (minor)
(C) Scotia, NY (Region 2) (minor)
(C) Ravenna, OH (Region 5) (minor)

HOSPITALS
(O) Naval Hospital Charleston, SC (major)
(C) Naval Hospital Oakland, CA (major)
(C) Naval Hospital Orlando, FL (major)

CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BRAC 88/91 RECOMMENDATIONS
(R) Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, CA (Retain no facilities, dispose vice outlease all property) (minor)
(R) Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA (Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of Marine Corps Air Station Tustin’s assets) (major)
(R) Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA, into available Air Force space vice new construction) (major)
(R) Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA) (minor)
(R) Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, NM (Retain as a tenant of the Air Force) (minor)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Large Aircraft
(R) Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (major)
(C) K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI (major)
(R) March Air Force Base, CA (major)
(C) Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY (major)
(O) McGuire Air Force Base, NJ (major)

Small Aircraft
(R) Homestead Air Force Base, FL (major)

Air Force Reserve
(C) O’Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station, Chicago, IL (major)

Other Air Force
(C) Gentile Air Force Station, OH (minor)

Air Force Depot
(C) Newark Air Force Base, OH (major)
(R) Ogden Air Force Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT (minor)

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations
(O) Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX (Requested redirect rejected) (minor)
(R) Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB, maintenance training function redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) (minor)
(R) Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB) (major)
(R) Chanute Air Force Base, IL (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis) (minor)
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(R) MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (Airfield to be operated by the Department of Commerce or another federal agency. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB.) (minor)

(R) Mather Air Force Base, CA (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB) (minor)

(R) Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker AGB instead of Wright-Patterson AFB. Rickenbacker AGB does not close.) (major)

Service/Support Activities

(O) Defense Logistics Support Center, Battle Creek, MI (major)

(O) Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, Battle Creek, MI (major)

(C) Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, Philadelphia, PA (major)

Data Center Consolidation

Navy Data Processing Centers

(C) Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA (minor)

(C) Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC (minor)

(C) Enlisted Personnel Management Center, New Orleans, LA (minor)

(C) Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA (minor)

(C) Fleet Industrial Support Center, San Diego, CA (minor)

(C) Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME (minor)

(C) Naval Air Station Key West, FL (minor)

(C) Naval Air Station Mayport, FL (minor)

(C) Naval Air Station Oceana, VA (minor)

(C) Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA (minor)

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD (minor)

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA (minor)

(C) Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA (minor)

(C) Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA (minor)

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA (minor)

(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI (minor)

(O) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, San Diego, CA (minor)

Defense Logistics Agency

Inventory Control Points

(C) Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH (major)

(O) Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA (major)

(C) Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, PA (major)

Regional Headquarters

(R) Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA (minor)

(R) Defense Contract Management District Northcentral, Chicago, IL (minor)

(R) Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, CA (minor)

Defense Distribution Depots

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA (minor)

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL (minor)

(O) Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA (minor)

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC (minor)

(C) Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT (minor)
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(N) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Washington, DC (minor)
(C) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, New Orleans, LA (minor)
(N) Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Pensacola, FL (minor)
(C) Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco, CA (minor)
(C) Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC (minor)
(C) Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA (minor)
(C) Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI (minor)

**Navy Data Processing Centers**

(C) Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA (minor)
(C) Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX (minor)
(C) Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA (minor)
(C) Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA (minor)
(C) Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA (minor)

**Marine Corps Data Processing Centers**

(C) Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC (minor)
(C) Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA (minor)
(C) Regional Automated Services Center, Camp Lejeune, NC (minor)
(C) Regional Automated Services Center, Camp Pendleton, CA (minor)

**Air Force Data Processing Centers**

(C) Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, TX (minor)
(C) Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX (minor)
(C) 7th Communications Group, Pentagon, Arlington, VA (minor)
(O) Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, CA (minor)

**Defense Logistics Agency Data Processing Centers**

(C) Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI (minor)
(C) Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT (minor)
(C) Information Processing Center, Philadelphia, PA (minor)
(C) Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA (minor)

**Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Data Processing Centers**

(C) Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH (minor)
(C) Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Indianapolis Information Processing Center, IN (minor)
(C) Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Kansas City Information Processing Center, MO (minor)
(C) Defense Information Technology Services Organization, Cleveland, OH (minor)

**Legend**

(C) Installation recommended for closure
(R) Installation recommended for realignment
(O) Installation recommended to remain open
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CHAPTER 1
COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has completed its review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments, as transmitted to the Commission on March 12, 1993. This chapter contains a summary of the Commission’s findings and its recommendations for closures and realignments.

Information on each of the Commission’s base closure and realignment decisions is presented below. The paragraphs entitled “Secretary of Defense Recommendations” and “Secretary of Defense Justifications” were taken verbatim from the Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report dated March 1993. The paragraphs entitled “Community Concerns” provide a brief summary of arguments presented to the Commission by local communities; they are not all-inclusive. Where applicable, substantial deviations from the application of the force-structure plan and final criteria are identified.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Fort George B. McClellan, Alabama

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch School
Mission: Chemical and Military Police Centers and Schools
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: NIA
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fort McClellan has the least amount of facilities and smallest population of any of the Army’s individual entry training/branch school installations and was accordingly ranked ninth in a category of 13 installations. Three of the 13 installations tied for the thirteenth position and were later removed from further consideration as a result of a specific capability needed to support mission requirements. The tenth installation in this category was not considered for closure because it controls airspace, airfields, and aviation facilities which represent unique assets to the Army.

Collocation of the chemical, military police, and engineer schools provides substantial advantages for operational linkages among the three branches. These linkages enable the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development of three key maneuver support elements. Synergistic advantages of training and professional development programs are: coordination, employment and removal of obstacles, conduct of river crossing operations, internal security/nation assistance operations, operations in rear areas or along main supply routes, and counter drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

Each school develops doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and material products which are technical in nature and proponent specific. The only place to achieve integration is at the combined arms level. Using the opportunity to collocate these schools will assure synergistic solutions for current, emerging, and future challenges.

This recommendation is a change to the recommendation made to the 1991 Commission that was disapproved. The 1991 Commission rejected this recommendation because it found the Army substantially deviated from criteria 1 and 2. Their rationale questioned the Army’s decision to maintain the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status because it could contribute little, if any, to chemical
Chapter I

Defense preparedness and the CDTF could not be reactivated quickly.

The Army's proposal to close Fort McClellan differs in two respects. First, the DODPI will relocate to Fort Leonard Wood, MO, instead of Fort Huachuca, AZ, and second, the Army will retain the capability to continue live-agent training. Subsequent to the 1991 Commission's decision, the Army conducted an in-depth study of the value of live-agent training. The study affirmed its military value. The Army's nuclear, biological, and chemical readiness training is interwoven throughout all training and included at all levels of command. Operations in a potentially hostile chemical environment are an integral part of individual and collective skills training, and routinely practiced during unit field training exercises. By maintaining the capability for chemical live-agent training at Fort McClellan, the Army will continue to provide realistic chemical preparedness training. A robust chemical/biological defense is a vital part of a three-pronged effort, including arms control and conventional/nuclear deterrence. The Army is the only service that conducts live-agent training, and it will continue this training. The Air Force has indicated its desire to collocate its disaster preparedness technical training with the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood; the Army supports this initiative.

The Army provides live-agent training not only for Army personnel (approximately 4000 students per year), but also for other Services, the State Department, and even foreign countries (approximately 600 students per year). This training usually involves two days at the CDTF while other training is conducted at other facilities of the Chemical School. The CDTF will remain part of the Chemical School, even though it is being operated at another location. Although it is feasible to replicate this facility at Fort Leonard Wood, maintaining the existing facility affords the same capability without any additional construction.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued separating the live-agent training facility from the Chemical School would seriously degrade the ability to test chemical decontamination doctrine and equipment. Community representatives also questioned the Army's ability to construct a new facility at Fort Leonard Wood, and noted even if it could be done, it would require up to nine years to accomplish. The community also asserted new construction costs would be up to five times greater than Army estimates.

The community cited the lower military value of other Initial Entry Training/Branch School installations and claimed the return on investment for Fort McClellan's closure was actually much lower than the Army analysis showed. In addition, the community cited numerous reasons for training degradation at Fort Leonard Wood, including the inadequacy of smoke ranges, the inability to develop joint-service training efforts begun at Fort McClellan, and the long period of turmoil resulting from the move. Community representatives also questioned the DODPI's ability to conduct research missions at Fort Leonard Wood.

Finally, the community argued this closure would produce the highest long-term economic impact of this round of the base closure process, because residual property at Fort McClellan would not provide offsetting commercial value for the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found separating the Chemical School from the CDTF would negatively impact the nation's chemical-defense capability. There was no guarantee the live-agent training facility, the CDTF, could be moved, and the Commission found it imprudent to jeopardize the facility's existence until such assurance could be obtained.

The Commission validated the military value of the installations in this category and found the DoD process considered all installations fairly and equitably. Fort Leonard Wood had sufficient space to conduct smoke training and the other training functions found at Fort McClellan, as well as additional space to conduct joint-training activities. The Army's recent experience in relocating two other branch schools was significant and could enable the Chemical and Military Police Schools to move with minimal disruption.

The Commission found economic impact was indeed high in the Anniston, AL area.
Chapter I

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, MO; retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan. The Commission does recommend that if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical Defense School and Chemical Decontamination Training Facility in the future, the Army should pursue all of the required permits and certification for the new site prior to the 1995 Base Closure process. The Commission finds that this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and the final criteria.

Commodity Oriented

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

Category: Commodity Oriented
Mission: Provides Facilities and Services to All Resident Activities
One-time Cost: $63.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-27.0 million (Cost)
Annual: $13.3 million
Payback: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, SC. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods subposts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fort Monmouth ranks fourth out of twelve installations in military value. It is a small installation with elements located off base in costly leased space. Relocating the CECOM Headquarters, an administrative and logistical headquarters, from leased facilities located outside the main post of Fort Monmouth, NJ, to permanent facilities at Rock Island, IL, allows the Army to terminate a lease of $15 million per year with additional savings of over $8 million per year in locality pay differential for the civilian workforce. At the same time, it better utilizes the excess space identified at Rock Island. Separating the headquarters and administrative function from the research and development aspect of CECOM will not have an operational impact.

Rock Island Arsenal has the infrastructure to support and house the headquarters element of CECOM. Currently, Rock Island has administrative space to accommodate approximately 1,000 additional personnel and permanent building space that can be renovated to accommodate even more personnel. The computer-systems center on the arsenal is one of the Army’s largest and can accommodate the needs of the headquarters.

The Rock Island community infrastructure can accommodate the new residents without the need to construct new schools, new water and sewer facilities, or other public facilities. There is abundant housing at reasonable costs and excellent access to higher education, both at the graduate and undergraduate level.

Fort Jackson trains about one half of the basic trainees and is the largest recruit training center. It is also the home of the Soldier Support Center, which is relocating from Fort Benjamin Harrison. The report to the 1991 Commission describing the proposed closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison stated the Army planned to collocate the Chaplain School with this Center eventually. The transfer of the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson benefits not only the Chaplain School’s students, but also the large population of basic trainees who are beginning a new career in the Army, many of whom are separated from their families for the first time. The Chaplain School and its staff of chaplains will facilitate the trainees’ transition to the Army life.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Secretary’s proposed realignment of CECOM headquarters to Rock Island Arsenal split the headquarters from the
elements it supports (Project Executive Officers and the Research and Development Center) and reduced overall operational efficiency and effectiveness. The CECOM would best be served by the consolidation of CECOM elements and by taking advantage of recently vacated and renovated facilities by moving onto Fort Monmouth. In addition, the community argued it would take a considerable capital investment to adjust the proposed Rock Island Arsenal warehouse facility to accommodate CECOM requirements. Movement onto Fort Monmouth would avoid the expensive movement and renovation costs associated with the move to Rock Island Arsenal.

Additionally, the community maintained the New Jersey/New York area was the east coast high-tech center and similar institutions and activities would not be available in the Rock Island area.

Lastly, the community argued locality pay should not be a cost consideration. They maintained Congress created locality pay to offset the wage differential between the private and public sectors in certain high cost areas. Therefore, they argued, using this factor in any consideration could penalize an installation when, in fact, it was a Congressional driven entitlement.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found there was excess administrative space at both Rock Island Arsenal and Fort Monmouth. The excess space at Fort Monmouth resulted from the movement of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, which is not a base realignment action, and the Chaplain School. The Commission found both the Department of Defense proposal and the community counter-proposal were rational approaches to the utilization of the excess administrative space.

The Commission agreed there was a potentially negative impact if the technically trained work force at CECOM did not move to Rock Island Arsenal.

The Commission noted the Department misstated the cost differential between two alternative choices. The Commission found the lower one-time cost of consolidating activities at Fort Monmouth outweighed the long-term savings associated with the relocation of CECOM to Rock Island Arsenal. The Commission further found the Army’s consideration of savings in locality pay was an added bonus of the realignment of CECOM to Rock Island Arsenal, but was not a primary consideration for the recommendation. The Commission found locality pay could penalize an installation when compared to one not entitled to it.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary’s recommendation on Fort Monmouth and instead adopts the following recommendation: move CECOM Headquarters out of the leased space and into space at Fort Monmouth vacated by the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Chaplain School, or other suitable space as appropriate; relocate the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, SC; consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth; and dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods subposts, as well as main post Fort Monmouth. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Vint Hill Farms, Virginia**

Category: Commodity Oriented

Mission: Research, Development, and Sustainment of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Equipment

One-time Cost: $ 72.4 million

Savings: 1994-99: $ -19.0 million (Cost)

Annual: $ 19.1 million

Payback: 8 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Vint Hill Farms ranked low in military value within its category. With the departure of the military intelligence battalion and its consolidation at Fort Gordon, GA, Vint Hill Farms is underutilized. It was determined that Vint Hill Farms could be closed and its functions performed elsewhere. Closure of this installation supports the Army’s basing strategy to consolidate similar functions and close small installations when feasible to do so. Moving its activities to Fort Monmouth enhances the synergistic effect of research and development for communication electronics and intelligence electronics warfare. Collocation at Fort Monmouth also facilitates the interaction between the Program Managers and Program Executive Officers that currently reside at Fort Monmouth, thereby creating greater military value in this category.

Consolidating research and development will achieve greater efficiencies in the areas of mission, mission overhead, and base operations. This allows the Army to reduce costs, giving the flexibility to put scarce resources into the research and development arena that significantly contributes to overall readiness.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community asserted DoD erred in assigning a relatively low military value to the installation, contending the true value of the installation should be based on the missions of the tenant activities. Additionally, community representatives argued DoD’s claim the post would be underutilized following the move of a resident military intelligence battalion was inaccurate.

The community further argued the realignment of the tenant activities could cause serious harm to national security. First, sensitive and, in some cases, highly-classified work is performed at Vint Hill Farms for the intelligence community, mostly headquartered in the National Capital Region. Relocating to New Jersey would disrupt this close working relationship. Second, the quality of the work performed is dependent on a superior work force. The community estimated approximately 80 percent of the work force would not move, thereby degrading the Army’s and the nation’s intelligence capability while replacements were hired and trained.

Finally, the community requested the Commission receive classified briefings on the activities and missions conducted at Vint Hill Farms. It was stated only by receiving these briefings could the true value of the installation, and the potential harm to national security, be assessed.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found all installations in the category were treated fairly. It also found the Secretary had overstated the impact the military intelligence battalion’s relocation would have on the post’s capacity. The battalion occupied only 7 percent of the facilities on the installation, and its move would not cause the installation to be grossly underutilized.

The Commission explored the potential impact of the proposed realignments on the agencies with whom the Vint Hill Farms activities work. The agencies all stated the relocation of the tenants would have minimal, or no, impact. The Commission agreed there was a potential impact if the work force did not move; however, a pool of technologically trained and available personnel does exist in the Fort Monmouth area. Prudent phasing of the move from Vint Hill Farms to Fort Monmouth could overcome any personnel shortfalls.

The Commission also received classified briefings on the activities and missions conducted at Vint Hill Farms. During these briefings nothing was discovered that would preclude the implementation of the DoD recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate (formerly the Signal Warfare Directorate), and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.


Amy Depots

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Category: Depots
Mission: Depot Maintenance
One-time Cost: $23.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $42.8 million
Annual: $13.1 million
Payback: 7 years

*These numbers reflect SIMA-E redirect savings

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realignment Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot-maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows: instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to realign LEAD was driven by the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize LEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots, the future heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S. and the resulting savings.

SIMA-E, which performs computer systems design and data management functions for a variety of activities, is transferring to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 1993. Retention keeps this activity focused regionally upon the customer. SIMA-West is located in St. Louis and supports functions in the western portion of the U.S. DISA advised the Army there were no advantages or savings from a relocation to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Less than 25% of the work performed by SIMA-E is associated with the Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the consolidation of the Joint Missile Maintenance mission at Letterkenny Army Depot, as originally recommended by Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918, remains the most sensible and economical option available for the interservicing of missile workload. The community maintained realigning the missile-maintenance workload to other depots would not take advantage of the efficiencies gained by interservicing at a single site. Also, the community argued existing artillery workload should not be transferred to another Army depot as originally planned. The community cited various factors including a partnership arrangement with private industry for assembling the Paladin weapon system. Additionally, the community believed Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) should not relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, but should remain in place at LEAD and form the Industrial Operations Command (IOC) from existing DESCOM assets thereby saving the cost of
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary’s recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, PA, and instead, adopts the following recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open. Consolidate tactical-missile main-tenance at the depot as originally planned by the Department of Defense in the Tactical Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot, 31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992). Add tactical-missile maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, to the consolidation plan. Retain artillery workload at Letterkenny. Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Army Depot (change to the 1991 Commission recommendation) until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Tooele Army Depot, Utah
Category: Depots
Mission: Depot Maintenance
One-time Cost: $ 73.7 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 107.2 million
Annual: $ 51.0 million
Payback: Immediate
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical-demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot-maintenance activities, including the private sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred, or eliminated, as appropriate.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to realign TEAD was driven by the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize TEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots, the future heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S. and the resulting savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

In October 1992, a nearly $150 million "state-of-the-market" Consolidated Maintenance Facility (CMF), designed to accomplish the projected wheeled vehicle workload for all services, opened at Tooele Army Depot. The community claimed without the interservicing workload of wheeled vehicles and related secondary items, the CMF would lose the opportunity to operate as designed, and the government would lose its investment.

Further, the community maintained closing TEAD's maintenance facilities would send a message throughout the Department of Defense that investments in efficiencies go unrewarded and the least efficient facilities survive. Finally, the community stated realigning TEAD would produce severe economic impact on the surrounding community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Army treated all its depots equally. The Commission also found the Army’s process for isolating and eliminating excess capacity was a consistent and prudent approach toward decreasing the excess capacity that existed in the Army’s depot system.

The Commission carefully considered interservicing of tactical wheeled-vehicle maintenance; however, the Commission found transferring the wheeled-vehicle maintenance workload from all Services to TEAD’s CMF was not sufficient to bring the capacity utilization of Tooele Army Depot to a cost-effective level. Future mission requirements would also not be sufficient to improve the utilization rate of the CMF to an acceptable level.

The Commission finds the Department of Defense should make every attempt to dispose of the CMF as an intact, complete, and usable facility such that the community has a better chance of recovering from the severe economic effects that may occur following the realignment of the installation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.
Command/Control

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Category: Command and Control
Mission: Administrative Center for U.S. Army
Activities Located in the National Capital Region.
One-time Cost: $11.3 million
Savings: 1994-99: $49.1 million
Annual: $13.4 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, MI. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

In July 1992, the Secretary of the Army requested the Army Science Board appoint a panel of members and consultants to conduct a review of the Army Material Command Research, Development, and Engineering Center (RDEC) business plans. Specifically, the Secretary requested the panel determine which RDEC capabilities the Army can afford. The panel based its findings on an objective assessment of the missions, functions, business areas, core capabilities, customer needs, and major fields of technical endeavor of each RDEC measured against at least the following criteria to determine which RDEC capabilities are essential and affordable:

- relevance to the Army customer
- availability from other sources
- R&D quality
- in-house cost and efficiency

The study identified technical areas to be emphasized, deemphasized, or eliminated. Areas identified for elimination are tunnel detection, materials, marine craft, topographic equipment, support equipment, and construction equipment. The Army Science Board panel recommended the closure of the Belvoir RDEC and dispersal of the business areas that were not recommended for elimination.

The relocation of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to TARDEC is consistent with the conclusions of the Army Science Board Study. There is a synergy between these functions and the mission of building military vehicles. For example, the Bridging area requires heavy vehicles such as tanks and heavy mobile logistics to move across demountable bridges and light spans. Supply, Fuel/Lubricants and Counter Mobility also complement the mission of TARDEC. The relocation of the Fuel/Lubricant business area as part the DoD Project Reliance has commenced.

The transfer of operational control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls, and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas from the Belvoir RDEC to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), also located in the same general area of Fort Belvoir, supports the study recommendations, while avoiding any additional costs.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community supported the disestablishment of the BRDEC and the elimination of the Tunnel Detection, Materials, and Support Equipment Business Areas. However, the community asserted the Marine Craft, Topographic, and Construction Equipment Business Areas were essential to maintaining the Army’s capabilities and readiness and, therefore, should not be eliminated. Accepting this assertion would result in the retention of 50 personnel authorizations. The community also maintained the relocation of the business areas from Fort Belvoir to Detroit Arsenal was not cost effective. By transferring command and control of these business
areas to TARDEC, but leaving them at Fort Belvoir, the costs of moving the personnel and associated construction costs could be avoided. This cost avoidance would pay for the retention of the personnel to staff the business areas the community recommended retaining.

Additionally, the community believed the proposed realignment cost was $26.2 million, not the $11.3 million estimated by the Army.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary’s plan for the disestablishment of the BRDEC, including the elimination of the Marine Craft, Construction Equipment and Topographic Equipment Business Areas, was reasonable and would eliminate duplication of efforts both within the Army and among the Services. The Army would retain its acquisition capability and would rely on commercial enterprises for the actual development of common items.

The Commission also found the Army’s long-term research, development, and engineering effort would be better served by collocation of similar activities at Detroit Arsenal, MI.

The community’s cost estimate appeared to include all new construction, which would dramatically increase DoD’s estimate. The DoD plan was based on renovation of currently existing and vacant facilities at the Detroit Arsenal.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA. Eliminate the Tunnel Detection, Materials, Marine Craft, Topographic Equipment, Construction Equipment and Support Equipment Business Areas. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, MI. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observable Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, VA.

Professional Schools

Presidio of Monterey/Presidio of Monterey Annex, California

Category: Professional School
Mission: Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
One-time Cost: $3.4 million
Savings: 1994-99: $74.9 million
Annual: $15.7 million
Payback: Immediate

ARMY RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Close the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the Presidio of Monterey Annex (part of Fort Ord). Relocate the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and contract the foreign-language training with a public university which must be able to provide this training at or near Fort Huachuca, AZ. This recommendation is contingent upon the successful negotiation of a contract by October 1994. If agreement cannot be met, DLI will remain at the Presidio of Monterey. The Army would then reevaluate options which might lead to another proposal to the 1995 Commission.

ARMY JUSTIFICATION

The Defense Language Institute currently has a staff and student population of over 4000 personnel. This institute offers training in over 20 languages (e.g., Russian, Somali, Swahili, Ukrainian). However, it has a high operating overhead in both facilities and staff. A new approach to the operation of the Institute should be considered.

Contracting foreign language training with an existing university-level institution will create significant savings in operational overhead, both in instructors (many of whom may already be on staff at a university) and in administration. The high base operations cost at the Presidio of Monterey would be avoided.
Chapter 1

Fort Huachuca is the home of the Army Intelligence school. Military intelligence has the largest requirement for linguists in all Services. The foreign language skill is most often used to interact with allies and better understand foreign military capability and intentions. Locating military personnel on Fort Huachuca provides advantages to both the soldier and the Army. First, it enables the Army to care for the needs of the soldiers during their formative training. It ensures “Soldierization” which is a critical factor in the development of all military personnel. Finally, it will enable the Army to integrate the students into the military intelligence concept during their training.

Army students in the human intelligence field are currently assigned to Fort Huachuca at the end of their foreign language training. Soldiers can attend the Basic Non-commissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) and continue with advanced language training or attend the Advanced Non-commissioned Officers Course and then continue with intermediate language training. This would save travel and per diem costs.

An agreement of this kind is not unique. For example, the University of Virginia at Charlottesville is the location of the Judge Advocate General School and the University of Syracuse sponsors the Army Comptroller graduate education program.

The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program, will ensure that the same high level of training currently taught at DLI will continue. They will continue to serve as the technical authority and provide qualitative assessment of foreign language training activities. In addition they will also conduct research and evaluation on training development methodologies, instructional methodologies and techniques, computer-based training, computer assisted instruction, and establish or approve standards or criteria for language training and provide various tests and evaluation procedures.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission confirmed the importance of the DLI to the national intelligence effort. The DLI has the premiere language training curriculum in the country, and the Commission believed a disruption caused by its movement would not be in the best interests of national security. However, the Commission found the actual return on investment for the recommendation depended on extraordinary base-operations costs, caused in large part by an oversized support facility at the Presidio of Monterey Annex (Fort Ord). It was apparent more efficient methods of base-operations support were not explored, specifically a consolidation with the Naval Postgraduate School also located in Monterey. In addition, other alternatives have not been explored, such as a commercial-activities contract with the local communities for base-operations support.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain the Presidio of Monterey but dispose of all facilities
at the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary, child care facility, and post exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey and Naval Post Graduate School. Consolidate base-operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice support agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base-operations support will provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations**

**Presidio of San Francisco, California**

Category: Command and Control  
Mission: Coordinates and Provides Base Operations Support for Sixth U.S. Army  
One-time Cost: None  
Savings: 1994-99: $ -35.9 million (Cost)  
Annual: $ -6.0 million (Cost)  
Payback: Never

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Change the recommendation of the 1988 DoD Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of to Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary’s BRAC Commission in 1988.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommended closing the Presidio of San Francisco. As a result of this closure, the Army identified Fort Carson, CO, as the receiver of the 6th Army Headquarters. Since then, the 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended several closures and realignments in California that did not have the capacity to receive functions or personnel in the 1988 process. During its capacity analysis, the Army identified available space at NASA Ames (formerly Naval Air Station Moffett) which could accept the 6th Army Headquarters. As part of its analysis, the Army determined the military value of retaining the headquarters in California is enhanced as it provides the best available location necessary to exercise the command and control mission over all the reserve units within its area of responsibility. These reasons are as follow:

(a) Seventy-five percent of the reserve units within Sixth Army’s area of responsibility are located on the West Coast;

(b) The principal ports of debarkation for the West Coast are Seattle, Oakland, and Long Beach;

(c) The West Coast is prime territory for military assistance to civil authorities. It is the area with the highest probability of natural disaster and is an area where substantial drug-enforcement missions are taking place;

(d) Timeliness/location is the critical element that may separate success from failure.

Additionally, recent experiences with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, natural disasters, and civil disturbances have pointed out the need to keep the headquarters on the West Coast.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community contended moving to NASA Ames did not achieve any cost savings. Community representatives argued the annual operating costs to locate 6th Army Headquarters at NASA Ames or the Presidio were similar. The community also stated the Sixth Army would have to move twice — first into temporary, then into permanent facilities — due to renovation requirements at NASA Ames. The requirement of two moves provides additional hidden costs. In addition, the community asserts NASA Ames did not have available family housing on base, while family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco is plentiful, well built, and economical to maintain.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the command and control Sixth U.S. Army exercises over its Reserve Component forces is regional, not site specific, encompasses twelve states, and has not changed from the 1988 stated mission. The Commission found 58 percent of the Reserve units
and 59 percent of the Reserve personnel Sixth U.S. Army supervises were located in the three West Coast states. California contains 38 percent of the Reserve units and 38 percent of the Reserve personnel. Because of the dispersion of the Reserve Component units within Sixth U.S. Army’s region, the Commission found communication and travel capability were the foremost requirements in determining its location.

The 1988 Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Realignment and Closure recommended the Sixth U.S. Army move to Fort Carson, CO, to place the headquarters on a multimission installation out of a high-cost area. The proposed change to the 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommendation would keep the Sixth U.S. Army in a high cost area; however, the Army felt operational necessity outweighed the increased steady-state cost. The Army felt staying in California would enhance the Sixth Army’s ability to exercise command and control of all Reserve units within its area of responsibility.

The Commission found there was very little difference in the operating costs of staying at the Presidio of San Francisco or moving to NASA Ames, and cost and turbulence could be avoided by not moving.

The Commission found the Secretary of the Interior supports the Sixth U.S. Army remaining at the Presidio of San Francisco as a tenant of the National Park Service. The Commission found the Secretary of the Interior has stated the National Park Service is prepared to begin negotiations on the terms of a lease arrangement and common support costs. The Secretary of the Interior also stated the Park Service is prepared to reach an equitable leasing arrangement that would be competitive with other lessors in the area.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary’s recommendation on the Presidio of San Francisco and instead adopts the following recommendation: the 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommendation will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA. The Department of Interior and the Department of the Army should negotiate a lease favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois**

Category: Commodity Oriented  
Mission: Production  
*One-time* Cost: $-44.1 million (Savings)  
Savings: 1994-99: $ 75.4 million  
Annual: $ 1.0 million  
Payback: Immediate

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows: instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Under the Commission’s recommendation in 1991, the materiel management functions for AMCCOM’s armament and chemical functions were to be transferred to Redstone Arsenal for merger with U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM). The merger would have created a new commodity command to be called the Missile, Armament, and Chemical Command (MACCOM). This merger allowed one national inventory control point (NICP) to be eliminated.
In December 1992, the Commander of Army Materiel Command (AMC) directed the command’s Core Competency Advocates (Logistics Power Projection, Acquisition Excellence, Technology Generation) review the creation of MACCOM to see if there was a more cost-effective option to realign Redstone Arsenal. These competency advocates recommended the AMCCOM’s materiel management functions should remain in place as a subset of the NICP at TACOM. A closer alignment exists between the armaments and chassis functions than between armaments and missiles, making the reorganization under TACOM more beneficial and cost effective for the Army:

- AMCCOM performs approximately $50 million and 500 work years for Tank Automotive Command’s research and development effort compared to only $9 million and 90 work years for Missile Command.
- AMCCOM receives $29 million from TACOM versus $0.1 million from MICOM for sustainment.
- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly produce all tanks, howitzers, and infantry vehicles. AMCCOM and MICOM do not jointly produce any weapon systems.
- AMCCOM and TACOM use common contractors and universities.
- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly field, manage, and sustain common weapon systems.
- AMCCOM and TACOM share common business practices.
- Guns have their fire control sensors and computers in the vehicle and require extensive joint integration, as AMCCOM and TACOM do now. Missiles have their sensors and fire control in the missile and are easier to mount on a vehicle, as MICOM and TACOM do now.

The Army believes the armament/chemical materiel management functions can be fully executed from Rock Island Arsenal without relocating. There is precedence for geographic dispersion of NICP functions. The U.S. Communications-Electronic Command NICP is currently performed at three separate sites. Retention of this activity at Rock Island Arsenal, as a subordinate element of the TACOM NICP, avoids the expense of building new facilities at, and relocating over 1,000 employees to, Redstone Arsenal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Huntsville, AL, community believed the reasons for moving the armament and chemical materiel management functions from the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) at Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and consolidating them with the NICP at Redstone Arsenal, AL, were just as compelling today as they were when recommended by the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Huntsville community claimed the projected savings from the 1991 Commission recommendation were still valid; therefore, leaving the materiel management functions at Rock Island Arsenal would not take advantage of those savings.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found all commodity-oriented installations were treated equally. The Commission determined the compelling argument for the redirect of the 1991 Commission recommendation was due to operational considerations and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) analysis that found that the materiel management functions were more closely aligned with the Tank Automotive Command (TACOM). The Commission found the consolidation of inventory control points would yield cost efficiencies for both the 1991 Commission recommendation and the 1993 Secretary of Defense recommendation and were, therefore, not a factor. However, the Commission found implementing this recommendation would avoid approximately $70 million in military construction and personnel moving costs while incurring no additional costs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: instead of sending the materiel management functions
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of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Shipyards

Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina

Category: Naval Shipyard
Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships
One-time Cost: $ 125.5 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 348.4 million
Annual: $ 90.9 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Shipyard (NSY) Charleston

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

NSY Charleston’s capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. The closure of NSY Charleston, when combined with the recommended closure of NSY Mare Island, California, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity, and its workload can readily be absorbed by the remaining yards. The elimination of another shipyard performing nuclear work would reduce this capability below the minimum capacity required to support this critical area. The closure of NSY Charleston, in combination with Mare Island NSY, allows the elimination of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community’s concerns centered on Charleston Naval Shipyard’s military value ranking by the Navy. It pointed out that Charleston ranked higher in military value than did NSY Portsmouth and NSY Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the community argued that the Navy underestimated NSY Charleston’s military value because it failed to consider Charleston’s ability to dry-dock four SSN-688 class submarines and its ability to perform off-site, short-duration work on nuclear ships. The community also criticized the Navy’s capacity analysis. It believed the Navy’s analysis did not accurately reflect Charleston’s nuclear capacity.

Furthermore, the Charleston community maintained the Navy did not consistently seek to maximize military value and minimize excess capacity. For example, the community argued that closing Mare Island and Norfolk Naval Shipyards would leave military value unchanged, but would leave less excess capacity than would be left by the closures of Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards. In another scenario, the community stated that closing Mare Island and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards would yield a higher military value than that produced by the closures of Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission, in view of the considerable excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing excess capacity was a primary consideration. In light of the subjective nature of the military value determination, the Commission chose to view the military value presented by the Navy as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. As such, the Commission sought to eliminate as much excess capacity as possible.

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the capacity study submitted by the Navy for base closure was an acceptable indicator of shipyard capacity.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation on Charleston and recommends the following: close Naval Shipyard Charleston, but maintain the option for the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission later to recommend retention of Charleston Naval Shipyard facilities deemed necessary to establish or support Naval commands that are retained, realigned to, or relocated to Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, California

Category: Naval Shipyard
Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships
One-time Cost: $397.8 million
Savings: 1994-99: $544.3 million
Annual: $206.7 million
Payback: 4 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station Concord.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The capacity of the Mare Island NSY is excess to that required to support the reduced number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. Mare Island has the lowest military value of those shipyards supporting the Pacific Fleet, and its workload can be readily absorbed by the remaining yards which possess higher military value. The closure of Mare Island NSY, in combination with the Charleston NSY, allows the elimination of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy’s military value calculation did not consider Mare Island’s unique capabilities. For example, the community stated Mare Island had the Navy’s only submarine construction capability and the only attack submarine refueling capability on the West Coast. The community felt the Navy’s data call on capacity was confusing; it believed the data call may have overstated Mare Island’s capacity relative to those of other shipyards. The community also said the Navy credited the Long Beach Naval Shipyard with a nuclear ship repair capability that it does not have. Consequently, the community argued Mare Island should have been ranked third, not seventh, in the Navy’s shipyard category.

The community also argued the cost and impact of moving Mare Island’s ocean engineering capability was not adequately addressed by the Navy. It stated that Mare Island has unique nuclear cleanup costs that will only be required if the base is closed.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission, in view of the considerable excess of shipyard capacity, found that reducing excess capacity was a primary consideration. In light of the subjective nature of the military value determination, the Commission chose to view the military value presented by the Navy as a gross, rather than a precise, discriminator. As such, the Commission sought to eliminate as much excess capacity as possible.

The measurement of shipyard capacity is not an exact science, nor is it an easy task. The Commission reviewed a number of past shipyard capacity studies and determined that the capacity study submitted by the Navy for base closure was an acceptable indicator of shipyard capacity.
When relocating a function from a closing shipyard, the Navy should determine the availability of the required capability from another DoD entity or the private sector prior to the expenditure of resources to recreate the capability at another shipyard.

The Department of Defense and the United States government bear the obligation for all environmental restoration costs, regardless of whether a military installation is closed and therefore, should not be considered as part of the costs to close a base.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station Concord.

**Operational Air Stations**

**Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California**

Category: Operational Air Station  
Mission: Support Aviation Operations  
One-time Cost: $897.6 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $349.9 million  
Annual: $148.5 million  
Payback: 4 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval and Marine air wings are projected to be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. MCAS El Toro is recommended for closure since, of the jet bases supporting the Pacific Fleet, it has the lowest military value, has no expansion possibilities, is the subject of serious encroachment and land use problems, and has many of its training evolutions conducted over private property. The redistribution of aviation assets allows the relocation of Marine Corps fixed wing and helicopter assets to the NAS Miramar, in a manner which both eliminates excess capacity and avoids the construction of a new aviation facility at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California. In an associated action the squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar will move to NAS Lemoore in order to make room for the relocation of the MCAS El Toro squadrons. This closure results in a new configuration of Naval and Marine Corps air stations having an increased average military value when compared to the current mix of air stations in the Pacific Fleet. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at MCAS El Toro and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community expressed concern the closure of MCAS El Toro would have a significantly adverse economic impact on an area already affected by other defense cutbacks. It also argued that the Navy’s military value ranking of MCAS El Toro was too low and that the ranking did not reflect the quality performance of the units from El Toro. The community suggested alternatives to the closure of El Toro; it stated that NAS Miramar would be a more appropriate candidate for closure because NAS Miramar had older facilities and less housing than did MCAS El Toro. The community argued that the Navy greatly overstated Miramar’s expansion capability citing that Miramar had environmental constraints on any further development.

The Twentynine Palms community also suggested that the Commission reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin and its 1993 recommendation to redirect rotary wing aircraft from Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms to NAS Miramar. The community maintained that those recommendations would cause overwhelming operational problems because they would place both rotary and fixed wing aircraft at NAS Miramar.
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The Tustin community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission’s closure decision to remain intact. The Tustin community had already invested substantially in a base reuse program. It did not want to abandon its two-year investment of effort and money in the reuse plan. The Tustin community also believed better alternatives existed to relocate Marine Corps helicopters without retaining MCAS Tustin. Specifically, it proposed: keeping MCAS El Toro open and adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed wing mission there; closing NAS Miramar and relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. It asserted this proposal would enhance operational readiness and still allow the community to pursue its reuse plan. The Tustin community also contended the Commission’s decision to reconsider its 1991 recommendation would encourage other communities to ignore the finality of the Commission’s actions and would encourage communities to resist closures long after the final vote of the Commission.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found air and ground encroachment at MCAS El Toro precluded future mission growth or force structure changes, and current mission requirements cause operations to be conducted over private property. It also found that force-structure reductions have created excess capacity at the Navy and Marine Corps west coast air stations. Relocation of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to NAS Miramar places these assets at a base that is relatively free of future encroachment, eliminates excess capacity, and integrated operations can be safely accomplished through careful base and flight operations planning. The Commission found relocation to NAS Miramar to be operationally advantageous due to close proximity to the Marine division at Camp Pendleton, where a significant percentage of critical training is conducted.

The Commission also found a sufficient number of acres were available at NAS Miramar to accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and support equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite of environmental constraints on development. While areas expected to be affected by necessary expansion included critical habitats, none were located in quantities sufficient to preclude anticipated necessary expansion. It further found that acreage expected to be developed for the placement of KC-130s was constrained such that either adjustment to development plans or relocation to MCAS Yuma, Arizona, was required.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and resulted in increased savings and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to other naval air stations, primarily, Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California, and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. In associated action, the squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar will move to other naval air stations, primarily NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon in order to make room for the relocation of the MCAS El Toro squadrons. Relocate Marine Corps Reserve Center to NAS Miramar. Additionally, change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission, which was to close MCAS Tustin and relocate its helicopter assets to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, as follows: relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton, California. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii

Category: Operational Air Station
Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations
One-time Cost: $897.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $349.9 million
Annual: $148.5 million
Payback: 4 years
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The NAS Barbers Point is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the reduced force levels contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The analysis of required capacity supports only one naval air station in Hawaii. NAS Barbers Point has a lower military value than MCAS Kaneohe Bay and its assets can be readily redistributed to other existing air stations. By maintaining operations at the MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, we retained the additional capacity that air station provides in supporting ground forces. With the uncertainties posed in overseas basing MCAS Kaneohe Bay provides the flexibility to support future military operations for both Navy and Marine Corps and is of greater military value. In an associated move the F-18 and CH-46 squadrons at MCAS Kaneohe Bay will move to NAS Miramar to facilitate the relocation of the NAS Barbers Point squadrons. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at NAS Barbers Point and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The State of Hawaii supports the closure of NAS Barbers Point because it is interested in reusing the land currently occupied by the Navy.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found retention of the Naval Air Reserve Center, in view of force structure reductions, was not consistent with operational requirements. It also found these reductions indicate the need for only one major Naval Air Station in Hawaii, and that MCAS Kaneohe Bay, with significantly higher military value and no ground-encroachment problems, was clearly the base warranting retention. The Commission found that relocation of many of the Marine Corps air assets at Kaneohe Bay which were planned for relocation to other air stations, was required to make room for the aviation assets from NAS Barbers Point.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel and equipment support to other naval air stations, including Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Disestablish the Naval Air Reserve Center. Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida

Category: Operational Air Station
Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations
One-time Cost: $312.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-189.1 million (Cost)
Annual: $48.9 million
Payback: 13 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by the requirement to “bed down” different mixes of aircraft at various air stations. In making these choices, the outlook for environmental and land use issues was significantly important. In making the determination for reductions at air stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity which could be eliminated with assets most readily redistributed to receiving air stations. The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-18s which were relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort and Cherry Point. These air stations both had a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems and dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air station with a lower military value, because NAS Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to support military operations of these aircraft. Its excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy’s recommendation was flawed because it understated the military value of NAS Cecil Field and overstated the savings associated with closing NAS Cecil Field. The community argued closing NAS Cecil Field and relocating its aircraft to MCAS Beaufort, MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana would be more expensive than leaving NAS Cecil Field open. The community focused on Cecil Fields greater expansion capability. It stated Cecil Field, unlike Cherry Point, Beaufort, and Oceana, did not have encroachment problems; furthermore, the community of Jacksonville adopted a Land-Use Comprehensive Plan which strictly limited the amount of development around Cecil Field. The community also argued MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point had significant wetlands contained within their installations which limited the expansion of runways. It emphasized construction on wetlands would require the Navy to create new wetlands to offset the loss of sensitive environmental land and the ratio of wetlands use was lower at NAS Cecil Field than at either Beaufort or Cherry Point.

The community also claimed operating costs would be lower at NAS Cecil Field than at the other air stations because Cecil Field was the closest to its training areas. The community stated the Navy should have considered these factors when assigning its military value ranking to Cecil Field and had the Navy done so, it would have seen that Cecil Field ranked far above Oceana, Beaufort and Cherry Point.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found significant excess capacity existed at NAS’ Cecil Field. The Commission also found current and potential future air encroachment at NAS Cecil Field were overstated by the Navy. The Commission also found other east coast air stations had higher priority missions, and NAS Cecil Field was not close enough to the Marine Corps Division at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC to support Marine Corps air assets.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam

Category: Operational Air Station
Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations
One-time Cost: $123.5 million
Savings: 1994-99: $51.4 million
Annual: $21.3 million
Payback: 11 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community urged the Commission to recommend the closure of NAS Agana. The community stated that it wanted to reuse the facilities at NAS Agana to expand its civilian airport. The community asserted NAS Agana is very low in military value; it argued the few activities performed at NAS Agana could be moved into existing facilities at Andersen Air Force Base, and the cost of relocation would be far less than the $229 million estimated by GAO. The community contended the payback period for the closure of NAS Agana would be between three and ten years.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found excess land and operations, maintenance, and administrative capacity existed at Andersen AFB to allow consolidation of the mission, personnel, aircraft, and support equipment of NAS Agana at Andersen AFB. The Commission found the consolidation was economically feasible and due to the elimination of duplicate base operating and administrative costs, the closure would be paid back in 11 years. Housing at NAS Agana supports Navy commands throughout Guam. The Commission also found if this housing were retained at NAS Agana, it would not be necessary to build replacement bachelor or family housing in the area of or on Andersen AFB because the two bases are only 15 miles apart.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station (NAS) Agana. Move aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment to Andersen AFB, Guam. Retain housing at NAS Agana necessary to support Navy personnel who have relocated to Andersen AFB. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island

Category: Operational Air Station
Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations
One-time Cost: $2.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $32.9 million
Annual: $6.6 million
Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Close Naval Air Facility Midway Island.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
The 1991 Commission Report, pages 5-19, recommended the elimination of the mission at NAF Midway Island and its continued operation under a caretaker status. Based on the DoD Force Structure Plan, its capacity is excess to that needed to support forces in its geographic area. There is no operational need for this air facility to remain in the inventory even in a caretaker status. Therefore, the Navy recommends that NAF Midway be closed and appropriate disposal action taken.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found no operational reason to maintain this facility, even in a caretaker status.
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COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Air Facility Midway Island.

Training Air Stations

Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee

Category: Training Air Station
Mission: Aviation Maintenance and Operations Training
Cost to Realign: $249 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-75.9 million (Cost)
Annual: $49.7 million
Payback: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis by terminating the flying mission and relocating its reserve squadrons to Carswell AFB, Texas. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, currently in Washington, D.C., will be relocated to NAS Memphis as part of a separate recommendation.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval aviator requirements are decreasing as a result of carrier air wing and fleet reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan. The NAS Memphis capacity is excess to that required to train the number of student aviators required to meet fleet needs. The Navy analyzed its training air stations with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent consistent with the decreasing throughput of students. Any remaining mix of air stations needed, at a minimum, to maintain the overall military value of the remaining bases, while allowing continuance of key mission requirements and maximized efficiency. These factors included availability of training airspace, outlying fields and access to over-water training. The inland location of NAS Memphis and lack of training airspace make it a primary candidate for closure. Its realignment combined with the recommended closure of NAS Meridian, Mississippi, reduces excess capacity while allowing consolidation of naval air training around the two air stations with the highest military value. The resulting configuration increases the average military value of the remaining training air stations and maximizes efficiency through restructuring around the two hubs, thus increasing the effectiveness of aviation training. Relocation of the Naval Air Technical Training Center fills excess capacity created by the closure of the Naval Aviation Depot and the Naval Supply Center at NAS Pensacola.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stressed NAS Memphis was improperly evaluated as a training air station. The NAS Memphis primary mission is enlisted aviation technical training; pilot training has not been conducted for over three decades. Moreover, NAS Memphis was evaluated using military-value criteria which do not address the installation’s main training function. The community also stated the amount of military construction required to relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Command to Pensacola would be double the Navy estimate. The community also offered nine alternatives that would save money by moving additional functions to NAS Memphis in lieu of the recommended movement out of NAS Memphis.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary’s realignment recommendation was consistent with the force-structure plan. The Commission found that, although the decision to realign NAS Memphis was initially premised on Memphis as a training air station, other factors justified the decision. These factors included the reduction of excess training capacity by relocating Naval Air Technical Training Command, Memphis, to NAS Pensacola, the achievement of economies of personnel and support through the consolidation of enlisted and officer aviation training at NAS Pensacola, and the consolidation of reserve air assets at Carswell Air Force Base. In addition, the Commission found significant cost savings could be achieved within a reasonable payback period even if military construction costs proved to be greater than the Navy’s original estimate. The Commission further found that consolidation of the Reserve air assets and Reserve Aviation Squadrons would realize economies
in management and training. By relocating these units to Carswell, they would be closer to operational areas and could capitalize on these in integrating training with operational units. In addition, the Commission found that the central location of Carswell would enhance Reserve contributory support to Navy Airlift.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had higher military value and should be adopted.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Naval Air Station, Memphis, by terminating the flying mission and relocating its reserve squadrons to Carswell, Texas. Disestablish the Naval Air Reserve Center, and relocate the Marine Corps (Wing) Reserve Center, Millington, to Carswell. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi**

Category: Training Air Station  
Mission: Jet Pilot Training  
One-time Cost: N/A  
Savings: 1994-99: N/A  
Annual: N/A  
Payback: N/A

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. Relocate advanced strike training to Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas. Relocate intermediate strike training and Naval Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Projected reductions contained in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training air station capacity. When considering air space and facilities of all types of support aviation training, there is about twice the capacity required to perform the mission. The training conducted at the Naval Air Station, Meridian can be consolidated with similar training at the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. This results in an economy and efficiency of operations which enhances the military value of the training and places training aircraft in proximity to over-water air space and potential berthing sites for carriers being used in training evolutions. Currently, for example, pilots training in Meridian fly to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola in order to do carrier landing training. The closure of Meridian and the accompanying closure of the Naval Air Station, Memphis, result in centralized aviation training functions at bases with a higher average military value than that possessed by the training air stations before closure. Both the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola have higher military value than the Naval Air Station, Meridian. The consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center with its parent command, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, will provide for improvement in the management and efficiency of the training establishment and enhance its military value to the Navy.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community claimed the Navy’s military value ranking of NAS Meridian was too low. It argued Naval training requires primarily “over-ground” airspace, but the Navy’s military value matrix was heavily weighted for “over-water” airspace. Since Meridian has considerable “over-ground” airspace but no “over-water” airspace, its military value ranking was unfairly diminished. The community also argued the Navy’s training plan failed to provide enough capacity to accomplish needed strike training and NAS Meridian was essential to meet the requirement. The community believed the Navy’s inclusion of bases into “complexes” was improper because it resulted in a failure to consider alternative scenarios for reducing excess capacity. The community believed greater cost savings would be achieved by closing other air stations with greater excess capacity and lower military value.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excess capacity existed in Naval Pilot Training, but it did not exist in Naval Strike Pilot Training. The Commission found a second full-strike training base was required to accommodate the current and future pilot training rate (PTR). The Commission further found military construction for the T-45, the Navy’s new intermediate and advanced strike training aircraft, which is complete at NAS Kingsville and has begun at NAS Meridian, is required at two sites to support future pilot training.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Air Station, Meridian will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Reserve Air Stations

Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan

Category: Reserve Air Station
Mission: Support for Reserve Units
One-time Cost: $11.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $44.8 million
Annual: $10.3 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Given the greater operational activity of active air stations, the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces places a high military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAF Detroit will eliminate excess capacity at the reserve air base with the lowest military value and allow relocation of most of its assets to the major P-3 active force base at NAS Jacksonville. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAF Detroit, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the recession and high local unemployment rates compounded with the loss of income generated by both active duty and reserve personnel in the local economy totaled $50 million. In addition, the local community council integrated NAF Detroit personnel to such an extent that many community youth services (i.e., youth sport leagues, Special Olympics) would suffer a negative impact. The community concern suggested that the relocation of the Medical and Dental Clinics would leave the Midwest devoid of Aviation Medical Assets to provide Navy Flight Physicals for Reserve Officer Training Programs and the Navy Recruiting District offices assigned to recruit aviation personnel in the Midwest. In addition, the community expressed concern regarding the disposition of other tenant commands, including the Personnel Support Detachment and the Personnel Support Detachment, Cleveland, Ohio. Reserve representatives expressed concern about the loss of qualified reservists with a resulting loss of readiness, and they projected it would take eighteen to sixty months to reconstitute reserve squadrons and restore readiness at the projected receiver sites.

The Michigan Air National Guard, the local communities, and the Detroit Wayne County Metropolitan Airport were all opposed to joint use of Selfridge ANG as an air passenger terminal. It stated the base infrastructure and local heavy industry would not support a civilian air cargo operation. Finally, representatives questioned the accuracy of the Navy’s cost and savings analysis.
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COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found demographics at receiver locations would effectively support the manning of the reserve squadrons and would place them closer to operating areas. The Commission also found some inconsistencies in COBRA data regarding $5.7 million in required military construction costs prior to closure. However, this cost did not significantly affect savings. In addition, tenant activities were not specifically addressed in the Secretary’s recommendation. However, these activities were all below threshold, and parent commands could designate receiver sites. Finally, the Commission found closure of NAF Detroit significantly reduced excess capacity in Reserve Naval Air Stations. This facility was rated lowest in military value, so consolidation of its assets at receiver sites resulted in an overall improvement in military value.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida or Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota.

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, West Virginia
Category: Reserve Air Station
Mission: Support for Reserve Units
One-time Cost: $27.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $70.2 million
Annual: $13.1 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community asserted that a 1986 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Study identified Martinsburg as one of four sites for location of Naval Medium/Heavy Airlift (C-130) Squadrons (the others listed were NAS Glenview, NAS New Orleans, and NAS Point Magu). It also indicated that Martinsburg would be more cost efficient to operate both because the Navy would be a tenant of the Air National Guard, and because of the relative low cost-of-living index when compared with other locations. Additionally, it stated that current experience with reserve recruiting and retention in the Air National Guard was indicative of a rich demographic environment that would successfully draw on the greater Washington-Baltimore area to supply qualified personnel. The community noted its central location in Eastern United States, its excellent transportation network, good infrastructure, and relatively uncrowded airspace were attributes that supported the decision to place a C-130 squadron in Martinsburg, West Virginia.

Regarding economic impact, they projected at least 200 full-time positions and 200 reservists positions will be assigned to the Martinsburg Facility. The assignment would have a significant positive impact on one of the poorest sections of West Virginia.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the construction of this facility is in the planning stages only. No ground has been broken. COBRA runs provided by the Navy for Martinsburg were not useable for comparison with similar existing reserve and active air stations. The assumption that high Air National Guard manning levels are predictors of high Naval Reserve manning levels for this activity presumes there are adequate numbers of qualified naval veterans or civilians with aviation background, or that members of the West Virginia Air National Guard currently awaiting billet assignments would sacrifice seniority to request interservice transfers. While the CNA study identified Martinsburg as one of four sites for location of a Naval Reserve Medium/Heavy Airlift squadron, it was conducted...
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during a defense build-up. With strategic planning incomplete in this era of fiscal constraints, construction of new facilities in a category with excess capacity does not appear to be a wise use of scarce resources.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Facility, Martinsburg, West Virginia. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas**

Category: Reserve Air Station  
Mission: Support Naval Reserve Aviation Units  
One-time Cost: $136.5 million  
Savings: 1994-99 $-108 million (Cost)  
Annual: $5.2 million  
Payback: 100+ years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, and REDCOM 11.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Navy with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Closure of Naval Air Station, Dallas and reconstitution at Carswell Air Force Base provides the reserves with a significantly superior air base. The resulting air station, with Air Force reserve squadrons now as tenants, will remove the operational difficulties currently experienced at the Naval Air Station, Dallas, including flight conflicts with the civilian airport. This closure, combined with three others in this category, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity in reserve air stations while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases in this category.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stressed the closure of NAS Dallas would detrimentally impact Vought Aircraft Company, which used the airport for 45 years to test aircraft under a $1/year agreement with the City of Dallas. It indicated the Navy’s concern over lack of airspace was incorrect because the city of Dallas owned all or part of two nearby airports so ample airspace was available. Furthermore only minor transitory problems occasionally occurred.

Regarding economic impact, the community emphasized it would be much greater than the Navy estimated, both in Dallas and in Grand Prairie.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the proposed realignment of NAS Dallas at Carswell Air Force Base (AFB) had merit because it would alleviate current air and ground encroachment restrictions. The Commission also found regular airlift to southwestern states would increase the recruiting area to support current and future mission capability of the reserve squadrons assigned to NAS Dallas. In addition, the Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) supported the proposed relocation to Carswell AFB because it was compatible with the existing and future Dallas-Forth Worth Metropolitan Air Traffic System Plan. The FAA indicated the move would result in better service to NAS Dallas units at its new site and would provide improved procedural efficiency to all users. The FAA stated since current air missions from NAS Dallas were to the west and southwest, the proposed relocation to Carswell AFB would shorten mission length and reduce flight costs.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate
its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell AFB, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, and REDCOM 11. Carswell AFB, Texas, will become a Navy-operated Carswell joint reserve center to receive and accommodate the reserve units currently there and being relocated there by this 1993 Commission.

**Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois**

Category: Reserve Air Station  
Mission: Support for Reserve Units  
One-time Cost: $132.1 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $34.5 million  
Annual: $30.0 million  
Payback: 6 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Navy Reserve, National Guard and other activities. Family housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Green Bay, Wisconsin, Stewart Army National Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York and NAS, Atlanta, Georgia.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force-Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Closure of NAS Glenview eliminates excess capacity at a base with a very low military value whose assets can be redistributed into more economical and efficient operations. This closure, combined with three others in this category, results in maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining reserve air stations. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS Glenview, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community contended NAS Glenview demonstrated the ability to recruit and train key reserve personnel from the highly skilled workforce of the Chicago Metroplex. The community said distant relocations proposed for NAS Glenview would undoubtedly result in large losses of qualified reservists in these units, and they highlighted the loss of joint operations. While local officials took a neutral position, other community representatives questioned the military value and excess capacity calculations. It also questioned COBRA model cost and savings analysis and identified over $90 million in military construction costs to relocate the units. The community leaders pointed out that relocation costs of tenant activities were not included in the COBRA analysis. It indicated the combined closures of this facility along with NAF Detroit and NAS Memphis would leave the heartland of the United States without an operational Naval and Marine Corps Air Reserve presence. Another concern of the community was that these closures would result in a loss of Navy airlift for midwestern reserve units.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found significant efforts had been made to upgrade NAS Glenview. However, serious ground and air encroachment problems, and the lack of adequate accident potential zones limited potential expansion at this Reserve Naval Air Station. While the Commission recognized the loss of reservists due to relocating the reserve squadrons, it found the potential for expansion at receiver sites would improve overall military value of the remaining installations.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close
the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Navy Reserve, National Guard and other activities. Family housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia; Green Bay, Wisconsin; Stewart Army National Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York; and NAS Atlanta, Georgia.

**Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts**

Category: Reserve Air Station  
Mission: Support for Reserve Units  
One-time Cost: N/A  
Savings: N/A  
Annual: N/A  
Payback: N/A

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), South Weymouth and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Stations Brunswick, Maine, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Camp Pendleton, California, and NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. The greater operational utility of active air stations and the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces place a higher military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAS South Weymouth allows the relocation of reserve P-3’s to the major P-3 active operating base at NAS Brunswick, ME and distributes other assets to the active operating base at Mayport, FL and to a reserve air station with a higher military value. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stated NAS South Weymouth was the only operational Naval Air Reserve Activity in the New England/New York area. The closure would preclude active participation by aviation qualified Naval Reservists in the northeastern United States, since reservists are geographically connected to the area of their domicile and civilian occupations. The community further stated the Navy military value ranked NAS South Weymouth third of eight, well above NAS Dallas (proposed for realignment), NAS Atlanta and NAF Washington. The community emphasized the combined highly educated technical workforce and large population of qualified veterans in the Boston area support recruitment for both the current mission and any expanded operational role. The proximity to wetlands and community zoning ordinances prevent land encroachment on air operations and further enhance NAS South Weymouth’s ability to assume expanded missions.

The community questioned the Navy’s programmed new construction in Martinsburg, West Virginia (for a C-130 Medium/Heavy Airlift Squadron); and Johnstown, Pennsylvania (for a Helicopter Squadron). These facilities would cost over $55 million, with an additional $50 million in initial set-up costs. It asserted NAS South Weymouth had adequate facilities and a trained manpower pool to assume the proposed missions for these sites, and indeed has facilities and equipment already on board for support of the C-130 aircraft. Further, it indicated NAS South Weymouth was closer to operating and potential threat areas for Anti-Submarine/ Anti-Surface Warfare and to carrier battle group operations than any other Reserve Naval Air Station and most operational bases.

The community conducted its own independent analysis of the certified data provided to the
Base Structure Analysis Team and raised serious concerns about the validity of costs and savings projected by the COBRA models developed by the Navy. In addition, it indicated the proposed closures of Reserve Naval Air Stations were predicated on nine Reserve Maritime Patrol Squadrons, not the thirteen Squadrons mandated by the FY93 Defense Authorization Act. It questioned the wisdom of such unprecedented cuts in view of the fact that both Congress and the Department of Defense have not yet defined the role of the reserves.

Regarding the cumulative economic impact, the community asserted New England employs only 13% of the Department of Defense, but had to absorb 33% of recent defense cuts. The community argued the closure of additional bases, including NAS South Weymouth, would have a heavy impact on an economy already struggling under the burdens of coping with previous defense cuts.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found several inconsistencies between the COBRA analysis and data call submissions regarding personnel accounting, and military construction costs for receiver bases. These inconsistencies tended to inflate savings and deflate costs in favor of the Secretary’s recommendation. Additionally, it appeared demographics for the purposes of force recruiting at proposed receiver bases were not considered in the relocation of squadrons attached to this command. There was no evidence current and future mission impacts were considered with respect to the retention losses that could result if squadrons were relocated several hundred to over 3000 miles away from the reservists currently assigned billets in these units. Additionally, no plan was proposed to retain incumbent reservists or to expedite recruitment and training of replacements. Similarly, impacts on contributory support to the active components, mission capability and readiness were not adequately considered by the Navy.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Air Station, South Weymouth will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, Pennsylvania**

Category: Reserve Air Station
Mission: Support for Reserve Units

**One-time Cost:** None

**Savings:** 1994-99: $15-20 million
(Construction Avoidance)
$20 million (Start Up Costs Avoidance)

**Annual:** N/A

**Payback:** N/A

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community expressed concern regarding the proposed cessation of construction of a Naval/Marine Corps air facility at the Joint Aviation Facility in Johnstown, PA. The community indicated the facility had strong Congressional support.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found construction costs for the Navy/Marine Corps addition to the Joint Aviation Facility at Johnstown, PA, were projected at $15-20 million with an additional $20 million in one-time start-up costs. The Commission found construction of the Navy/Marine Corps facility was scheduled for FY 1994 with occupancy planned for FY 1996. The Commission found the nearby reserve center in Ebensburg could house administrative units, and significant excess capacity exists in Naval/Marine Corps reserve air stations.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close (halt construction of) the Naval/
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Marine Corps air facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Naval Bases**

**Naval Education and Training Center**

*Newport, Rhode Island*

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Ships
One-time Cost: $13.8 million
Savings: 1994-99: $7.94 million
Annual: $4.26 million
Payback: 5 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Realign the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport and terminate the Center’s mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related property shall be retained by NETC Newport. The Education and Training Center will remain to satisfy its education and training mission.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The piers and maintenance activity associated with NETC Newport are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. NETC Newport currently berths five ships which can be absorbed at other homeports with a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the Navy underrated Newport’s military value. The community also questioned the Navy’s estimated savings associated with this realignment, expressing belief that the Navy’s analysis created a false sense of savings because it did not fully examine the costs of moving ships and maintaining real property. Moreover, the relocation of ships would not reduce excess capacity or operational costs because Newport would still retain its piers. The community also argued the impact on Reserve Training in the Northeast was significant, and the economic impact of the realignment was underestimated.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Newport is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in savings.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport and terminate the Center’s mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related property shall be retained by NETC Newport. The Education and Training Center will remain to satisfy its education and training mission.

**Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina**

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Ships
One-time Cost: $186.36 million
Savings: 1994-99: $146.67 million
Annual: $69.78 million
Payback: 5 years
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station (NS), Charleston and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Pascagoula, Mississippi; Ingleside, Texas and Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. Appropriate personnel, equipment and support, to include the drydock, will be relocated with the ships. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (PERA) relocates to Portsmouth, Virginia; the Naval Investigative Service Regional Office disestablishes; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Charleston disestablishes, and the Naval Reserve Center and REDCOM 7 relocate to leased space in the Charleston area; Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center relocates to Naval Station Ingleside, Fleet Training Center Mayport, and Fleet Training Center Norfolk; Submarine Training Facility Charleston disestablishes. Family housing located within the Charleston Navy complex will be retained as necessary to support the nearby Naval Weapons Station Charleston.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The piers and maintenance activity at NS Charleston are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The berths at the NS Charleston are excess to Navy requirements. The relocation of the 21 ships currently based at NS Charleston will allow the closure of this naval base and eliminate almost half of the excess berthing capacity in bases supporting the Atlantic Fleet. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet Bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated the Navy underrated Charleston's military value. It believed the haste of the Navy’s process resulted in inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Navy’s military value matrix questions. The community also believed the Navy underestimated the costs of relocating its activities to Naval Station Kings Bay and Naval Station Ingleside. The community further asserted the ability to obtain the necessary environmental permits for Mine Warfare training in the Gulf of Mexico was questionable. The community also stated the closure of the Naval Station and other facilities in Charleston would have a devastating economic impact on the area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships and submarines in Charleston is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found when combined with other Charleston closures, such as the closure of the Charleston Naval Shipyard, the closure of Naval Station Charleston would account for a significant job loss in this employment area; however, closure will result in substantial savings.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station (NS), Charleston but maintain the option for the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission later to recommend the retention of Naval Station, Charleston facilities that are deemed necessary to establish or support naval commands that are retained at, realigned to, or relocated to Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Naval Station Mobile, Alabama  
Category: Naval Base  
Mission: Support Homeported Ships  
One-time Cost: $4.88 million  
Annual: $8.43 million  
Payback: 2 years  

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION  
Close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION  
The berths at Naval Station, Mobile are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations were configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The ships based at Naval Station Mobile can be relocated to other naval bases which have a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS  
The community argued the Navy’s military value ranking was inaccurate. The community stated the Navy did not give adequate consideration to the role Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mobile plays in training reserves. The community also felt the Navy did not correctly compare NAVSTA Mobile to Pascagoula. The community claimed Mobile was superior to Pascagoula in the areas of navigation, safety, quality of life and the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity. It believed the Navy greatly overestimated the savings associated with the closure of the base. The community also noted its strong state and local support for the facility and argued the closure of NAVSTA Mobile would have a serious and adverse effect on the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS  
The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Mobile is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in savings.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION  
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

Naval Station Staten Island, New York  
Category: Naval Base  
Mission: Support Homeported Ships  
One-time Cost: $-16.15 million (Savings)  
Annual: $42.64 million  
Payback: Immediate  

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION  
Close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Recruiting District, New York disestablishes; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION  
The berthing capacity of Naval Station Staten Island is excess to the capacity required
to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with the goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. The ships currently berthed at Naval Station Staten Island can be relocated to bases with higher military value. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Navy’s analytical process was not sound because it contained many procedural errors, analytical inconsistencies and inflated values for certain capabilities. The community also challenged the soundness of the Navy’s megaport concept. It believed closing Naval Station Staten Island would pose operational problems because New York is four to five days closer to potential conflicts than ports in the Gulf of Mexico. The community claimed the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would create a loss of significant training opportunity for Naval Reservists, particularly in light of other planned closures in the Northeast. The community felt the Navy did not adequately consider the adverse economic impact the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would have on the New York Harbor industrial base, especially private shipyards.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Staten Island is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in substantial savings. The Secretary suggested a correction or revision to his March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found that the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes. Retain family housing located at Naval Station, Staten Island, as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Submarine
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London by terminating its mission to homeport ships. Relocate berthed ships, their personnel, associated equipment and other support to the Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia and the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. This relocation is to include a floating drydock. Piers, waterfront facilities, and related property shall be retained by the Navy at New London, Connecticut. The Nuclear Submarine Support Facility, a major tenant, relocates to Kings Bay, Georgia and Norfolk, Virginia; and another major tenant, the Nuclear Power Training Unit, disestablishes.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Submarine Base, New London’s capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. With a reduction in ships, the Navy requires one submarine base per Fleet. In view of the capacity at the Submarine Base, Kings Bay and the Naval Station, Norfolk, the submarines based at New London can be relocated to activities with a higher military value. The education and training missions being performed at the Submarine Base, New London will continue to be performed there and the Navy will retain piers, waterfront facilities and related property. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy’s proposal to realign New London did not reduce excess capacity. Instead, it only duplicated existing resources elsewhere and therefore wasted the taxpayers’ money. The community also questioned the Navy’s configuration analysis. The Navy’s analysis required that (1) Norfolk be a part of any solution and (2) there be only one SSBN/SSN unique base per fleet. The community claimed these rules led the Navy to exclude New London automatically from any solution. The community argued the Navy’s analysis thus appeared to be used to justify its previous judgment to exclude New London. The community questioned the strategic gain and increase in military value resulting from the realignment of New London, since military value did not appear to be a part of the Navy’s configuration analysis. The community proposed an alternate plan involving retaining submarines that would ostensibly save $1.2 billion. The community also stated the economic effect of the realignment would be grave because the New London area is heavily dependent on defense industries.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to terminate Naval Submarine Base (SUBBASE) New London’s mission to homeport submarines calls for substantial military construction (MILCON) at SUBBASE King’s Bay and Naval Station Norfolk to replace capabilities and facilities that exist in New London. The Commission further found the Navy’s analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizeable MILCON, particularly in view of what costs the Navy deemed appropriate to consider. Just prior to final deliberations, the Chairman of the Navy’s Base Structure Evaluation Committee reported to the Commission that the Navy was not likely ever to move attack submarines to Kings Bay.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Submarine Base, New London remains open and does not realign. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Air Station Alameda, California

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support of Aviation Activities, Afloat Units, and Other Activities

One-time Cost: $193.69 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-72.17 million (Cost)
Annual: $41.69 million
Payback: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California and NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed
at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The projected carrier air wing reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a significant decrease in air station and naval station capacity. NAS Alameda is recommended for closure as it has the lowest military value of those air stations supporting the Pacific Fleet. Given the number of aircraft “bedded down” at the air station, it has greatest amount of excess capacity. Also, given the need to eliminate excess ship berthing, its capacity is not required to meet force levels, since no more than five carrier berths are required on the West Coast; three at the fleet concentration in San Diego and two at Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Both the limited aircraft (primarily reserve) and ship assets at NAS Alameda can be readily absorbed at bases with a higher military value. This closure results in an increased average military value of both the remaining air stations and naval stations in the Pacific Fleet.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community believed the Navy penalized NAS Alameda’s military value ranking because the Navy evaluated Alameda as a naval air station when its capabilities more closely resemble those of a naval station. The community criticized the Navy’s plan to build at NAVSTA Everett and NAS North Island to replace existing capabilities at NAS Alameda; it said the Navy underestimated the costs of closing at Alameda and rebuilding elsewhere. The community also asserted that both Everett and North Island required dredging and building nuclear carrier piers and that the licensing and environmental procedures are difficult. The community argued that even if this costly construction were completed, Everett would not have a contiguous airfield while NAS Alameda does, asserting the presence of a contiguous airfield creates a synergism among the facilities at Alameda. By contrast, the absence of a contiguous airfield would pose potentially significant operational problems at Everett.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the aircraft beddown capacity and ship berthing at NAS Alameda is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found NAS Alameda had the lowest military value as a Naval Air Station in the Pacific fleet. While its military value as a Naval Station is relatively high, its primary purpose is the homeporting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and there is sufficient carrier berthing capacity in San Diego, Puget Sound, and Everett. Substantial military construction (MILCON) is occurring at Naval Station, Everett, Washington, and Naval Air Station North Island, California, to replace a portion of the nuclear aircraft carrier berthing capacity that exists at Alameda. These MILCON projects are being accomplished separate from the base closure process and will ultimately result in the Navy’s ability to homeport aircraft carriers at a reduced cost.

In a letter dated June 1, 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commission that the original Secretary of Defense recommendation to close Naval Air Station Alameda did not fully distinguish between active duty aviation assets and tenant reserved aviation assets. That distinction is made clear in the Commission recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Reserve aviation assets relocate to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California, NAS Whidbey Island, and NAS Willow Grove; Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco.
realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

**Naval Station Treasure Island, California**

Category: Naval Base  
Mission: Maintain and Operate Facilities and Support Tenant Activities  
One-time Cost: $30.95 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $123.0 million  
Annual: $44.48 million  
Payback: 3 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The DoD Force Structure Plan supports a decrease in naval station capacity. Naval Station, Treasure Island has a relatively low military value and its capacity is not required to support Navy requirements. The naval bases to which its activities will be relocated have higher military value to the Navy than does this naval station. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Pacific Fleet, reduces excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Pacific Fleet bases.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community argued the closure of Naval Station (NAVSTA) Treasure Island, along with the other proposed Bay Area closures, would destroy the strategic infrastructure of the San Francisco area. It pointed out NAVSTA Treasure Island had a new fire fighting school that was environmentally sound and was the only one of its kind on the West Coast. It was also the site of over 1,000 family housing units and other support services the military retirement community depended upon heavily, particularly in light of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Treasure Island was excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. Further, the Commission found the primary purposes of NAVSTA Treasure Island are to provide military family housing, some training and other support for shipboard personnel and dependents in the San Francisco Bay area. In view of the recommendations to close NAS Alameda, these facilities are not required.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno,
California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

**Naval Training Centers**

**Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida**

Category: Naval Training Center  
Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel  
One-time Cost: $374 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $ -83.5 million (cost)  
Annual: $ 75.8 million  
Payback: 9 years  
(These cost figures include the cost to close NTC San Diego.)

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear “A” School relocate to the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London; Personnel Support Detachment relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Dental Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Education and Training Program Management Support Activity disestablishes.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The 1991 Commission rejected the recommendation to close NTC Orlando due to prohibitive closure costs. This recommendation encompasses the additional closure of NTC San Diego and proposes significantly reduced closure costs by taking advantage of facilities made available by the recommended realignment of NSB New London. Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure. As a result of projected manpower levels the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators, to perform the recruit training function. The closure of the NTC Orlando removes excess capacity and relocates training to a naval training center with a higher military value and results in an efficient collocation of the Submarine School, the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear “A” School at the NSB, New London. The resulting consolidation at the NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value for this group of military activities but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC Orlando has equipment and facilities which are more readily relocated to another naval training center.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Orlando community argued the Navy’s goal to eliminate the greatest amount of excess capacity while maintaining and/or improving overall military value did not necessarily generate the most cost-effective option. The community also maintained the various COBRA alternatives it generated showed a net present value for NTC Orlando 2-4 times greater than the Navy’s recommendation. The community claimed the climate affects utility costs, impacts training routines and student morale; however, the Navy did not consider climate a relevant training factor. The Orlando community also maintained the Navy’s military-value questionnaire was flawed because it did not accurately evaluate the training center’s capability. The community emphasized the questions asked were not relevant and there were more negative than positive responses to the questions. Further, the community added that NTC Orlando’s military value was incorrectly judged to be lower than NTC Great Lakes and utility costs and cost of operations were not included in the military value calculations.

The community also stressed the Navy did not know the true cost of relocating or replicating NTC Great Lakes’ engineering “hot-plant” trainers but still justified its decision in large part on the prohibitive cost of moving or rebuilding these trainers. As an example, the community mentioned training simulators could be used to replace “hot-plant” trainers at a fraction of the cost of the “hot plants”.

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COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary's closure recommendation was consistent with force-structure plan. Closure of NTC Orlando would contribute to the elimination of excess training capacity which is 2-3 times greater than the projected requirement. The Commission accepted the Navy's argument that consolidation of naval training at a single training site allows DoD to generate savings through the reduction of overhead expenses and the elimination of redundant training staff. Consolidation of naval training at NTC Orlando would have required a substantial capital investment which the Commission questioned whether an acceptable return on investment could be realized. The Commission found relocation or replacement of NTC Great Lakes engineering propulsion systems ("hot plants") at another NTC would result in an extended period when training could not be effectively conducted. In addition, the Commission found NTC Great Lakes provides facilities and personnel support for numerous tenants and regional reserve units which could not be economically replaced.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, and relocate certain personnel, equipment, and support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the Naval Education and Training Program Management Support Activity disestablishes.

Naval Training Center San Diego, California

Category: Naval Training Center
Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel
One-time Cost: $374 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-83.5 Million (Cost)
Annual: $75.8 million
Payback: 9 years
(These cost figures also include the cost to close NTC Orlando.)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego, and relocate certain personnel, equipment, and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other locations, consistent with training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting District relocates to Naval Air Station, North Island; Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of the Service School Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and Fleet Training Center, San Diego.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure capacity. As a result of projected manpower levels, the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators, to perform the recruit training function. The closure of NTC San Diego removes unneeded excess capacity and results in the realignment of training to a training center with a higher military value. The resulting consolidation at NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC San Diego has equipment and facilities which can more readily be relocated to another naval training center.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued NTC San Diego would be the best option for single-site naval training for several reasons. First, San Diego is collocated with the fleet. This allows for more cost-efficient training because it permits quick filling of vacant training billets and greater interaction between operational training units. Furthermore, consolidating naval training at NTC San Diego would eliminate the need for large, recurring transportation costs, since 88% of NTC San Diego's instructors come from San Diego-based units. Retaining naval training in a fleet-concentration area would also produce a higher quality of life for NTC personnel, since fewer sailors would have to be separated from their families. Reduced family separation increases retention rates which, in turn, lowers training costs. The community also stated NTC San Diego had the capacity and land space to accept additional naval training with minimal military construction.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary’s closure recommendations were consistent with projected force-structure reductions. Closure of NTC San Diego would contribute to the elimination of excess training capacity, which is two to three times greater than the projected requirement. The Commission accepts the Navy’s argument consolidation of naval training at a single training site allows DoD to generate savings through the reduction of overhead expenses and the elimination of redundant training staff. The Commission found NTC San Diego possesses less available land to absorb training requirements than the Navy’s two other training centers and would be severely constrained during periods of mobilization or surge.

The Secretary of Defense suggested a revision to his original March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego. Relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other locations, consistent with training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting District relocates to Naval Air Station North Island; Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of the Service School Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and the Fleet Training Center, San Diego. The cogeneration plant and the bachelor quarters and adjacent non-appropriated fund activities (marinas) located aboard NTC San Diego property will be retained by the Navy to support other naval activities in the San Diego area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

NavalAviation Depots

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, California

Category: Naval Aviation Depot
Mission: Aviation Depot Level Maintenance
One-time Cost: $ 171 million
Annual: $ 78 million
Payback: 5 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum

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reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community asserted NADEP Alameda had several unique capabilities and capacities, including significant engineering and technical support and extensive synergy with the aircraft carriers berthed at NAS Alameda. Community representatives stated these and other uncredited special skills and equipment should have given them a much higher military value than the one determined by the Navy. In addition, several of the NADEP’s facilities are new and environmentally sound. Further, they noted that NADEP Alameda has an extremely diverse workforce.

The community feels the Navy COBRA analysis did not provide a sufficient estimate of the number or extent of real costs in closing their operations. It believed the costs to close NADEP Alameda were the greatest, while they asserted NADEP Jacksonville was the easiest and least expensive NADEP to close. It also noted Alameda had the Navy’s largest amount of missile work. Finally, Alameda had been selected to provide maintenance services to a large amount of Army equipment that could be placed in Oakland, California as part of a proposed prepositioning plan.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found excess capacity in the depot category indicated that three NADEPs should be closed. In evaluating combinations of open and closed NADEPs, the closure of Alameda resulted in less disruption, and lower costs. The combination of other NADEPs selected to remaining open provided a better overall savings, military value and reduction of excess capacity.

The Commission found NADEP Alameda had very diverse workforce, a number of unique capabilities, and provided a valuable synergy with local Navy activities. The Commission also found NADEP Alameda had higher military value than credited by the Navy. Nevertheless, NADEP Alameda is the most expensive NADEP in terms of overall rates, and its operations can easily be absorbed by the remaining NADEPs. The requirement for a West Coast NADEP is more appropriately met by NADEP North Island due to its collocation with the San Diego Megaport and lower overall rates.

NADEP Alameda was dependant on the continued operation of the Naval Air Station Alameda. Without it, the NADEP would incur the extra operating costs associated with the required airfield. Due to the Commission’s recommendation to close NAS Alameda, NADEP Alameda will lose its tenant status and ability to operate cost competitively.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, Virginia
Category: Naval Aviation Depot
Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance
One-time Cost: $ 226 million
Annual: $ 108 million
Payback: 5 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at NADEP, Norfolk can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. While the military value of the Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk was not substantially less than that of the Naval Aviation Depots at Cherry Point and Jacksonville, those NADEPs possess unique features and capabilities which required their retention. The closure of NADEP Norfolk will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stressed NADEP Norfolk’s military value score did not properly credit its assets and capabilities. Also, with the concentration of air and sea assets in the Norfolk area, the community argued having a NADEP in Norfolk provided a valuable synergy which resulted in cost and service efficiencies. The community claimed NADEP Norfolk had the lowest labor costs compared to its counterparts, and the very high rate used by the Navy was incorrect. In addition, community representatives challenged the Navy’s justification that NADEP Norfolk was chosen instead of Cherry Point because NADEP Cherry Point had unique composite capabilities. Finally, the community asserted closing three NADEPs would eliminate too much of the Navy’s in-house capacity; therefore, a maximum of two NADEPs should be closed.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found excess capacity in the depot category which indicated three NADEPS should be closed. The Commission agreed with the Navy’s military judgement that one NADEP must be maintained on each coast. The Commission evaluated scenarios which corrected the high rates used by the Navy.

It also considered the results of other management decisions which would have unfairly disadvantaged NADEP Norfolk’s comparison to other NADEPs. Even after cost adjustments, an objective evaluation and, given the Navy’s requirement for a NADEP on each coast, the Commission found the closure of NADEP Norfolk resulted in less disruption and lower costs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, Florida

Category: Naval Aviation Depot
Mission: Depot Level Aviation Maintenance
One-time Cost: $214 million
Savings: 1994-99: $71 million
Annual: $51 million
Payback: 5 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola (NADEP), and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The dynamic component and rotor blade repair facility will remain in place.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost
50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community suggested the process to determine NADEP Pensacola’s military value was flawed and deserved a much higher value. It noted closing NADEP Pensacola would be a major loss to the Navy. It has an extremely diverse workforce, performs a high level of interservice work, and has skills in the repair and maintenance of rotary-wing aircraft and dynamic components. Its current configuration is already able to handle the new V-22 Osprey. In addition, they asserted no other facility could absorb their workload without new construction, especially for a whirl tower to handle the largest helicopter’s blades.

The community proposed all of the Navy’s rotary-wing workload be moved to Pensacola. This scenario, according to their estimates, would provide more savings for the Navy.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found NADEP Pensacola’s military value should have been higher due to its high level of interservice work, special skills and equipment, unique capabilities for doing rotary wing work, and diverse workforce. The Commission evaluated the unique capabilities of NADEP Pensacola in a variety of scenarios to quantify the cost and disruption of closing NADEP Pensacola. The Commission evaluation noted the need for construction at the receiving facilities in order to accommodate Pensacola’s workload and unique equipment. However, the construction cost was not excessive, and did not significantly degrade the potential savings derived from closing the NADEP.

The Commission also found the cost to construct a new whirl tower and to accommodate Pensacola’s dynamic component workload at NADEP Cherry Point or Corpus Christi Army Depot, was far less than the costs associated with keeping these activities at Pensacola. Therefore, the Commission found it was more economical and cost effective to close NADEP Pensacola completely.

In evaluating various closure scenarios, the Commission found closing NADEP Pensacola resulted in less disruption and lower costs. The combination of other NADEPs remaining open provided a better overall savings, military value and excess capacity reduction.

The Commission found that the Navy considered interservicing possibilities when analyzing base closure costs. The Navy intended to interservice some of its rotary wing work from NADEP Pensacola to the Corpus Christi Army Depot, and to transfer work it was doing on Air Force helicopters to NADEP Cherry Point. The Commission analyzed projected rotary wing workload forecasts and found excess capacity existed at both the Corpus Christi and Cherry Point Depots. Accordingly, the Commission agreed with the Navy plan to interservice H-60 and H-1 rotary wing workload to Corpus Christi Army Depot under a depot maintenance interservicing agreement. The Commission also agreed transferring the H-2, H-3 and H-53 rotary wing workload to NADEP Cherry Point was sound policy. This plan would increase facility utilization rates and contribute to reduced overall hourly operating costs for both of the receiving depots.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Aviation Depot at Pensacola, and relocate repair and maintenance capabilities for H-1 and H-60 helicopters to Corpus Christi Army Depot, and the remaining repair and maintenance activities to the NADEP at Cherry Point. This relocation will include the personnel and equipment needed to accommodate the new work. In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and
dynamic component facility be moved to Cherry Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the private sector, in lieu of the Navy’s plan to retain these operations in a stand-alone facility at NADEP Pensacola. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Naval Inventory Control Points**

**Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

Category: Inventory Control Point  
Mission: Naval Aviation Logistical Support  
One-time Cost: N/A  
Savings: N/A  
Annual: N/A  
Payback: N/A

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

The reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan equate to a significant workload reduction for the Navy’s inventory control points. Since there is excess capacity in this category the Navy decided to consolidate their two inventory control points at one location. A companion consideration was the relocation of the Naval Supply Systems Command from its present location in leased space in the National Capital Region, to a location at which it could be collocated with major subordinate organizations. This major consolidation of a headquarters with its operational components can be accomplished at SPCC, Mechanicsburg with a minimum of construction and rehabilitation. The end result is a significantly more efficient and economical organization.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The Philadelphia community claimed the military value assessment for ASO Philadelphia focused on the installation and geography instead of on the intellectual capacity and experience of the managers. In addition, the community maintained the ASO’s management efficiency, which amounted to just 5% of material cost, was not considered in the service analysis. The community also emphasized savings were overstated because they did not reflect the cost of operating the ASO.

The community pointed out ASO Philadelphia was a model of innovation and cost-saving techniques, and movement would require years to train a new work force to accomplish the same results. The community also stated that a consolidation of other activities in Philadelphia at the ASO compound would save $350 million.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the savings to be realized by moving the Naval Aviation Supply Office were exaggerated since the ASO Compound in North Philadelphia would remain open even after ASO departed, and the facility’s operating costs were not included in the cost analysis. The Commission did not find a significant synergy from collocating the ASO with the SPCC in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The cumulative economic impact on Philadelphia was also found to be severe, with no appreciable savings to the Department of Defense.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Technical Centers (SPAWAR)**

**Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division, Trenton, New Jersey**

Category: Technical Center  
Mission: Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Support  
One-time Cost: $97.0 million  
Savings: 1994-1999: $31.0 million  
Annual: $ 19.3 million  
Payback: 11 years
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RECOMMENDATION

Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE J USTIFICATION

This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected, if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The closure of the Trenton Detachment completes a realignment of NAWCs approved by the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, with continuing reductions in forces being supported and in resource levels. Further consolidations are required so that we may have the most efficient and economic operation.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) does not have the capacity to assume NAWC’s workload. The community questioned the ability of AEDC and Patuxent River to handle the increased workload resulting from the 1991 base closure decision to move work out of Trenton. The community also pointed to the private sector’s increasing interest in getting out of the testing business, directing their work to DoD, and making it more difficult for AEDC to handle the workload. The community also asserted AEDC receives a substantial subsidy from the Tennessee Valley Authority; should this subsidy be rescinded, the cost for AEDC to do business would increase significantly.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that, unlike many of the facilities looked at during the process, the NAWC at Trenton was fully utilized. The Commission also found there is some risk the receiving facilities would not be able to handle the increased workload. However, private-sector capability offsets this potential risk. In sum, the Commission found receiving installations, and the private sector, could accommodate the workload from NAWC, Trenton.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey, and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Naval Air Technical Services Facility
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Technical Center
Mission: Technical Publication Support
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: N/A
   Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to the new Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, Patuxent River, Maryland.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Projected reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan results in a decrease in required technical center capacity. Budget levels and the number of operating forces being supported by technical centers continue to decline. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and consolidate wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the DoD. Closure of the Technical Services Facility eliminates excess capacity and allows the consolidation of necessary functions at the new headquarters concentration for the Naval Air Systems Command producing economies and efficiencies in the management of assigned functions. This consolidation will also incorporate the Depot Operation Center and the Aviation Maintenance Office currently at Patuxent River.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community noted NATSF and the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, have developed a synergistic relationship in putting logistics and technical documentation together. The community cited the potential for establishing at the facility a central DoD technical publications organization. Such an organization could eliminate duplicate workload among the Services and, thus, save money. Further, the community claimed that by remaining in Philadelphia along with other interservice organizations, NATSF would maintain a high degree of perceived impartiality. In contrast, moving to NAS Patuxent River would make NATSF appear to be a Navy organization.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DoD had not adequately addressed the true costs and potential savings of the proposed action. The Commission found after segregating this action into a discreet set of numbers, the one-time cost of $22 million, coupled with a steady state savings of only $800 thousand, made this an economically unsound recommendation. Additionally, the Commission found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload among the Services of establishing a joint organization under the auspices of NATSF.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation: the Naval Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory
Port Hueneme, California

Category: Technical Center
Mission: Facility Engineering Studies
One-time Cost: $27.0 million
Annual: $37.3 million
Payback: 8 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close this technical center and realign necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force
levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy will dispose of this property and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the required engineering service mission areas of NCEL can be performed at Construction Battalion Center (CBC) Port Hueneme, CA. The move achieved savings in facility operations costs and personnel reductions by using common support provided by CBC Port Hueneme and also provides a 32-acre waterfront property for reuse.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL), Port Hueneme, CA, and realign necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.

Naval Electronic Centers
Charleston, South Carolina; Portsmouth, Virginia; St. Inigoes, Maryland; and Washington, D.C.

Category: Technical Center
Mission: In-Service Engineering
One-time Cost: $44.4 million
Savings: 1994-99: $32.3 million
Annual: $11.1 million
Payback: 11 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Close Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) St. Inigoes, Maryland, disestablish NESEC Charleston, South Carolina and Naval Electronics Security Systems Engineering Center (NESSEC), Washington, DC. Consolidate the Centers into an East Coast NESEC at Portsmouth, Virginia. The ATC/ACLS facility at St. Inigoes and the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory will remain in place and will be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
This recommendation was rejected by the 1991 DoD Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In doing so, the Commission stated that DoD had failed to explore other alternative sites and had failed to address asserted problems at Portsmouth with testing of radars and communication equipment. Several new factors contributed to the renewal of this recommendation.

The DoD Force Structure Plan shows a significant further decrease in force structure from that in 1991, giving rise to additional excess capacity. The facilities at St. Inigoes, Maryland, once NESEC St. Inigoes relocates to Portsmouth, would be available to support the major relocation to the Patuxent River complex of the Naval Air Systems Command and several of its subordinate organizations. This move results in both substantial organizational efficiencies and economies and is a significant element of the Navy’s compliance with the DoD policy to move activities out of leased space in the National Capital Region (NCR) DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation includes NESSEC Washington, DC, resulting in an additional relocation from leased space in the NCR into DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation also achieves a major reduction in excess capacity for these activities and with this consolidation in Portsmouth, the Navy Management Support Office can be consolidated at this Center. Without the Portsmouth consolidation, the benefits resulting from the synergy of consolidating the three centers would not be realized, and the reduction in excess capacity would be adversely impacted.
The Portsmouth consolidation utilizes, as the magnet site for this consolidation, the installation with the highest military value of all activities in the cluster. A review of the certified data call responses indicates that one of the reasons for this military value rating is NESEC Portsmouth’s current capability to perform a broad range of testing functions on a wide variety of communications and radar systems, including the Submarine Broadcast System, Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar, Tactical Secure Voice, and the AN/SLQ-32(V) 1/2/3/4/5. At its Fleet Engineering Support Center is a completely integrated shipboard communications system that contains a sample of every communications receiver, transmitter, data link and ancillary terminal hardware in the LF through UHF frequency range. The radar systems testing capability is enhanced by the AN/SSQ-74(V) Radar and Communications Signal Simulator with its associated antenna farm. These capabilities, particularly when joined with those of the other activities in this consolidation, gives the Navy a most formidable technical center which, because of the consolidation, will be able to function more economically and efficiently than these activities could if separate.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

CHARLESTON

The community contended the closure of NESEC Charleston and other bases in Charleston would have a disastrous economic impact on the community. The Charleston area has already lost employment due to retrenchment at Naval Shipyard Charleston and expects further losses due to cutbacks at the Polaris Missile Facility, Atlantic (POMFLANT). The community emphasized the closure of the NESEC alone would result in the direct and indirect loss of 3,776 jobs, or 1.6% of employment base. All of the proposed base closures in the Charleston area would negatively impact approximately 15% of the employment base. It argued that statewide, South Carolina stood to be hit harder than any other state relative to its population. South Carolina would lose one-third of all military jobs and one-sixth of all the civilian positions in this round of base closures.

PORTSMOUTH

The community indicated electro-magnetic interference was not a problem. It claimed the NESEC needs to remain in the Norfolk area.

ST. INI Goes

The community contended the military value grade for Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA) St. Inigoes was understated because of miscalculations in the technical, facilities, manpower and location categories. Also the community claimed they did not get credit for area quality of life capabilities and pointed out NESEA St. Inigoes had a unique combination of facilities suited to its mission that would not be available at Portsmouth. Accordingly, they asserted there would be a high loss of skilled personnel who would not relocate, resulting in a significantly reduced Navy capability. It also stated that concerns about the consolidation expressed by the 1991 Commission were not addressed by the Navy in 1993. The community also expressed concern about the sharply increased unemployment in St. Mary’s County, Maryland, associated with the closure of NESEA, St. Inigoes that would take place if the NCR relocation does not backfill through the transfer of Naval Air System Command to NAS Patuxent River, MD.

WASHINGTON

There were not formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission fully supports the Navy’s effort to consolidate the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Centers and Activities. However, the Commission found that while NESEC Portsmouth is not responsible for electromagnetic interference (EMI) problems, the EMI situation in Portsmouth is of sufficient concern that it should not be the East Coast Electronics Center. Furthermore, the cost of renovating and building facilities at St. Julien’s Creek was found to be unacceptably high. The Commission found the most economical solution providing a relatively EMI free environment is the consolidation
of the NESECs and NESEA at Charleston, South Carolina. Finally the cumulative economic impact resulting from Commission recommendations to close multiple Charleston Naval facilities would be severe.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 5 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Charleston remains open and becomes the new East Coast lead facility. The Commission provides for the retention of Charleston Naval Station and Naval Shipyard facilities that are deemed necessary to establish or support this East Coast NESEC. NESSEC, Washington closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston. NESEC, Portsmouth closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston, except for a detachment of fewer than 60 people. NESEA, St. Inigoes closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston, except for a detachment of fewer than 60 people. NESEC, Portsmouth closes and moves to NESEC, Charleston. Module Maintenance Facility moves from Charleston Naval Shipyard to NESEC Charleston. The ATC/ACLS facility, the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory, Identify Friend or Foe, Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS), and special warfare joint program support at St. Inigoes will remain in place and will be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Navy Radio Transmission Facility
Annapolis, Maryland
Category: Telecommunications Activity
Mission: Naval Telecommunications
One-time Cost: $ -0.5 million (Savings)
Annual: $ 137 thousand
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
This action is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. South-Atlantic VLF communications coverage is duplicated by the NRTF Annapolis and NCTS Puerto Rico, and the Mid-Atlantic VLF by NRTF Annapolis and NRTF Cutler, Maine. Since both the Puerto Rico and the Maine facilities also are the sole coverage for another geographic area, and since NRTF Annapolis is not, it could be disestablished without eliminating coverage. The property on which this activity has been sited will be retained by the Navy to support educational requirements at the Naval Academy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community argued the NRTF Annapolis signal was more dependable than NRTF Cutler, Maine. The community believed the work of NRTF Annapolis could be done with substantially fewer people than are used presently creating a greater cost savings. This cost savings would allow the Navy to maintain the radio facility.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the transmission coverage of NRTF Annapolis created a redundancy in the area covered. The primary facility, NRTF Cutler, Maine, was essential to the geographic configuration of the Naval telecommunications mission. The Commission found NRTF Annapolis could be eliminated with no loss of transmission coverage. The retained land would be utilized by the U.S. Naval Academy to support educational requirements.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis, Maryland. The Navy shall retain the real property on which this facility resides.
**Navy Radio Transmission Facility**  
*Driver, Virginia*

Category: Telecommunications Activity  
Mission: Naval Telecommunications  
One-time Cost: $478 thousand  
Annual: $2.06 million  
Payback: Immediate

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**  
Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Driver.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**  
This closure is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. Mid-Atlantic high frequency communications coverage is duplicated by NRTF Driver and NRTF Saddle Branch, Florida.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**  
There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**  
The Commission found the coverage provided by NRTF Driver was redundant to the coverage provided by NRTF Saddle Branch. The primary facility, NRTF Saddle Branch, was essential to the geographic configuration of the Naval telecommunications mission. The Commission found NRTF Driver could be eliminated without loss of transmission coverage.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**  
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Driver, Virginia.

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**Technical Centers (NAVSEA)**  
**Naval Surface Warfare Center–Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment,**  
*White Oak, Maryland*

Category: Technical Center  
Mission: Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Support  
One-time Cost: $74.6 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $-33.2 million (Cost)  
Annual: $21.9 million  
Payback: 9 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**  
Disestablish the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren, located at White Oak, Maryland. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, Virginia. The property and facilities at White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy so that it may, among other things, relocate the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased space in Arlington, Virginia.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**  
This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.
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COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the consolidation of personnel and functions contained in this recommendation makes sense from an operational perspective. The Commission also found the driving factor behind this planned action is not predicated upon, nor dependent upon, other actions within the National Capital Region.

The Secretary suggested a revision to his March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found that the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure and final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), (Dahlgren), located at White Oak, MD. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, VA, NSWC-Indian Head, Indian Head, MD, and NSWC-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, FL. The property and facilities at White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy so that it may, among other things, relocate the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased space in Arlington, VA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Surface Warfare Center—Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland
Category: Technical Center
Mission: Research, Development, Testing, And Evaluation Support
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Disestablish the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Philadelphia Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and NSWC-Carderock, Bethesda, Maryland.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The Annapolis community stressed in 1991 the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission found NSWC Annapolis essential to current and future mission requirements. The community noted the site facilities were acknowledged to be superior by the 1991 Commission. The community also highlighted the high retention rates among an extremely educated and experienced staff. It also emphasized the Navy’s analysis of excess capacity was global and not specific to the work done at NSWC Annapolis. The community maintained the
services provided by NSWC Annapolis were essential regardless of downsizing, and it would be expensive and time-consuming to replicate the facility’s services elsewhere. The community also objected to the Navy’s plan to implement this realignment proposal since it would require engineers to commute to Annapolis, Maryland, from their new offices in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Bethesda, Maryland in order to conduct routine on-going research and development.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the DoD recommendation overstated the potential savings from the proposed action by not taking into account added costs and inefficiencies, resulting from having engineering personnel separated from their test facility. Additionally, one of the primary motives of this recommendation appears to be reduction in personnel.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5 and, therefore, adopts the following recommendation: the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Annapolis, MD, remains open and is not disestablished. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Surface Warfare Center—Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, Virginia
Category: Technical Center
Mission: Technical Support of Shipboard Systems
One-time Cost: $2.0 million
Savings: 1994-99: $8.1 million
Annual: $6.9 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community argued relocating the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia, would destroy in-service engineering workload synergies created by the 1991 Defense Base Closure’s realignment of the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, to FCDSSA Dam Neck. Further, the community pointed out the irrationality of moving the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, away from a similar in-service engineering function to the Fleet Combat Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia, which is a training function.

The community also contended the 1993 Defense Base Closure Commission’s estimated savings reflect planned personnel reductions, not reductions in overhead costs.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the proposed disestablishment involved a minimal physical relocation. The proposed move to a larger base
would allow the Navy to gain some operational efficiencies not otherwise achievable.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and therefore the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish the Virginia Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment, and support to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

**Naval Undersea Warfare Center–Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia**

Category: Technical Center  
Mission: In-service engineering in support of underwater vehicles  
One-time Cost: $18.0 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $6.0 million  
Annual: $5.0 million  
Payback: 6 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), Newport, Rhode Island.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the approved DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community believed the Navy understated the Warfare Center’s military value ranking by not fully considering the installation’s wide range of engineering and logistics services. The community stated in-service engineering facilities should be located near fleet customers to be responsive. By moving the Center’s activities to Newport, Rhode Island, the Navy would be moving those services farther away from the customers.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the Navy had understated the costs associated with the proposed closure of NUWC Norfolk in two areas. First, transportation costs associated with the proposed relocation of activities had been underestimated. Second, the cost to the Navy of getting out of its current lease in Norfolk had not been adequately stated. The Commission also found the activities in Newport and Norfolk were organizationally linked, and increased efficiencies and synergy would be gained from their collocation. This increase in the operational functioning of the combined organization outweighs the costs associated with the closure of the Norfolk facility, and the resulting relocation to Newport.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island.
Planning, Engineering for Repair and Alteration Centers (PERA)

Category: Technical Centers  
Mission: Ship Repair Planning  

**PERA (CV)**  
One-time Cost: $6.3 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $-4.46 million  
Annual: $0.74 million  
Payback: 17 years

**PERA (All others combined)**  
One-time Cost: $8.9 million  
Savings: $1.2 million  
Annual: $2.3 million  
Payback: 7 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the following four technical centers and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport News, Virginia:  

- (PERA)-(CV), Bremerton, Washington,  
- (PERA)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia,  
- (PERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, California,  
- (PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

These technical centers are recommended for disestablishment because their capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

(PERA Surface, Philadelphia)  
The community stated the Navy’s study of PERA Philadelphia was fundamentally flawed because the community alleged the Navy did not use certified data. Furthermore, the community claimed the Navy’s proposal could not realize real savings in either personnel or monetary terms because the projected elimination of positions could not actually occur. The community also stated the Navy did not consider an alternative proposal from the community that would save $16 million.

(PERA CV, Bremerton)  
The community stated the mission of PERA (CV) was substantially different from both PERA (Surface) and Supervisor of Shipbuilding. It noted the move of PERA (CV) would not break-even for seventeen years—the longest break-even period of any naval activity recommended for closure or realignment.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

In the case of PERA (HQ) Philadelphia, the Commission found the Navy’s recommendation was based on certified data, and the personnel reductions proposed by the Navy were reasonable. The consolidation proposed for the PERA centers allows for efficiencies of collocation.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the following four technical centers and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport News, Virginia:
Sea Automated Data Systems Activity
Indian Head, Maryland

Category: Technical Center
Mission: Data Automation Support
One-time Cost: $ -0.1 million (Savings)
Savings: 1994-99: $ 0.1 million
Annual: $ 0.5 million
Payback: 6 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Indian Head, Maryland.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force-Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found there was excess capacity in the Technical Center base category. Considering the need to realign and consolidate these facilities wherever possible, and considering the feasibility of consolidating this facility in particular, the Commission found it was in the best interests of the Navy to disestablish SEAADSA Indian Head, MD. The proposed action is primarily organizational. The one-time costs of the proposed action are negligible, and the disestablishment of SEAADSA pays for itself almost immediately.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission adopts the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Indian Head, Maryland.

Submarine Maintenance,
Engineering, Planning and Procurement, Portsmouth,
New Hampshire

Category: Technical Center
Mission: Ship Repair Planning
One-time Cost: $ 1.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 8.7 million
Annual: $ 2.6 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The employees expressed concern that, as a part of the shipyard, SUBMEPP might be forced to raise their man-day rate, thereby decreasing their ability to serve the fleet. It also noted they are expected to represent the customers of the shipyard, and might not be viewed as an honest broker if not established as a tenant command of the shipyard.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Navy decision was based on sound data. Once moved to the shipyard, the former SUBMEPP would remain under the jurisdiction of the Naval Sea Systems Command, which could determine the most effective management organization.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), New Hampshire, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine.

Naval Supply Centers

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center)

Charleston, South Carolina

Category: Supply Center
Mission: Supply Support
One-time Cost: $9 million
Savings: 1994-99: $23.2 million
Annual: $10.6 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston’s capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Naval Station Charleston, have been recommended for closure. The workload of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston will move with its customer’s workload to receiving bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Charleston community asserted a large number of people will still be needed to support contracting throughout the Southeast as well as various supply functions in the Charleston area. The community also pointed out that the retention of the quality jobs at FISC Charleston would help to mitigate the cumulative economic impact of the recommended closure of multiple activities in the Charleston area. The community further emphasized the cumulative economic impact on Charleston will be even greater when combined with the significant drawdowns that have already occurred since 1989.
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The community viewed the amount of shipping required to move materials to Norfolk as unrealistically low. The community also suggested that Cheatham Annex be closed instead of the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Charleston because it had a lower military value.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that despite the closure of Charleston’s Shipyard and Naval Station, there still remains sufficient workload to justify the existence of a supply presence in the Charleston area, in the form of a downsized FISC to support Navy requirements in the region now served by FISC Charleston. FISC Charleston has been the major contracting office for Navy and other Government agencies in the Southeastern United States and has an expertise in this area which could be retained in the downsized FISC. The total closure of FISC Charleston would leave that area, including the Weapons Station and the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, without contract and supply support that FISC did provide.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: partially disestablish Naval Supply Center (NSC) Charleston, South Carolina, and retain the facilities and personnel appropriate for the continued support of Navy activities in the Charleston, South Carolina area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center
(Naval Supply Center)
Oakland, California

Category: Supply Center
Mission: Supply Support
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: N/A
Annual: NIA
Payback: NIA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland, including the Naval Supply Depot, Point Molate, and relocate two supply ships to the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), San Diego. The Office of the Military Sealift Command, Pacific Division, relocates to leased space in the Oakland area.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center’s (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland; Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda; Naval Hospital, Oakland; Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Naval Station Treasure Island have also been recommended for closure. The workload of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Oakland will move with its customers to other locations.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Oakland community argued the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, is located at a major transportation hub on the west coast that uniquely offers access to air, rail, land, and sea transportation ports. The community added the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, has legal authority to negotiate a lease with the Port of Oakland for the port to construct a new container facility on Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, property. It pointed out the lease payments would support Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) operations and the Navy still has reversion rights in contingency situations, which are statutorily protected.

The Oakland community argued the Oakland Fleet and Industrial Supply Center’s (Naval Supply Center) major customers were not local. The center’s major customers were the ships located throughout the Western Pacific commands.
The community further argued the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, also acted as a naval station and was the primary berthing site for ships officially homeported at Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. In addition, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland, had many tenants and not all costs were identified to relocate these tenants.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense based his recommendation to close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland on the excess capacity found in the overall capability at the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers.

The primary customers of the Center are not local. The ships and shore commands found in the Mid- and Western Pacific rely extensively on FISC Oakland for supply support. While many of the Center’s local customers are being closed, this workload is only a small part of the business base, thus justifying retention of FISC Oakland.

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Oakland was ideally located on the west coast in a major transportation hub offering major access to air, rail, land, and sea transportation ports which greatly enhances its military value.

The Commission also found that the quality, and often minority, jobs retained at FISC Oakland helped to mitigate the cumulative economic impacts of other Bay Area commands recommended for closure.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Supply Center (NSC) Oakland, California, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

**Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Pensacola, Florida**

Category: Supply Center  
Mission: Logistics Support for the Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola  
One-time Cost: $7.9 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $29.06 million  
Annual: $6.7 million  
Payback: 0 years  

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Pensacola.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

NSC Pensacola’s capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customer of NSC Pensacola, the Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, is also recommended for closure. The workload of NSC Pensacola will move with its customers’ workload to receiving bases.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community stated that personnel from the local commands’ supply departments were transferred to what is now Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center), Pensacola, in order to partially staff that organization. Therefore, savings would be substantially less than perceived by the Navy, even if NADEP Pensacola were closed because the remaining activities could require the logistics support of the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center). It was also a concern of the community if NADEP Pensacola remained open, all supply support for this activity would have to come from NADEP Jacksonville, which it perceives to be inadequate support.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center’s (Naval Supply Center) primary customer at Pensacola is the Naval Aviation
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Depot. The Commission found that since the Naval Aviation Depot is recommended by the Commission for closure, the workload requirement would diminish significantly and excess capacity would result.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC), Pensacola.

**National Capital Regional (NCR) Activities**

**National Capital Regional (NCR) Activities**

Category: National Capital Region
Mission: Personnel
One-time Cost: $427 million
Annual: $110 million
Payback: 2-14 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Navy National Capital Region activities and relocate them as follows:

- Naval Air Systems Command to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland
- Naval Supply Systems Command (Including Food Service System Office, and Defense Printing Management Systems Office) to Ship Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
- Bureau of Naval Personnel (Including Office of Military Manpower Management) to Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee
- Naval Recruiting Command to Naval Training Center Great Lakes, Illinois
- Naval Security Group Command (Including Security Group Station and Security Group Detachment, Potomac) to National Security Agency Fort Meade, Maryland
- Tactical Support Office to Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet Norfolk, Virginia
- Relocate the following National Capital Region activities from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland:
  - Naval Sea Systems Command
  - Naval Facilities Engineering Command
  - Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
  - Office of the General Counsel
  - Office of the Judge Advocate General
  - Navy Field Support Activity
  - Office of the Secretary of the Navy
    - Legislative Affairs
    - Program Appraisal
    - Comptroller
    - Inspector General
    - Information
  - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
  - Office of Civilian Manpower Management
  - International Programs Office
  - Combined Civilian Personnel Office
  - Navy Regional Contracting Center
  - Naval Criminal Investigative Service
  - Naval Audit Service
  - Strategic Systems Programs Office
  - Office of Naval Research
  - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations & Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps
  - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps
  - Marine Corps Systems Command (Clarendon Office)
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The State of Virginia, and Arlington County in particular, argued they would suffer an unfair and disproportionate share of job losses from the recommended NCR actions. The community also challenged the COBRA cost savings estimated for these recommendations. It asserted the military construction (MILCON) and travel costs were understated at receiver locations, present and future lease costs for current office space were overstated, and the elimination of personnel associated with these realignments and relocations relied on unsubstantiated expectations. Further, the community asserted all required personnel reductions could be made in place.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found cost savings produced through realigning NCR activities were substantial. The Commission found significant military value in the consolidation of NCR missions at receiver locations. With respect to various unsolicited and revocable lease and sale offers for buildings in Northern Virginia presently occupied by Navy tenants, the Commission did not have the information or expertise to evaluate properly whether the “offers” provided the best value to the government or if they met the Navy’s requirements. Moreover, the Commission was not the appropriate entity to accept or reject the proposals. If, after careful scrutiny of these or other proposals, the Navy wishes to seek purchase of these or any facilities, it can submit a recommended change concerning these NCR activities to the 1995 Commission.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

- Realign Navy National Capital Region activities and relocate them as follows:
  - Naval Air Systems Command to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland
  - Naval Supply Systems Command (Including Food Service System Office, and Defense Printing Management Systems Office) to Ship Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
  - Bureau of Naval Personnel (Including Office of Military Manpower Management) to Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee
  - Naval Recruiting Command to Naval Training Center Great Lakes, Illinois
  - Naval Security Group Command (Including Security Group Station and Security Group Detachment, Potomac) to National Security Agency Fort Meade, Maryland
  - Tactical Support Office to Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet Norfolk, Virginia
  - Relocate the following National Capital Region activities from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland:
    - Naval Sea Systems Command
    - Naval Facilities Engineering Command
    - Space and Naval Warfare Systems
    - Office of the General Counsel
    - Office of the Judge Advocate General
    - Navy Field Support Activity
    - Office of the Secretary of the Navy
      - Legislative Affairs
      - Program Appraisal
      - Comptroller
      - Inspector General
      - Information
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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Civilian Manpower Management
International Programs Office
Combined Civilian Personnel Office
Navy Regional Contracting Center
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Naval Audit Service
Strategic Systems Programs Office
Office of Naval Research
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
(Installations & Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Systems Command
(Clarendon Office)

Other Naval Bases

1st Marine Corps District
Garden City, New York
Category: Administrative Activity
Mission: Recruiting Support
One-time Cost: $ N/A
Savings: 1994-99: $ N/A
Annual: $ N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the 1st Marine District, Garden City, New York and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Defense Distribution Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. The Defense Contract Management Area Office, a present tenant in the facility occupied by this activity as its host, will remain in place and assume responsibility for this facility. The Marine Corps Reserve Center, Garden City will relocate to Fort Hamilton, New York.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The reductions in force structure require a reduction of capacity in administrative activities. Consolidation of this activity into a joint services organization will enhance its ability to discharge its mission most effectively and economically.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community opposed the relocation of the First Marine Corps District to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Citing the long history of Marine service in Garden City, the community asserted the Marines were an integral part of the community. The Marine Corps supported relocation of this recruiting support activity to Pennsylvania to locate it more centrally within the nine-state area it services. However, relocation of the Marine Corps Reserve Activity to Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York, would not be cost effective since Fort Hamilton does not have adequate facilities. The community suggested an alternative to collocate with an existing reserve facility within a reasonable commuting distance from Garden City, or become a tenant of the Defense Contract Management Area Office.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found military construction would be required at Fort Hamilton, New York, to accommodate the relocation of the Marine Corps Reserve Center. The Commission found this additional military construction was neither cost effective nor necessary from a military perspective.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the 1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, New York, will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

DoD Family Housing and Family Housing Office, Niagara Falls, New York

Category: Miscellaneous Other Support Activities
Mission: To provide housing for military personnel
One-time Cost: $.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 7.9 million
Annual: $ 1.5 million
Payback: Immediate
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 housing units it administers.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The force reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan require reduction of support activities as well. This activity administers housing units which are old and substandard and expensive to maintain. These housing units are occupied by military personnel performing recruiting duties in the local area. The number of recruiting personnel will be drawing down and those that remain will be able to find adequate housing on the local economy.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found these 111 substandard units provide housing for about one-third of the military assigned independent duty in western New York State. This activity services 18 small commands in an area where affordable housing is available in the local economy. Repair costs to bring these structures up to standards would not be economical.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 housing units it administers.

Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Western Engineering Field Division
San Bruno, California

Category: Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Mission: Facility Engineering Support
One-time Cost: $.8 million
Savings: 1994-99 $.2 million
Annual: $ 1.3 million
Payback: 6 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary personnel, equipment and support as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering Field Activity under the management of the Southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, California.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The reduction in the force structure in the DoD Force Structure Plan and the closure of major naval activities in the San Francisco Bay area requires the realignment of this activity. The activity’s capacity to handle NAVFAC’s considerable responsibilities in dealing with environmental matters arising out of the 1993 round of base closures will remain in the same geographic area. The activity presently has such capacity. Retaining it for this purpose is a more economical and efficient alternative than relocating it to San Diego and then handling on-site problems on a travel status.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Western Engineering Field Division provides support to commands in the San Francisco Bay area recommended by the Commission for closure. Retaining a portion of the organization to provide environmental services during the closure process would facilitate the provision of these important services to those naval activities.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary personnel, equipment and support as a Base...
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering Field Activity under the management of the southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, California.

**Navy Public Works Center,**
**San Francisco, California**

Category: Public Works Center  
Mission: Public Works Support  
One-time Cost: $37.5 million  
Savings: 1994-99 $ 25.7 million  
Annual: $ 33.9 million  
Payback: 2 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) San Francisco.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**

PWC San Francisco’s capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan, and due to other Navy closures and realignments, its principal customer base has been eliminated.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**

The community claimed the Naval Public Works Center in San Francisco provided a greater number of family housing units than any other Navy location. The Navy Public Works Center operates over 7,000 family housing units in the Bay area, many of which were new.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**

The Commission found PWC San Francisco provides family housing, utilities, transportation, maintenance, engineering, and planning services to Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Coast Guard, and DOD commands in the San Francisco Bay Area. Because its primary customers in the Bay area are being recommended for closure, PWC San Francisco can also be closed and the customers that remain can receive the necessary services, including family housing, from reconstituted public works departments.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following:

disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) San Francisco.

**Reserve Activities**

**Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers**

Category: Reserve Centers  
Mission: Support Reserve Activities  
One-time Cost: $ 3.2 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $ 57.1 million  
Annual: $ 13.6 million  
Payback: N/A

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**

Close the following Reserve Centers:

- Naval Reserve Centers at:  
  - Gadsden, Alabama  
  - Montgomery, Alabama  
  - Fayetteville, Arkansas  
  - Fort Smith, Arkansas  
  - Pacific Grove, California  
  - Macon, Georgia  
  - Terre Haute, Indiana  
  - Hutchinson, Kansas  
  - Monroe, Louisiana  
  - New Bedford, Massachusetts  
  - Pittsfield, Massachusetts  
  - Joplin, Missouri  
  - St. Joseph, Missouri  
  - Great Falls, Montana  
  - Missoula, Montana  
  - Atlantic City, New Jersey  
  - Perth Amboy, New Jersey  
  - Jamestown, New York  
  - Poughkeepsie, New York  
  - Altoona, Pennsylvania  
  - Kingsport, Tennessee  
  - Memphis, Tennessee  
  - Ogden, Utah  
  - Staunton, Virginia  
  - Parkersburg, West Virginia  

- Naval Reserve Facility at:  
  - Alexandria, Louisiana  
  - Midland, Texas
Readiness Command Districts at:
Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18)
Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2)
Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The DOD Force Structure Plan requires the reduction of reserve assets as it does active duty assets. These Reserve Centers are being closed because their capacity is excess to the projected Navy/Marine Corps requirements. In arriving at the recommendation to close the Reserve Centers, specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was either an alternate location available to accommodate the affected reserve population (e.g., realign with an existing reserve center), or demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which units were being relocated. This specific analysis, conducted through the COBRA model, supports these closures.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Various communities expressed concerns about these closures since no provision appeared to have made to allow for reservists assigned to continue to drill. The communities indicated these activities were below threshold, and closure would result in reservists having nowhere within a reasonable commuting distance to drill. The communities also argued the Navy should have explored consolidation possibilities at some of these sites rather than closures.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that while data calls did not directly assess the mission of these activities, the analysis was nevertheless consistent. When recurring logistics costs for reservists who commute outside a reasonable distance to drill were included in the COBRA, it produced no significant change in return on investment. A Reserve Force comprehensive facilities review with projected repair costs, supported the Secretary’s recommendation; even though it did not address specific shortfalls in space requirements for vehicles, controlled equipage, trainers, and other special use spaces. A nation-wide scatter diagram of reserve drill population by activity preserved a surface reserve presence in all geographic locations of the nation. The proposal minimized disruption in reserve training, and contributory support to the active components, while producing cost efficiencies and enhancing the overall military value of remaining reserve centers.

However, the Commission found variance in the case of Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Billings, Montana. The Marine Corps Reserve indicated it would not be able to man its units if they were forced to compete for recruits at the Armed Forces Reserve Center in Helena where the Navy is consolidating its reserves.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the following Reserve Centers:

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Abilene, Texas

Naval Reserve Centers at:
Gadsden, Alabama
Montgomery, Alabama
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Pacific Grove, California
Macon, Georgia
Terre Haute, Indiana
Hutchinson, Kansas
Monroe, Louisiana
New Bedford, Massachusetts
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
Joplin, Missouri
St Joseph, Missouri
Great Falls, Montana
Missoula, Montana
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Perth Amboy, New Jersey
Jamestown, New York
Poughkeepsie, New York
Altoona, Pennsylvania
Kingsport, Tennessee
Memphis, Tennessee
Ogden, Utah
Staunton, Virginia
Parkersburg, West Virginia
Naval Reserve Facilities at:
Alexandria, Louisiana
Midland, Texas

Readiness Command Districts at:
Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18)
Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2)
Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5)

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers

Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center at Lawrence, Massachusetts
Naval Reserve Center at Chicopee, Massachusetts and Quincy, Massachusetts

Category: Reserve Centers
Mission: Support for Reserve Activities
One-time Cost: $ 20.7 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 19.4 million
Annual: $ .415 million
Payback: 100+ years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added these military installations to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

All four communities involved expressed support for this consolidation recognizing the economies to be realized by combining command and support structures at an existing base with messing and berthing facilities.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found upon further analysis consolidation of these three Reserve Centers would not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the final selection criteria. Consolidation of these activities at the existing facilities at Naval Air Station (NAS) South Weymouth, would preserve reserve unit manning levels by keeping a drill site within reasonable commuting distance of the reservists it supports. In addition, consolidation would reduce overhead costs for three separate facilities, associated messing and berthing costs for assigned reservists, and dispose of three older facilities.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; close Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; and close Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts; and consolidate these activities at existing facilities at NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Hospitals

Naval Hospital
Charleston, South Carolina

Category: Medical Activity
Mission: Provide Health Care
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Hospital, Charleston and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. As a result of the closure of the Charleston Naval Station, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the supporting Supply Center and Public Works Center, the active duty personnel previously supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, are no longer in the area to be supported.
Closure of the Naval Hospital follows the closure of these activities supporting these operating forces.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Charleston community expressed great concern regarding health-care for eligible beneficiaries remaining in the Charleston area if the Charleston Naval Hospital closes. The community argued that if all of the proposed Navy reductions and closures in Charleston were approved by the Commission, there would still be a significant number of active-duty military personnel in the Charleston area requiring medical care. The large number of eligible retirees and dependents would also benefit from the retention of Naval Hospital Charleston. The community argued that should the Naval Hospital, Charleston, close, the eligible retired beneficiary population, including those eligible for Medicare, in the greater Charleston area would be faced with additional and unanticipated medical expenses, particularly in obtaining prescriptions.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that if the recommended closure of the Charleston Naval Station and Shipyard is approved, the active-duty population supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, will be greatly reduced. However, the Commission found that DoD based their recommendation for the closure of the Naval Hospital, Charleston, on changes to mission assignment and not on the requirement to serve the active-duty and eligible beneficiary population found in the Charleston area.

The Commission found that even with the recommended closure of the Naval Station, Charleston and the Naval Shipyard there will still be a substantial number of active duty personnel and eligible beneficiaries in the Charleston area requiring access to health care facilities.

Additionally, the Commission found that Naval Hospital, Charleston, supported eligible beneficiaries from the Myrtle Beach AFB, MCAS Beaufort, Charleston AFB, and elsewhere in the metropolitan Charleston area. In addition, Naval Hospital, Charleston, treats patients who return to the United States on military MEDEVACs flights from Europe.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and criteria 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Hospital, Oakland, California

Category: Medical Activity
Mission: Provide Health Care
One-time Cost: $57.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $51.6 million
Annual: $41.5 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. In the San Francisco Bay area, the Naval Air Station, Alameda, Naval Shipyard, Mare Island and the supporting Public Works Center and Supply Center are being recommended for closure. Given the elimination of these operating force activities, closure of the Naval Hospital, Oakland is indicated as the military personnel previously supported are no longer in the area.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Oakland community argued plans had been made for the Navy to take over Letterman Army Hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco, and this was a very low-cost way to maintain a needed
Navy facility. The community also argued the Naval Hospital Oakland would be needed to support Navy activities in Alameda as well as other DoD-eligible beneficiaries in the Bay Area. The community expressed great concern regarding health care for the eligible beneficiary population remaining in the Oakland area should the Naval Hospital close. The community also argued they felt a replacement hospital should be built due to the advanced age of the current Navy Hospital at Oakland. The CHAMPUS-eligible beneficiaries were concerned about the possible increase in cost of medical care should they be required to use CHAMPUS or Medicare instead of a DoD medical treatment facility.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found since the primary military installations in the Bay Area were recommended for closure (with the exception of Naval Supply Center Oakland, a primarily civilian command activity), Naval Hospital Oakland would no longer be required. This finding is in keeping with the DoD policy of providing primary hospital care in support of only active duty populations. The Commission further found the medical needs of retirees could be met at the extensive number of civilian, Veterans’ Administration, or military medical facilities within a reasonable distance. Additionally, the Commission found the current Navy Hospital in Oakland was expensive to operate and maintain due to its advanced age. Investigation by the Commission found that extensive repairs would be essential to bring it up to seismic stabilization standards as well as acceptable medical standards.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington.

Naval Hospital, Orlando, Florida

Category: Medical Activity
Mission: Provide Health Care
One-time Cost: $51.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $-31.0 (Cost)
Annual: $8.1 million
Payback: 13 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any naval hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the forces which created a demand for the presence of a naval hospital in the first instance. The Naval Training Center, Orlando which was supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is being recommended for closure. Accordingly, the operating force support previously provided by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is no longer required and closure follows the decision to close the Naval Training Center.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Orlando community expressed great concern over health care for the eligible beneficiaries remaining in the Orlando area should the Naval Hospital close. The Orlando community argued the Naval Hospital, Orlando served approximately 45,000 more patients annually than the Naval Hospital, Great Lakes and operated at a more efficient level. This efficiency resulted in an annual $8 million saving at Orlando Naval Hospital. The community suggested even with the large number of retirees who receive health care in the Orlando area, the Naval Hospital, Orlando, provided a CHAMPUS savings estimated at $51 million.
The community also stated the Orlando Naval Hospital was capable of incorporating the additional training requirements with no additional military construction. The Orlando community stressed the Naval Hospital Great Lakes was currently operating at 25% of capacity and would require significant construction if this capacity were to be expanded. The community also argued there was asbestos found throughout the Naval Hospital facility at Great Lakes that would make any expansion both difficult and expensive.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the active duty population supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando, will be greatly reduced with the recommended closure of the Orlando Naval Training Center. The Commission found acceptable the Navy’s argument military hospitals are intended to support active-duty personnel and should not be retained in cases when the active-duty population is reduced below levels necessary to warrant a military hospital. In addition, the Commission found it would be less expensive to provide health care to DoD eligible beneficiaries through CHAMPUS than by an active-duty Navy hospital due to the availability of local civilian health care organizations and the competitive atmosphere among health-care providers in the Orlando area. The transfer of Naval Hospital, Orlando, medical personnel to other military installations will increase the availability of medical care at those receiving locations, which in turn will partially offset the predicted increase in CHAMPUS costs in the Orlando area.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California

Category: Naval Shipyards
Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships
Cost to Redirect: N/A
Savings: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Permit the Navy to dispose of this facility in any lawful manner, including outleasing.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission Report, at page 5-18, recommended closing the Hunters Point Annex and outleasing the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space for Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning Engineering for Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a Contractor-Operated test facility.

Force level reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan remove any long-term need to retain all of this facility for emergent requirements. The recommended closure of the major naval installations in this geographic area terminates any requirement for these facilities. The limitation of disposal authority to outleasing unnecessarily restricts the Navy’s ability to dispose of this property in a timely and lawful manner.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found the Navy’s 1991 request, and the 1991 Commission’s subsequent recommendation to outlease Hunters Point Annex unnecessarily inhibits the Navy’s ability to dispose of this property.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: permit the Navy to dispose of Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, California, in any lawful manner, including outleasing.

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California
Category: Operational Air Station
Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations
One-time Cost: $ 897.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 349.9 million
Annual: $ 148.5 million
Payback: 4 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment. MCAS Tustin was recommended for closure in 1991, with its aviation assets to relocate to MCAGCC Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both. In 1993 MCAS Tustin’s aviation assets were recommended by the Secretary of Defense for redirection to NAS Miramar and MCAS Camp Pendleton.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The community did not want the Commission to reconsider its 1991 recommendation to close MCAS Tustin; it wanted the 1991 Commission’s closure decision to remain intact. The community had already invested substantially in a base reuse program. It did not want to abandon its two-year investment of effort and money in the reuse plan. The community also believed better alternatives existed to relocate Marine Corps helicopters without retaining MCAS Tustin. Specifically, it proposed: keeping MCAS El Toro open and adding the MCAS Kaneohe Bay fixed wing mission there; closing NAS Miramar and relocating its units per the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. The community asserted this proposal would enhance operational readiness and still allow the community to pursue its reuse plan. The community also contended the Commission’s decision to reconsider its 1991 recommendation would encourage other communities to ignore the finality of the Commission’s actions and would encourage communities to resist closures long after the final vote of the Commission.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found a sufficient number of acres were available at NAS Miramar to accommodate the aircraft, personnel, and support equipment from MCAS Tustin in spite of environmental constraints on development. While areas expected to be affected by necessary expansion included critical habitats, none were located in quantities sufficient to preclude anticipated necessary expansion. The Commission also found relocation to NAS Miramar to be operationally advantageous due to close proximity to the Marine division at Camp Pendleton, where a significant percentage of critical training is conducted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
See Marine Corps Air Station El Toro.

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California and NESEC Vallejo, California
Category: Naval Technical Center
Mission: Electronic In-Service Engineering
One-time Cost: $ 914 thousand
Savings: 1994-99: $ 2.5 million
Annual: $ 0.65 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California and the NESEC Vallejo, California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, California.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

This is a change from the 1991 Commission action which called for closure of NESEC San Diego and relocation to Point Loma to form Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC). Air Force Plant #19 was operated by a contractor as an Air Force Government-Owned-Contractor-Owned and NESEC San Diego subleased space. Now the contractor has left and Air Force offered to transfer Plant 19 without reimbursement. Rehabilitation can be accomplished within the estimates of the BRAC 91 recommendations for both relocating NESECs and avoiding the serious environmental concerns attendant to new construction at Point Loma.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Vallejo community contended the Navy’s estimates to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 are understated. Specifically, the community argued the Navy’s military construction estimates do not include the cost of building or refurbishing a remote facility to conduct radiological work, the cost of disassembling and reassembling the extensive computer systems, and the cost of hiring and training employees to replace those who are not willing to relocate. In addition, the community stated the anticipated savings were being extracted from a larger personnel elimination than was advertised by the Navy in 1991. The community provided documentation supporting their claim that cost to execute the DoD redirect would exceed Navy estimates.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Navy’s cost estimate to refurbish Air Force Plant #19 was reasonable and closely reflected the cost to execute DoD’s recommendation. In addition, the Commission found the Navy should realize operation efficiencies through the consolidation of both NESEC San Diego and NESEC Vallejo at AFP #19.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California, and the NESEC Vallejo, California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, California.

Naval Surface Warfare Center – Pt. Hueneme, Virginia Beach, Virginia

(Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown, Virginia)

Category: Technical Center
Mission: Support Mine Warfare In-Service Engineering

One-time Cost: $7.5 million
Savings: 1994-99: $3.2 million
Annual: $1.1 million
Payback: 9 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

In the 1991 Commission Report, the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (NMWEA), Yorktown, Virginia, was recommended for closure and realignment to facilities under the control of the Chief of Naval Education and Training at Dam Neck, Virginia. The realignment has been accomplished through organizational changes and NMWEA is now the Yorktown Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme. However, after BRAC 91, the needs of the educational and training community were such that the Dam Neck space is no longer available. Therefore, as part of BRAC 93 process, alternative receiving sites were explored. Because of the advisability of consolidating activities performing similar functions, and since the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, has significant responsibilities in mine warfare R&D, COBRA data was requested. Because of the advantages of collocating this mine warfare engineering activity with another facility having substantial responsibilities in the same fields, and because
it is less expensive than the BRAC 91 relocation to Dam Neck, Virginia, the Navy recommends that the receiving site for this activity be revised to Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, in lieu of Dam Neck, Virginia.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The east coast mine warfare community could be consolidated in the Yorktown, Dam Neck, Little Creek area. The community pointed out the Panama City, Florida, facility consists of many, small buildings instead of the single facility where employees currently work in the Yorktown area. The community also noted there were few mine warfare experts in the Panama City area. The potential loss of these experts could be devastating to the programs, especially in light of the increasing mine warfare role in low-intensity conflict scenarios.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found that space planned for use at Dam Neck by Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity was no longer available. The projected potential savings and synergy of collocating like missions in the newly proposed receiver site at Panama City, Florida, outweigh the potential loss of expert personnel.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

Navy Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, New Mexico
Category: Technical Center
Mission: Coordinate with Sandia Laboratory, Department of Energy
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Permit a small detachment of the Weapons Division to remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF) in order to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
This recommendation was originally intended as an exception to the 1991 recommendation to close NWEF Albuquerque, but was not included in the specific DoD recommendations. The Navy has a continuing need for a detachment to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory and other agencies involved in nuclear programs in that geographic area. The detachment would remain as a tenant of Kirtland Air Force Base.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Secretary’s recommendation to close Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque reduces unnecessary infrastructure, however there is a continuing need for a detachment to provide liaison with Sandia Laboratory and other agencies involved in nuclear programs in that geographical area.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: permit a small detachment of the Weapons Division to remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF), Albuquerque, New Mexico, in order to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy.
Chapter I

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Large Aircraft

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Bomber/Tanker
One-time Cost: $120.8 million
Savings: 1994-99: $61.8 million
Annual: $39.2 million
Payback: 6 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactive. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an “as needed, on call” basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria are applied, Griffiss AFB ranked low compared to the other large aircraft bases. Based on this analysis, the application of all eight DoD selection criteria, and excess capacity which results from reduced force structure, Griffiss AFB is recommended for realignment.

The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base in the Northeast to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. Griffiss AFB was evaluated specifically as the location for this wing, along with other bases that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission: McGuire AFB, New Jersey and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its geographical location, attributes and base loading capacity. Principal mobility attributes include aircraft parking space (for 70-80 tanker/airlift aircraft), fuel hydrants and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with present and future encroachment and airspace considerations.

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and is located in adequate facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB. It does not need to be closed or realigned as a result of the reductions in the rest of the base.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign Griffiss AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Griffiss AFB community believed the Air Force should have selected Griffiss AFB as the East Coast Mobility Base rather than Plattsburgh AFB. The community believed some of the information the Air Force used in selecting the East Coast Mobility Base was erroneous, and if the Air Force knew the facts, it would have selected Griffiss AFB. Community officials addressed parking capacity; petroleum, oils, and
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lubricants storage; numbers and types of hydrants; and airfield infrastructure at Griffiss AFB. Also addressed were ground and air encroachment problems at Plattsburgh AFB. The community presented information asserting it would be less expensive to establish Griffiss AFB than to establish Plattsburgh AFB as the East Coast Mobility Base.

The community was also very concerned that in realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD could be positioning itself to close one of its tenants, the Rome Laboratory, in the near future.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

As a B-52 bomber base, the Commission found even though Griffiss AFB rated high in criteria 1, 2, and 3, other bomber bases rated higher in overall military value. The Commission found Barksdale AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, and the Air Force had selected Barksdale AFB to be the B-52 combat crew training base. Minot AFB, which the Commission rated high as a B-52 bomber base, also had additional military value as a missile field. The Commission rated Griffiss AFB very high as a tanker base in criteria 1, 2, and 3, but other installations, including Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had higher overall military value. The Air Force announced the selection of Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB as major receiver sites for tankers. Fairchild AFB had increased overall military value because it hosts the Air Force Survival School and Grand Forks AFB had the additional military value of a missile field.

The Commission requested that the Air Force comment on the community concern that in realigning Griffiss AFB at this time, DoD appears to be positioning itself to close the Rome Laboratory in the near future. In a May 7, 1993 letter to the Commission, Mr. James Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, stated “the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate the Rome Laboratory within the next five years.”

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah. The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss AFB in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an “as needed, on call” basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Bomber
One-time Cost: $143.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $167.3 million
Annual: $62.4 million
Payback: 4 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft instead of implementing the previous Base Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, to K.I. Sawyer AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with
respect to START 11. This requires the retention of the ballistic missile fields at Malmstrom AFB, Grand Forks AFB, Minot AFB, and F.E. Warren AFB. It is more economical to retain a bomber/missile base that must remain open for missiles than to maintain a bomber-only base. Therefore, based on the facts that K.I. Sawyer AFB does not support ballistic missile operations, that when all eight DoD criteria are applied K.I. Sawyer AFB ranks low, and that there is excess large aircraft base capacity, K.I. Sawyer AFB is recommended for closure.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close K.I. Sawyer AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Air Force did not compare large and small aircraft bases. If it had, the Air Force would have realized K.I. Sawyer AFB would make an outstanding base for the future because access to airspace in the Upper Peninsula region is unencumbered, and the base is strategically located for deployment to potential trouble spots around the globe. The community also challenged the Air Force decision to keep bomber bases with missile fields open instead of bomber-only bases such as K.I. Sawyer AFB. The community said this decision potentially hurts the survivability of two legs of the triad, and K.I. Sawyer AFB should remain open as a bomber base to increase the targeting problem of a potential adversary.

The community was also very concerned about the potential unemployment in the region if K.I. Sawyer AFB closed. The unemployment figures in the community were projected to be approximately 24%, which could devastate the local economy. Also, the community argued the Secretary of Defense did not consider the cumulative economic impact to the region, including the closure of Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, in the 1991 round of base closures, and Kincheloe AFB, Michigan, in an earlier round of base closures.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found K.I. Sawyer AFB did not rate as high in criteria 1, 2, and 3 as other B-52 bases. The Commission found Barksdale AFB rated very high as a B-52 base, and the Secretary of the Air Force selected Barksdale AFB to be the B-52 combat crew training base. Minot AFB, which the Commission rated relatively high as a B-52 base, also had the additional military value of a missile field. As a small aircraft base, the Commission evaluated K.I. Sawyer AFB in criteria 1, 2, and 3 and found it had a rating lower than all other small-aircraft bases. As a tanker base, the Commission rated K.I. Sawyer AFB moderately high in Criteria 1, 2, and 3, but other installations, including Fairchild AFB and Grand Forks AFB, had higher overall military value. Fairchild AFB had the Air Force Survival School and a higher one-time cost to close and Grand Forks AFB had the additional military value of a missile field.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft instead of implementing the previous Base Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, to K.I. Sawyer AFB.
March Air Force Base, California

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Tanker
One-time Cost: $134.8 million
Savings: 1994-99: $53.8 million
Annual: $46.9 million
Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. First, the Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Also, when all eight DoD criteria were applied to the large aircraft bases, March AFB ranked low. The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base (KC-10, C-5 and C-141 aircraft) on the west coast. When bases in the region (Beale AFB, California; Fairchild AFB, Washington; March AFB, California; McChord AFB, Washington; Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Travis AFB, California) were analyzed for this mission, Travis AFB ranked highest. March AFB currently requires a large active duty component to support a relatively small active duty force structure. The conversion of March AFB to a reserve base achieves substantial savings and the benefit of a large recruiting population for the Air Force Reserve is retained.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign March AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued March AFB should remain an active-duty base because of its strategic location and its importance to the defense of the U.S. Further, the community maintained the base was a vital onload point for US Marines in support of Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Operation Restore Hope. The community also argued future Marine Corps rapid deployment requirements would not be met with only a reserve capability at March AFB. Further, the community pointed out there has been approximately $200M in construction at the base in the past few years. The community also noted the Air Force incorrectly graded numerous subelements that were used in evaluating the large aircraft bases. The community noted further that the base has a modern, state-of-the-art hydrant refueling system. The community also took issue with the CHAMPUS savings in the COBRA model, maintaining there were higher costs, not savings, which reduced the overall savings anticipated by the realignment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found March AFB, California, ranked low in military value due to its location in a highly congested airspace environment. While the base has been used as the onload point for
U.S. Marine deployments, the realignment of active-duty resources would not restrict future use of the base for airlift of the Marine forces. The majority of military construction (MILCON) funds expended at March AFB recently has been for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard facilities which will continue to be needed. In addition, other MILCON funds have been expended for organizational realignments from the 1988 base closure actions. (These organizations would also be remaining at March AFB.) The Commission found no significant disparity in the CHAMPUS documentation. While the Commission agrees some grading errors may have been made in the Air Force report, the adjustments to those color grades did not materially change the overall rating of March AFB.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain at March.

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Airlift
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign McGuire AFB, NJ. The 438th Airlift Wing will inactivate. Most of the C-141s will transfer to Plattsburgh AFB, NY. Fourteen C-141s will remain and transfer to the Air Force Reserve. The 514th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), the 170th Air Refueling Group Air National Guard (ANG), and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain and the base will convert to a Reserve base. The 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) will relocate from Willow Grove Naval Air Station, PA, to McGuire AFB. The Air Force Reserve will operate the base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DOD force structure plan. McGuire ranked low when compared to other bases in its category and when it was compared specifically with other airlift bases.

The Air Force plans to establish a large mobility wing base in the Northeast United States to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. McGuire AFB, Griffiss AFB, New York and Plattsburgh AFB, New York were evaluated specifically as possible locations for this wing since all met the geographical criteria. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its location, attributes, and base loading capacity.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued McGuire AFB’s capability to support the mobility wing was better than that of Plattsburgh AFB, and McGuire AFB proved its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The community also argued McGuire was strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. They also asserted Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The community noted McGuire could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than Plattsburgh AFB.
Further, the community argued McGuire AFB was incorrectly downgraded for ground and airspace encroachment, and training was not encumbered as indicated by the Air Force. Other concerns raised by the community included encroachment of the accident potential zone at Plattsburgh AFB.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission found McGuire AFB's training limitations were successfully managed. A new air mobility wing would be able to meet its total mission requirements based at McGuire AFB. DoD did not adequately consider the military value of McGuire AFB in its assessment of the extent of the impact of airspace problems and the base's contribution during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or potential similar contingency operations. Further, the cost to realign McGuire was understated in the Air Force report. While an increase in civil aviation is very likely to occur, the increased mission activity could be accommodated with continued airspace management by the Federal Aviation Administration. Also, although there were sufficient alternatives for providing fuel to Plattsburgh AFB in the wintertime, the fuel delivery costs were approximately 5.6 times more expensive annually at Plattsburgh AFB than at McGuire AFB. This increased cost of fuel delivery at Plattsburgh AFB, not originally considered in cost computations, makes the base a more attractive closure option than realigning McGuire. In addition, McGuire AFB is closer to customers of the military airlift system, prospective contingency onload points, and is in the heart of the northeast surface transportation systems.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain McGuire AFB as an active installation. The 438th and 514th Airlift Wings, the 170th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain at McGuire AFB. Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from Barksdale AFB to McGuire AFB. Move the requisite number of KC-135 aircraft to establish the east coast mobility base at McGuire AFB. The C-130 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) remains at Willow Grove NAS, PA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York
Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Tanker
One-time Cost: $131.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $137.1 million
Annual: $56.6 million
Payback: 3 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
The opposing community argued that McGuire AFB had the capability to support the mobility wing better than Plattsburgh and McGuire AFB had proven its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. McGuire is strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. Opposing communities also argued Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The McGuire community also noted McGuire AFB could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than it would take at Plattsburgh AFB. The opposing communities also pointed out the Air Force had failed to properly recognize significant ground encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB. The Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of the fuel resupply issue, arguing the base could be refueled anytime, although there had been no previous requirement to do so. Additionally, the Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of ground encroachment and argued Plattsburgh was being judged on a double standard regarding the encroachment. The Plattsburgh community stressed the importance of their superior ramp space and superb quality of life.
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COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found Plattsburgh AFB had a relatively small active duty force structure supported by a large installation and support organization. Also, the base can be closed with relatively low costs with high returns for a short payback period. Plattsburgh AFB is located some distance from normal airlift customers and onload points, increasing the cost of annual operations. Further, annual fuel resupply to Plattsburgh AFB to support the proposed east coast mobility wing were estimated at $11.8M, approximately 460% higher than at McGuire AFB. The Air Force’s Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) program, a voluntary program for communities, provides guidelines for land development near Air Force installations for public safety. There was concern with the continued commercial development in the North Accident Potential Zone II (APZ II). Though the Air Force has a very good accident record, a large airlift/tanker aircraft accident in this area could be catastrophic.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Plattsburgh AFB and redistribute assets as appropriate. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Small Aircraft

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Small Aircraft
Mission: Power Projection, F-16
One-time Cost: $42.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $357.5 million
Annual: $71 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Homestead AFB, Florida, is recommended for closure. The 31st Fighter Wing will inactivate. All F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy will move to Lackland AFB, Texas. The Air Force Water Survival School will be temporarily located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the US Navy. The 301st Rescue Squadron, Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will move to Patrick AFB, Florida. The 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) will move to MacDill AFB, Florida and convert to KC-135Rs. The NORAD alert activity will move to an alternate location. The 726th Air Control Squadron will relocate to Shaw AFB. The Naval Security Group will consolidate with other US Navy units. All DoD activities and facilities including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange facilities will close. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will continue until completed. If Homestead AFB resumes operations as a civilian airport, the NORAD alert facility may be rebuilt in a cantonment area.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There were several factors which resulted in the closure recommendation. First, the Air Force has one more small aircraft base than is required to support the fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When the data were evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria, Homestead AFB ranked low relative to the other bases in the small aircraft subcategory. While Homestead AFB’s ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, one stood out: the excessive cost to rebuild Homestead, while other small aircraft bases required little or no new investment. The cost to close Homestead AFB is low, especially when measured against the high cost of reconstruction, and the long-term savings are substantial.

All small aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. Bases were evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general
officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close Homestead AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community highlighted the military value of Homestead’s proximity to Cuba, both as a deterrent to possible aggression and for staging combat and contingency operations in the southern region and against Cuba. The community described the situation where Hurricane Andrew effectively closed Homestead in August 1992, when base personnel evacuated and did not return. Damage caused by Hurricane Andrew denied the local region time to adjust to normal base closure actions during a time of severe economic devastation. The community disagreed with the Department of Defense assessment of 1% economic impact on the area. The community believed the Air Force understated costs for moving the 482d Fighter Wing to MacDill as part of Homestead’s cost to close. The community agreed the cost to fully restore Homestead was excessive, but supplemental appropriations for rebuilding the base would adequately cover the cost of building a reserve cantonment area, allowing the return of both reserve units, the Water Survival School, and the alert facility. These funds were held in abeyance by the Air Force pending the 1993 base-closure decisions and were not considered in Homestead’s scenario cost comparisons. The community also argued that base-operating costs associated with reopening MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, operated by the 482d Fighter Wing, were not factored in Homestead’s cost to close and would exceed operating costs of a cantonment area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the military value of Homestead AFB’s location was indeed high, due to its strategic location, but this did not justify rebuilding the base to its previous capabilities. The Commission found the community erred in its cost-saving analysis by mixing operations and maintenance funds with military construction funds, the supplemental allocation funds combined with savings from not moving the units were sufficient to rebuild facilities for the Air Force Reserve’s 482d Fighter Wing, the North American Air Defense alert detachment, and the Water Survival School. When combined with savings from military construction cost avoidance for rebuilding the 31st Fighter Wing facilities at Homestead, the 301st Rescue Squadron facilities could also be rebuilt. The Commission’s cost analysis showed more savings for rebuilding facilities to house F-16 aircraft, not KC-135R aircraft, because support facilities for KC-135Rs would be approximately $29,600,000 more than rebuilding facilities for F-16s.

The Commission found rebuilding the Water Survival School facilities at Homestead AFB was affordable, but reestablishing that unit would necessitate reopening Homestead as an active duty air force base with attendant increased requirements for facilities to house and support active-duty military personnel, actions which were not cost effective.

The Commission found rebuilding the 301st Rescue Squadron facilities was affordable, and the Air Force could enhance combat mission integration and effectiveness by collocating these two synergistic reserve component combat units. The Commission found the Space Shuttle support mission the unit currently performs is secondary to its primary tasking, and current Space Shuttle mission requirements for the unit could be supported from Homestead AFB.

The Commission found the Air Force did not include operating costs for opening MacDill AFB in its closing-cost analysis and thus overestimated savings from closing Homestead AFB. The Commission also found, although the projected employment loss was only 1% of the Miami-Hialeah Metropolitan Statistical Area, the actual economic impact was concentrated in the less densely populated South Dade County where damage from Hurricane Andrew was more concentrated and where Homestead AFB is located. The economic impact from this closure to South Dade County was 6.5%.

Finally, the Commission found that it would be more economical for Dade County to operate Homestead AFB as a civil airport with the Air Force Reserve units as tenants on the base.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 3, 4 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Homestead AFB with the following actions. Inactivate the 31st Fighter Wing; all F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina; move the Inter-American Air Forces Academy to Lackland AFB, Texas; temporarily relocate the Air Force Water Survival School to Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the Navy. Relocate the 726th Air Control Squadron to Shaw AFB. Consolidate the Naval Security Group with other US Navy units. Close all DoD activities and facilities, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base-exchange facilities. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will be completed. The 482d F-16 Fighter Wing (AFRES) and the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) and the North American Air Defense alert activity will remain in cantonment areas. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Air Force Reserve

O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station, Illinois

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Airlift and Tanker
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

O'Hare Reserve Station is in the Northwest corner of O'Hare International Airport, enjoying immediate access to two runways. Two ARC units are based there: the 928th Airlift Group (Air Force Reserve), with C-130s; and the 126th Air Refueling Wing (Air National Guard), with KC-135s. An Army Reserve Center is located adjacent to the base. In addition, a large Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activity currently occupies a government owned, recently renovated office building on the base; however, DLA is recommending disestablishment of this activity to other locations as part of the 1993 base closure process.

In a 1991 land exchange agreement, intended to resolve all real property issues between the Air Force and the City of Chicago at O'Hare International Airport, the City specifically agreed that it would seek no more land from the O'Hare ARS. The Air Force has advised the City that the ARC units are adequately housed at O'Hare, and there is no basis for moving them. There are no savings from moving; only costs. To justify this realignment under the DoD Base Closure Selection Criteria, all costs of closure1 realignment would have to be funded entirely outside the federal government. (For example, no DoD or FAA funds). The relocation site would have to meet all operating requirements, such as runway length and freedom from noise-related operating limitations, and be close enough to Chicago that the units would not suffer major loss of personnel. The day-to-day operating costs at the relocation site would have to compare favorably with those at O'Hare International Airport.

The City proposes that the ARC units move to Greater Rockford Airport, 55 miles northwest of O'Hare International Airport. Virtually no facilities for the units exist at Rockford, so an entirely new base would have to be constructed. The airfield is constrained on two sides by the cost whatsoever to the federal government and that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1997. Chicago would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport.
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Rock River and flood plain. At least one runway will have to be extended for KC-135 operations. There appear to be noise and other environmental problems to resolve before a final determination of siting feasibility can be made.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Some community groups supported the realignment of O’Hare ARS, while others opposed it; however, all involved wanted the units to stay in Illinois. The opposition groups claimed the unit combat effectiveness would be adversely impacted by loss of personnel and a diminished recruiting population base outside the Chicago metropolitan area. The opposition groups argued the City of Chicago had no financial plan and had not determined costs to rebuild replacement facilities for the reserve units. Furthermore, assurances were initially made to avoid costs to DoD, but not to the federal government. The opposition also argued costs to relocate were excessive because there were no other runways in Illinois long enough to handle the KC-135 aircraft and the proposed site at the Greater Rockford Airport currently had no unit facilities.

The groups supporting the O’Hare ARS realignment believed other sites would provide adequate populations for recruiting. The groups also claimed moving the units to a less-congested location would increase training opportunities and allow for future unit expansion. The current use of the airport land as a military installation is inefficient, and the realignment of the base would allow economic development, increase the number of jobs, and improve airport efficiency. The City of Chicago asserted the time constraints were unrealistic and the Secretary of Defense recommendation should be changed to allow completion of the move by 1999 as the statute allows. The supporting organizations claimed no Department of Defense funds would be spent for unit relocations, but federal funds could be spent for normal civil aviation improvements to facilitate the transfer. In addition, the groups claimed federal policy promoting conversion of military bases to civil aviation was relevant in this situation.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found although the units were adequately housed at O’Hare Air Reserve Station, the community’s desire to move the units undermines the typical community-base support relationship found at other bases, and could be detrimental to future mission accomplishments. The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the relocation must be at no cost to the federal government and that financial plans must include the receiving community’s contributions toward this relocation. The Commission found flying operations were impeded during adverse weather due to basing on the world’s busiest airport. Additionally, local visual flight training was conducted at remote fields due to traffic congestion at Chicago O’Hare. The Commission found all military construction was halted at O’Hare ARS in response to closure actions thus affecting maintenance of the base and potentially affecting flying operations, if the Air Force subsequently rejects relocation sites. The Commission found there would be a smaller population base from which to recruit, likely impacting unit manning. These additional costs to replace personnel would not be recoverable from the City of Chicago, but should not significantly impact unit combat capability.

The Commission found the City of Chicago did not plan for moving the Army Reserve activity adjacent to the base, but must include that unit in future expansion proposals.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close O’Hare ARS as proposed by the City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force (in consultation and agreement with the receiving location), provided the City of Chicago can demonstrate that it has the financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities (except for FAA grants for airport planning and
development that would otherwise be eligible for federal financial assistance to serve the needs of civil aviation at the receiving location), environmental impact analyses, moving, and any added costs of environmental cleanup resulting from higher standards or a faster schedule than DoD would be obliged to meet if the base did not close, without any cost whatsoever to the federal government, and further provided that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1998. Chicago would also have to fund the cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Other Air Force Bases

Gentile Air Force Station
Dayton, Ohio

Category: Air Force Station
Mission: Principal and host organization is the Defense Electronics Supply Center. In addition there are over 20 tenant activities.

One-Time Cost: $31.3 million
Savings: 1994-99: $17.1 million (cost)
Annual: $3.8 million
Payback: 8 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community was primarily interested in retaining the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) as the host on Gentile AFS. It argued keeping DESC at Gentile AFS was more cost effective than relocating the mission to Columbus, Ohio, as recommended by DoD.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found closing the Defense Electronics Supply Center and relocating it at the Defense Construction Supply Center, along with most of the other Gentile Air Force Station tenants, streamlined operations and cut cost. However, the Defense Switching Network will remain as the sole tenant of Gentile Air Force Station, with the possibility of being phased out within three to four years. The Commission did not ascertain costs associated with closure of Gentile AFS. The closure would be relatively inexpensive because Gentile is a small installation, owned by the Air Force (Wright Patterson AFB), which would be vacant except for the automatic switching center.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio, except for space required to operate the Defense Switching Network. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Air Force Depots

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio

Category: Depot
Mission: Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center

One-time Cost: $31.3 million
Savings: 1994-99: $17.1 million (cost)
Annual: $3.8 million
Payback: 8 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Newark AFB, Ohio, is recommended for closure. The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) depot will be closed; some workload will move to other depot maintenance activities including the private sector. We anticipate that most will be privatized in place.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Due to significant reductions in force structure, the Air Force has an excess depot maintenance capacity of at least 8.7 million Direct Product Actual Hours (DPAH). When all eight criteria
Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Air Force Reserve
Mission: Power Projection
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Bergstrom AFB as follows: The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas and the cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB will close. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian air port authority elects to assume the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended the closure of Bergstrom AFB. The AFRES was to remain in a cantonment area. In reviewing AFRES plans for Bergstrom AFB, the Air Force found that considerable savings could be realized by realigning the Bergstrom AFRES units and aircraft to the Carswell AFB cantonment area. This realignment will result in savings in Military Construction (MILCON) funds, reduced manpower costs, and will not significantly impact unit readiness. The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost $12.5 million in MILCON to construct a cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB. Based on the best estimates available at this time, the cost of this change is $5.8 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of $6.7 million. This action will also result in net manpower savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community believed the F-16 reserve squadron and its support units should remain in a cantonment area on Bergstrom AFB which will be operated by the city of Austin as a municipal airport. Austin city officials pointed out the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report clearly states: “the Air Force Reserves units shall remain in the Bergstrom cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport, and if no decision is made by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed.” On May 1, 1993, the citizens of Austin overwhelmingly approved a $400 million bond referendum to relocate the municipal airport to Bergstrom AFB; therefore, the city argued, the Air Force is committed to leaving the reserve units at Bergstrom.

In a report dated May 26, 1993, the community also suggested that a more sensible decision would be to not only retain the reserve units at Bergstrom, but to move the Air Force reserve units from Carswell AFB to Bergstrom. The community contended this decision would improve operational readiness, result in significant MILCON savings ($57 million), provide vastly superior facilities with expansion room, and alleviate air-space congestion in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Air Force was resolute in its recommendation to move the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units to Carswell AFB, Texas and to close the Bergstrom cantonment area despite any commitments it may have made in 1991. The Air Force believes current circumstances have overtaken the 1991 plan to leave these AFRES units at Bergstrom.

The Commission also found that the City Council of Austin has formally adopted five resolutions since July 1990 indicating the city’s commitment to reuse Bergstrom AFB as its municipal airport. On May 1, 1993 the citizens of Austin voted for a bond proposition in the amount of $400 million to finance moving its municipal airport. The Air Force does not appear to have considered the Austin community’s long-term commitment to move its municipal airport to Bergstrom AFB.

The Commission found the Air Force learned the details of the Navy’s proposal to move a large number of reserve aircraft to Carswell
after it decided to recommend that the Bergstrom reserve units move to Carswell. The Commission was concerned the Air Force failed to consider the recruiting problems that may exist by moving approximately ten thousand reservists to the Fort Worth area. Competition among the services to recruit qualified technicians will no doubt have an adverse affect on the readiness of these units. Training plans require three to five years for a new affiliate to meet the military services and FAA performance standards. The Commission also had concerns with locating 186 aircraft in an area that has ground-encroachment problems and is in a high density aircraft traffic pattern.

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense recommendation concerning the Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF) was consistent with the selection criteria. If closure is required because the civilian airport authority does not elect to assume responsibility for operating and maintaining the RCCF, the Department of Defense should insure that all reusable equipment and resources from that facility are relocated to the extent economical and practicable.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1, 2, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Bergstrom cantonment area will remain open and the 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units remain at the Bergstrom cantonment area until at least the end of 1996. Close or relocate the Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority assumes the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Air Force Reserve
Mission: Power Projection
One-time Cost: $0.3 million
Savings: 1994-99: $1.8 million
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Carswell AFB as follows: Transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and commissary test program.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended that the 436th Training Squadron be relocated to Dyess AFB as a whole. The proposed action will result in more streamlined and efficient training operations. Transferring the fabrication function to Luke AFB will avoid duplicating this function within Air Combat Command. The Hill AFB move will ensure that maintenance training is provided in a more efficient manner.

The original 1991 realignment cost was $1.8 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is $0.3 million MILCON, for a projected savings of $1.5 million MILCON.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community viewed the Secretary of Defense’s 1993 recommendation to establish Carswell as a joint, master reserve/guard base as a win-win situation that would complement its redevelopment-authority efforts. The community stated the proposed expansion of the cantonment area would not be a problem, since most of the development being considered by the community is south of the expanded cantonment area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the proposed actions involving Dyess, Luke and Hill AFB would result in more streamlined and efficient DoD training operations and avoid duplication of training.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and commissary test program.

Castle AFB, California

Category: 1991 Closure
Mission: N/A
One-time Cost: $59.5 million
Savings: 1994-99: $78.7 million
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Castle AFB as follows: Redirect the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus AFB, Oklahoma (KC-135).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The force structure upon which the 1991 Commission based its recommendations has changed and B-52 force structure is being reduced. The Air Force currently plans to base a large number of B-52s at two locations, with Barksdale AFB serving as the hub for B-52 operations and training. Similarly, training for mobility operations is being centralized at Altus AFB. This redirect will reduce the number of training sites and improve efficiency of operations.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost $78.7 million in MILCON. The estimated cost for this 1993 recommendation is $59.5 million in MILCON for a projected savings of $19.2 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the recommended force-structure changes would result in a large number of B-52s at Barksdale AFB. Additionally, Air Mobility Training, to include KC-135s, is being consolidated at Altus AFB. This action would improve efficiency of training and military operations.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost was $78.7M in MILCON. The estimated cost for this 1993 recommendation is $59.5M in MILCON for a projected savings of $19.2M.

CHANUTE AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

Category: 1988 Closure
Mission: N/A
One-time Cost: $16.4 million
Savings: 1994-99: $17.5 million
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

As part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, the Air Force recommends consolidating its 16 Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, and then move with the Navy when NAS Memphis closes. The 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended that these courses, along with 36 other courses, be transferred to Sheppard AFB, Texas.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

On March 31, 1992, the DoD Inspector General recommended that the Air Force consolidate and collocate its 16 metals training courses with the Navy. There will be no Military Construction (MILCON) costs associated with temporarily relocating the specified training courses to NAS Memphis. This is considerably less than the $17.5 million in MILCON cost to relocate these courses to Sheppard AFB. As this training is now scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes, the Air Force and Navy will work to achieve a cost effective approach until a more permanent site is found.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

No formal community concerns were expressed.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found there were no MILCON costs associated with temporarily relocating the specified training courses to NAS Memphis. The Commission did find, however, the Navy had initially indicated a cost of $16.4 million to relocate this training to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission found the training was originally scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes and, therefore, the Air Force and Navy could work to achieve a more cost-effective approach to insure the efficiencies involved in Joint Service training are realized. Collocation of these courses with the Navy would achieve efficiencies and savings.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force structure plan and final criterion 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: as part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, consolidate the Air Force’s 16 Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, and then move them with the Navy to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Major Headquarters
Mission: Headquarters USSOCOM and USCENTCOM
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: $25.6 million
Annual: N/A
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding MacDill AFB as follows: The Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will temporarily operate the airfield as a reserve base, not open to civil use, until it can be converted to a civil airport. This will accommodate the recommended reassignment of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) from Homestead AFB to MacDill AFB and its conversion to KC-135 tankers. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) will not be transferred to Charleston AFB, South Carolina as recommended in 1991, but, instead, will remain at MacDill AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended a realignment and partial closure of MacDill AFB. Its F-16 training mission has been relocated to Luke AFB, Arizona, and the JCSE was to be relocated to Charleston AFB. Two unified commands, Headquarters Central Command and Headquarters Special Operations Command, were left in place. The airfield was to close.

Several events since 1991 have made a change to the Commission action appropriate. The closure of Homestead AFB requires the relocation of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES). The best location for this unit, when converted to KC-135s, is MacDill AFB. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aircraft element has relocated from Miami International Airport to MacDill AFB and would like to remain permanently. NOAA is prepared to pay a fair share of the cost of airport operations.

The AFRES's temporary operation of the airfield will have reduced operating hours and services.
Chapter 1

The 1991 Commission noted a number of deficiencies of MacDill AFB as a fighter base: “pressure on air space, training areas, and low level routes...not located near Army units that will offer joint training opportunities...[and]...ground encroachment.” These are largely inapplicable to an AFRES tanker operation.

Encroachment remains a problem, but the reduced number of flights and the increased compatibility of both tanker and NOAA aircraft with the predominant types of aircraft using Tampa International Airport make this viable. As an interim Reserve/NOAA airfield, use will be modest, and it will not be open to large-scale use by other military units.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost for the JCSE relocation was $25.6 million in MILCON. Retaining the JCSE at MacDill avoids this cost.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the requirement for United States Central Command and United States Special Operations Command to have access to an operational runway would not be met if the 482nd Fighter Wing was returned to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.

COMMmission findings

The Commission found the cost to move the Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE) to Charleston AFB, SC, is $25.6 million. Retaining the unit at MacDill avoids this cost. MacDill AFB is host to several tenant units that require the use of an operational airfield, including the JCSE, United States Special Operations Command, United States Central Command, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The City of Tampa has stated it has no need for the excess property at MacDill and, therefore, has no plans to assume its operation. The Department of Commerce (DOC), specifically the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has requested a no-cost transfer of the MacDill airfield to DOC control. The Secretary of Defense has indicated approval of the request, and it has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from criteria 1, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain the Joint Communication Support Element at MacDill as long as the airfield is non-DoD operated. Operation of the airfield at MacDill will be taken over by the Department of Commerce or another Federal agency. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Category: 1988 closure
Mission: N/A
One-time Cost: $12.5 million
Savings: 1994-99: $33.7 million
Annual: N/A
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Mather AFB as follows: Redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California, vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, while awaiting permanent bedding at Beale AFB.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Moving the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) to Beale AFB is more cost effective. The original 1991 realignment cost was $33.7 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect is $12.5 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of $21.2 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
Chapter I

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The 1988 Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended the closure of the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital and the retention of the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather AFB, CA. The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the realignment of the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather AFB to McClellan AFB, California, and recommended the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital remain open as an annex to McClellan AFB, CA. The 1993 Secretary of Defense recommendation changed the realignment location for the 940th from McClellan AFB, California, to Beale AFB, California. The proposal to redirect the 940th ARG to Beale AFB, California would save $21.2M in MILCON. Even with the temporary facilities construction costs ($1.1M) and termination costs ($3M) at McClellan, the savings are substantial enough to support the Secretary’s recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California vice McClellan AFB, California. The proposal to redirect the 940th ARG to Beale AFB, California would save $21.2M in MILCON. Even with the temporary facilities construction costs ($1.1M) and termination costs ($3M) at McClellan, the savings are substantial enough to support the Secretary’s recommendation.

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio

Category: 1991 Closure
Mission: Tanker
One-time Cost: $8 million
Savings: 1994-99: $18.2 million
Annual: NIA
Payback: NIA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rickenbacker ANGB as follows: The 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPA’s airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will still move to Edwards AFB, California.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1991 Commission recommended closing Rickenbacker ANGB, and realigning the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) to Wright-Patterson AFB. These units were to occupy facilities being vacated by the 4950th Test Wing, which will move to Edwards AFB to consolidate test units.

The airfield at Rickenbacker is no longer a military responsibility, having been transferred by long term lease to the RPA in 1992. It will be conveyed in fee under the public benefit authority of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 when environmental restoration is complete. The State of Ohio has proposed that under current circumstances, more money could be saved by leaving the ANG tanker units at Rickenbacker ANGB than by moving it to Wright-Patterson AFB. The Air Force has carefully examined his analysis and concluded that it is correct. The current analysis is less costly than the original estimate of moving both Rickenbacker ANGB units to Wright-Patterson AFB, primarily because of the State’s later burden-sharing proposal to lower the ANGS long-term operating costs at Rickenbacker.

In a related force structure move, in order to fully utilize the facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB, the Air Force recommends that the 178th Fighter Group move from the Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson AFB, about 30 miles away. This unit will fit into the available facilities with little construction. The move will save approximately $1.1 million in base operating support annually based on economies of consolidating some ANG functions with AFRES and active Air Force functions at Wright-Patterson. Since the unit moves only a short distance, retention of current personnel should not be a problem.
The 4950th will still move to Edwards AFB, California from Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to take advantage of the enhanced military value through the efficiency of consolidating test assets.

The original 1991 realignment cost was $37.9 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is $26.2 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of $11.7 million.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Rickenbacker airfield, no longer a military responsibility, was transferred by long-term lease to the Rickenbacker Port Authority in 1992. The State of Ohio showed cost savings by leaving the ANG tanker units in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of moving them to Wright-Patterson AFB. The community argued the move of the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB was not cost-effective and jeopardized unit military value. In addition to the cost savings realized by not moving to WPAFB, the community asserted significant impacts on recruitment and retention were avoided. By moving to WPAFB, which already has a National Guard recruiting shortfall, the community believed the move would result in personnel problems. The community also argued moving the ANG units from Rickenbacker to Wright-Patterson would impact military readiness because the facilities could not accommodate the units properly.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found moving the ANG units from Rickenbacker ANGB to Wright-Patterson AFB was no longer cost effective. The Secretary of Defense recommendation in 1991 to realign Rickenbacker units to Wright-Patterson AFB was estimated to cost $49.6 million. This figure included $21 million in one-time moving costs. In contrast, the total cost to remain at Rickenbacker in a cantonment area, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense in 1993, is estimated at $32.2 million. When compared to the cost of realignment, a $17.4 million savings could be realized by retaining the Air National Guard at Rickenbacker.

Additionally, in a related move suggested by the Secretary of Defense, analysis showed it was not cost effective to move the units at Springfield to Wright-Patterson AFB or to move the 178th from Springfield to WPAFB. The USAF performed a detailed site survey in April 1993, and, on May 4, 1993, provided the preliminary results. The site survey showed the USAF MILCON projections for construction of facilities at WPAFB for the 178th FG were significantly erroneous. Initially, in the March 1993 recommendations to the Commission, DoD estimated the cost to move and beddown the 178th Fighter Group from Springfield ANGB to WPAFB was $3 million. The updated estimate revealed a $35 million cost to beddown the 178th at WPAFB. Overall, the data showed a cost of $26.61M to move the 178th in contrast to an earlier stated savings of $14.39M which made such a related move uneconomical.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on RPA’s airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will still move to Edwards AFB, California. There is no recommendation by the Secretary of Defense or the Commission to move the 178th Fighter Group; it will stay at Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Inventory Control Points

Defense Electronics Supply Center
Gentile AFS, Ohio

Category: Inventory Control Point
Mission: Provide wholesale support of military services with electronic type items
One-time Cost: $ 101.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ -47.6 million (cost)
Annual: $ 23.8 million
Payback: 10 years
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and relocate its mission to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

DESC is one of four hardware Inventory Control Points (ICPs). It is currently the host at Gentile Air Force Station in Dayton, Ohio. The only other tenant at Gentile AFS is the Defense Switching Network (DSN). The base has a large number of warehouses (vacant since the depot closed in the mid-seventies) which require extensive renovation before they could be used as administrative office space. The Agency has no plans to re-open the Depot at this location.

The hardware ICPs are all similar in missions, organizations, personnel skills and common automated management systems. The ICP Concept of Operations which takes into account the DoD Force Structure Plan, indicates that consolidation of ICPs can reduce the cost of operations by eliminating redundant overhead operations. The Consumable Item Transfer will be completed in FY 94 and consolidation can begin after that transfer has been completed.

Consolidating DESC and DCSC at both Columbus and Dayton was considered. The Columbus location provided the best overall payback and could allow for the complete closure of Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio. DCSC currently has approval for construction of a 700,000 square foot office building which should be completed in FY 96. This building will provide adequate space for expansion of the ICP. As a result of the closure of DESC, Gentile Air Force Station will be excess to Air Force needs. The Air Force will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure. It is the intent of the Air Force that the only other activity, a Defense Switching Network terminal, phase out within the time frame of the DESC closure. If the terminal is not phased out during this period, it will remain as a stand alone facility.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community contended Gentile Air Force Station should remain open and DESC should not move to Columbus, Ohio. The community asserted they had empty warehouses which could be converted into administrative use. Rather than construct a new building at Columbus which would cost $89M, the hardware center at Columbus could be moved to Gentile, utilizing existing space and combining two activities. The community argued such a move could be accomplished at a lower cost than the DoD and DLA proposal to move DESC to DCSC at Columbus, Ohio.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the consolidation of Inventory Control Points was a rational approach to increase management efficiencies. Further, the Commission found moving DESC to DCSC allowed for both the closing of Gentile Air Force Station and future expansion at DCSC if required. In addition, the Commission found the cost data supports the Secretary’s proposal to merge DESC with the DCSC in Columbus, Ohio. Although the costs used by the Secretary varied and were debatable, the estimates did not affect the validity of the recommendations.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: close the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and relocate its mission to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Inventory Control Point
Mission: Provide wholesale support of military services with industrial type items
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A
RECOMMENDATION

Relocate the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), a hardware Inventory Control Point (ICP), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

DISC is a tenant of the Navy’s Aviation Supply Office (ASO) located in Philadelphia. With the Navy decision to close ASO during BRAC 93, DISC must either be relocated or remain behind and assume responsibility for the base.

The Executive Group considered options where square footage or buildable acres existed. Also, only locations where ICPs currently exist were considered.

Collocation with DCSC, DESC and DGSC were also considered. DGSC has buildable acres but no space available. DESC has warehouse space and DCSC will have administrative space in 1997. However, with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations.

Locating DISC at Defense Distribution Region East, a DLA activity located at New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and the presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. The relocation of DISC to New Cumberland provides the best payback for DoD. The relocation allows the Navy to close and dispose of ASO.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued moving DISC, the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), and ASO out of Philadelphia, and closing the Defense Clothing Factory could impact more than 9,000 jobs and would be economically devastating to the community. The community contended DISC and ASO should remain together and DPSC should be moved to the ASO facility, resulting in the closure of the DPSC installation. This scenario, they asserted, would also provide more cost savings and would be less disruptive than moving DPSC and DISC to New Cumberland, as proposed by DoD and DLA.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found moving DISC from Philadelphia would create a negative cumulative economic impact on Philadelphia. The Commission also found the Secretary’s recommendation did not yield the greatest savings commensurate with no mission degradation. Further, the Commission found the most cost-effective option was for DISC to remain in place.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Defense Industrial Supply Center remains open and located within the Aviation Supply Office compound in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Defense Personnel Support Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Inventory Control Point
Mission: Provide food, clothing and textiles, medicines, and medical equipment to military personnel and their eligible dependents worldwide
Cost to close: $45.9 million
Savings: 1994-99: $6.5 million
Annual: $26.1 million
Payback: 7 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

DPSC is the host of this Army-permitted activity in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The installation also houses the Clothing Factory, the Defense Contract Management District (DCMD) Mid-Atlantic, and other tenants with approximately 800 personnel. The decision to close the Clothing Factory is based on the premise that clothing requirements for the armed forces can be fulfilled cost effectively by commercial manufacturers, without compromising quality or delivery lead time. DPSC was not reviewed as part of the ICP category since it manages a much smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC would make building or extensive renovations impossible for some time in the future.

With the movement of DCMD Mid-Atlantic and the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working Group examined options to either utilize the base as a receiver or move DPSC to another location. Scenarios were built so that activities moved to locations where excess space had been identified. DISC, currently a tenant at ASO which is recommended for closure by the Navy, was considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which realigned DPSC to ASO where DLA would assume responsibility for the base was analyzed. Another, which split the three commodities at DPSC between DGSC and DCSC was also examined.

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has available buildable acres. Additionally, another recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This allows several activities to be consolidated. The presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a result of the closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued moving DPSC out of south Philadelphia would severely impact the livelihood of the south Philadelphia merchants, who rely on DPSC personnel for their business. The community also contended moving the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) and the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) out of Philadelphia and closing the Defense Clothing Factory could impact more than 9,000 jobs and would be economically devastating to the community. The community believed DISC and ASO should remain together and DPSC should be moved to the ASO facility, resulting in the closure of the DPSC installation. This scenario, they argued, would also provide more cost savings and would be less disruptive than moving DPSC and DISC to New Cumberland, as proposed by DoD and DLA.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The commission found relocating DPSC out of Philadelphia would result in a significant loss of trained workers who would be difficult to replace. The Commission also found this move would have an adverse economic impact on Philadelphia. The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation did not yield the greatest savings commensurate with no mission degradation. The Commission also found the ASO installation had enough excess capacity to accommodate the present tenants, ASO and DISC, as well as DPSC. The Commission found this to be the most cost effective option.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4, 5, and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to the Aviation Supply Office compound in North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
Service\Support Activities

Defense Clothing Factory
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Service/Support Activity
Mission: Surge capacity to support mobilization requirements, production of small lots and special sizes requirements, and production of hand-embroidered flags
One-time Cost: $19.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $75.3 million
Annual: $15.5 million
Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

DPSC is the host of this Army-permitted activity in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The installation also houses the Clothing Factory, the Defense Contract Management District Mid-Atlantic (DCMDM), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and other tenants with approximately 800 personnel. The decision to close the Clothing Factory is based on the premise that clothing requirements for the armed forces can be fulfilled cost effectively by commercial manufacturers, without compromising quality or delivery lead time. DPSC was not reviewed as part of the Inventory Control Point (ICP) category because it manages a much smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC would make building or extensive renovations impossible for some time in the future.

With the movement of DCMD Mid-Atlantic and the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working Group examined options to either utilize the base as a receiver or move DPSC to another location. Scenarios were built so that activities were moved to locations where excess space had been identified. The Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), currently a tenant at the Aviation Supply Office (ASC), which is recommended for closure by the Navy, was considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which realigned DPSC to ASC, in which DLA would assume responsibility for the base, was analyzed. Another option, which split the three commodities at DPSC between the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, Virginia, and the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio, was also examined.

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has available buildable acres. Additionally, another recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP, from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This allows several activities to be consolidated. The presence of three ICPs and major Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a result of the closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community noted the clothing factory employees represented approximately 10 percent of the people employed in the apparel trade in the eight-county Philadelphia metropolitan statistical area. It pointed out the employees are primarily minorities and many have worked for years in the Clothing Factory. It argued it would be difficult for the Factory employees to find jobs in their trade if the Factory closes. It also argued the Clothing Factory has taken on a new mission as an evaluation and demonstration site for new apparel technologies.
COMMISSION FINDINGS

Although the Commission considered whether the Clothing Factory could remain as a stand-alone activity at the Defense Personnel Support Center, the Commission found the Clothing Factory’s mission could be accommodated far more economically by commercial manufacturers without compromising quality or delivery. The cost data supported the Secretary’s recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria, and, therefore, that the Commission adopt the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: Close the Defense Clothing Factory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, relocate the personnel supporting the flag mission, and use existing commercial sources to procure the Clothing Factory products.

Defense Logistics Services Center
Defense Reutilization and Marketing
Service Battle Creek, Michigan

Category: Service/Support Activity
Mission: DLSC - Manages and operates the federal catalog system.
DRMS - Responsible for DoD’s excess personal property program
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC), Battle Creek, Michigan, and collocate its mission with the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

Relocate the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS), Battle Creek, Michigan, to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio. DCSC will provide all necessary support services for the relocated personnel. Two separate functional areas, Logistics Information Management and Logistics Information Distribution, will be assigned to the DLA Inventory Control Point (ICP) to accommodate the operational mission areas now performed by DLSC.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

With the implementation of DMRD 918, “Defense Information Infrastructure Resource Plan,” the responsibility for Central Design Activity (CDA) and Information Processing Centers (IPC) were assigned to the Defense Information Technology Service Organization. As a result of the realignment the continued need of DLSC as a stand alone organization was evaluated. By consolidating functions at a DLA ICP, all support services can be performed by the receiving activity. Some of the functions currently being performed by DLSC NATO Codification personnel can be distributed among the remaining DLA hardware centers, thereby consolidating similar functions. This relocation also places HQ DRMS Battle Creek, Michigan, and Operations East, Columbus, Ohio, with a DLA Inventory Control Point to facilitate overall materiel management. Savings result from moving DLSC and DRMS from GSA-leased space.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the DLA cost savings were substantially overstated primarily because most of the personnel the Defense Logistics Agency claimed would be eliminated by relocating DRMS and disestablishing DLSC could actually be eliminated even if the activities remained where they were. The community realized the cost of the GSA lease for the DLSCI DRMS facility would be saved if the two organizations were relocated. However, they contended the government would continue to incur part of the lease cost because the General Services Administration would be required to maintain the empty office space in the Battle Creek Federal building if the activities moved.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found DLSC and DRMS were independent activities with little synergism to be gained from being located with DCSC. In
addition the Commission found economic hard-

ships could occur in Battle Creek, Michigan, by
relocating DLSC and DRMS. Further, the Com-
mission found the value of existing personnel

efficiencies could not be measured. Also, the
cost efficiencies were negligible when the over-

tall cost to the taxpayer was considered.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense
deviated substantially from final criterion 4.

Therefore, the Commission recommends the fol-

lowing: the Defense Logistics Services Center
and Defense Reutilization and Marketing

Service remain open and located in Battle

Creek, Michigan. The Commission finds this

recommendation is consistent with the force-

structure plan and final criteria.

Regional Headquarters

Defense Contract Management
District Midatlantic,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and

Defense Contract Management
District Northcentral,
Chicago, Illinois

Category: Regional
Mission: Perform contract administration

services for DoD organizations and

other U.S. Government agencies

One-time Cost: $16.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $74.1 million

Annual: $17.5 million
Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish Defense Contract Management
District Midatlantic (DCMDM) and Defense
Contract Management District Northcentral
(DCMDN), and relocate the missions to DCMD
Northeast, DCMD South, and DCMD West.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Defense Contract Management Districts per-
form operational support and management over-

sight of 105 Defense Contract Management Area

Operations (DCMAOs) and Defense Plant Rep-

resentative Offices (DPROs). Since the estab-
lishment of the DCMDs a number of DCMAOs

and DPROs have been disestablished, thereby
reducing the span of control responsibility of
the five DCMDs. Based on the assumptions
derived from the DoD Force Structure Plan, it
is anticipated the DCMD span of control will
not increase in future years. This allows for the
reconfiguration of the DCMDs by realigning
responsibility for the operational activities, thereby
reducing the number of headquarters facilities
which perform operational support and manage-
ment oversight. All plant and area opera-
tions would continue to be under geographically
aligned Districts. The Military Value analysis
resulted in the recommendation to disestablish
the Midatlantic and Northcentral activities and
relocate their missions to the three remaining
districts.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Philadelphia community argued DCMD
Midatlantic should not be closed because the
facility was the most cost-effective and efficient
of the five district offices. The Chicago commu-
nity argued the Defense Logistics Agency was
spending $12 million to rehabilitate the build-
ing occupied by the Northcentral District office
at the same time it was recommending closing
its district office. Both organizations believed
their work force was superior to those of the
other districts.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found consolidating the DCMDs
from five to three was a reasonable approach to
increasing management efficiencies. The Com-
mission also found the quantity and complexity
of the assigned workloads, geographical loca-
tion; and other factors analyzed supported the
Secretary’s recommendation. Once the consoli-
dation is completed, DLA will realize a $17.5
million per year steady-state savings with no
mission degradation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense
did not deviate substantially from the force-
structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the
Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic (DCMDM) and Defense Contract Management District Northcentral (DCMDN), and relocate the missions to DCMD Northeast, DCMD South, and DCMD West.

**Defense Contract Management District West**
*El Segundo, California*

Category: Regional  
Mission: Perform contract administration services for DoD organizations and other U.S. Government agencies  
One-time Cost: $12.5 million  
Savings: 1994-99: $-5.1 million (Cost)  
Annual: $4.4 million  
Payback: 9 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**
Relocate the Defense Contract Management District West (DCMD West), El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, CA.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**
The DCMD West is currently located in GSA-leased administrative space in El Segundo, CA. Significant savings will result by moving the organization from GSA space to a building on Government property at Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA. A number of available DoD properties were considered as potential relocation sites. The Naval Shipyard was selected because it does not involve the payment of Personnel Change of Station (PCS) costs. This move may require new construction to provide a building to receive the DCMD West.

**COMMUNITY CONCERNS**
There were no formal expressions from the community.

**COMMISSION FINDINGS**
The Commission found it was cost effective for DCMD West to move from leased spaced to DoD-owned property. Further, DoD was considering new construction at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard for DCMD West and the Commission found it questionable to construct new facilities given the apparent abundance of available buildings on DoD installations or other federally owned buildings.

**COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION**
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Defense Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, California, or space obtained from exchange of land for space between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

**Defense Distribution Depots**

**Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, South Carolina**

Category: Distribution depots  
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail (service owned) material in support of the Armed Forces  
One-time Cost: $12.6 million  
Annual: $1.1 million  
Payback: 26 years

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION**
Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, South Carolina (DDCS), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, Florida (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material remaining at DDCS at the time of the realignment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION**
The decision to realign DDCS was driven by the Navy’s decision to close several naval activities in Charleston, SC, eliminating DDCS’s customer base. The loss of customer base along with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution system drove the disestablishment. DDCS
rated 6 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDCS are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission recommended the partial disestablishment of the Naval Supply Center and the closure of Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina. The Commission found these naval installations to be the principal customers of the Defense Distribution Depot Charleston. With no major customers, the need for the distribution depot will be eliminated. Further, the Commission found closing this depot would reduce the overall excess capacity in the defense distribution depot system.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC (DDCS), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material remaining at DDCS at the time of the realignment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Defense Distribution Depot
Letterkenny, Pennsylvania

Category: Distribution depots
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail (service owned) material in support of the Armed Forces
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: NIA
Annual: NIA
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION
Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania (DDLP), and relocate the depot’s functions and materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania (DDTP), Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama, and Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas (DDRT). Active consumable items will be moved to Defense Depot New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and Defense Depot Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Any remaining materiel will be placed in available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
The decision to disestablish DDLP was driven by the Army decision to realign the Letterkenny Army Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance functions with those existing at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and Red River Army Depot, Texas. Realignment of DDLP’s primary customer and substandard facilities drive the decision to relocate the distribution mission to DDRT. DDLP rated 25 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDLP are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS
There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS
The Commission recommended Letterkenny Army Depot not be realigned and its maintenance function be retained. Accordingly, the Commission found the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, which provides principal support to the Letterkenny Army Depot, is required.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation to be consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

Defense Distribution Depot
Oakland, California

Category: Distribution depot
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail (service owned) material in support of the Armed Forces
One-time Cost: $15.0 million
Savings: 1994-99: $17.3 million
Average Annual: $10.0 million
Payback: 5 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, California (DDOC), and relocate the primary mission to Defense Distribution Depot Tracy, CA (DDTC), Defense Distribution Depot Sharpe, CA (DDSC), and Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA (DDDC). Slow moving or inactive materiel remaining at DDOC at the time of closure will be relocated to other available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to realign DDOC was driven by the Navy’s decision to close Oakland Navy Base and Naval Air Station Alameda, CA. The closure of the Navy Supply Center at Oakland (fleet support) and the Naval Aviation Depot at Alameda removed the customer base from Oakland. This closure along with substandard facilities contributed to the decision to realign the distribution mission out of Oakland. DDOC rated 14 out of 29 in the military value matrix. Except for two depots, all depots rated lower than DDOC are collocated with a maintenance depot. The other two depots exceed Oakland’s throughput capacity and storage space.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission recommended closing Naval Air Station Alameda, California, Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, California, and Naval Station Treasure Island, California. The Commission found these naval installations to be the principal customers of the Defense Distribution Depot Oakland. Because of the loss of the principal customers, the need for the distribution depot was eliminated. Further, the Commission found closing this depot would reduce the overall excess capacity in the Defense Distribution Depot system.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA (DDOC), and relocate the primary mission to Defense Distribution Depot Tracy, CA (DDTC), Defense Distribution Depot Sharpe, CA (DDSC), and Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA (DDDC). Slow moving or inactive materiel remaining at DDOC at the time of closure will be relocated to other available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Defense Distribution Depot
Pensacola, Florida

Category: Distribution depots
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail (service owned) material in support of the Armed Forces
One-time Cost: $2.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $3.1 million
Average Annual: $1.5 million
Payback: 5 years
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
RECOMMENDATION

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, Florida (DDPF), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material remaining at DDPF at the time of the disestablishment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to disestablish DDPF was driven by the Navy’s decision to close the Naval Supply Center and Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL. These closures eliminated DDPF’s customer base. The loss of customer base along with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution system drove the disestablishment. DDPF rated 10 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDPF are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission recommended closing the Naval Supply Center and Naval Aviation Depot at Pensacola. The Commission found these installations to be the principal customers of Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola. Because of the loss of the principal customers, the need for the distribution depot was eliminated. The Commission also found closing this distribution depot was consistent with efficient management and would reduce the overall excess capacity in the Defense Distribution Depot system.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL (DDPF), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive material remaining at DDPF at the time of the disestablishment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Defense Distribution Depot
Tooele, Utah

Category: Distribution depots
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail (service owned) material in support of the Armed Forces
One-time Cost: $39.7 million
Annual: $5.6 million
Payback: 11 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, Utah (DDTU). Relocate the depot’s functions/materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas (DDRT). Any remaining material will be placed in available space in the DoD Distribution System.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to disestablish DDTU was driven by the Army decision to realign Tooele Army Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance functions with those existing at Red River Army Depot. The realignment of DDTU’s primary customer and the substandard facilities drive the decision to disestablish DDTU and relocate its functions and materiel to DDRT. DDTU rated 18 out of 29 in the military value matrix. With the exception of one depot (Columbus, Ohio), lower rated depots are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot. The Columbus depot has almost twice the storage capacity and four times the issue throughput capacity as DDTU.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.
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COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission recommended realigning the Tooele Army Depot and consolidating its maintenance functions with those at Red River Army Depot. Because the Tooele Army Depot was the principal customer of Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, the distribution depot is no longer required. Also, the Commission found closing this Distribution Depot would reduce the overall excess capacity in the Defense Distribution Depot system. Further, the Commission found the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the relocation of the Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado supply mission to Tooele Army Depot, Utah.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, Utah (DDTU). Relocate the depot’s functions/materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas (DDRT). Any remaining material will be placed in available space in the DoD Distribution System. Change the recommendation of the 1988 Commission regarding Pueblo Army Depot, CO, as follows: instead of sending the supply mission to Tooele Army Depot, UT, as recommended by the 1988 Commission, relocate the mission to a location to be determined by the Defense Logistics Agency. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force structure plan and final criteria.

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA)

Category: Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
Mission: Non-combat Data Processing
One-time Cost: $316 million
Savings: 1994-99: $401 million
Annual: $212 million
Payback: 5 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Execute a DoD-wide Data Center Consolidation Plan that disestablishes 44 major data processing centers (DPCs) by consolidating their information processing workload into fifteen standardized, automated “megacenters” located in existing DoD facilities.

The 44 DPCs recommended for disestablishment are located at the following DoD installations:

* Navy Sites
  - NCTS San Diego, CA
  - NSC Puget Sound, WA
  - NSC Norfolk, VA
  - NAWC AD Patuxent River, MD
  - NAWC WD Point Mugu, CA
  - NSC Pearl Harbor, HI
  - NAS Whidbey Island, WA
  - TRF Kings Bay, GA
  - NAS Key West, FL
  - NAS Oceana, VA
  - NCTAMSLANT Norfolk, VA
  - NCTS New Orleans, LA
  - CRUITCOM Arlington, VA
  - NARDAC San Francisco, CA
  - NCCOSC San Diego, CA
  - NSC Charleston, SC
  - ASO Philadelphia, PA
  - NCTS Pensacola, FL
  - NAWC WD China Lake, CA
  - FISC San Diego, CA
  - FACSO Port Hueneme, CA
  - TRF Bangor, WA
  - NAS Brunswick, ME
  - NAS Mayport, FL
  - EPMAC New Orleans, LA
  - BUPERS Washington, DC
  - NCTS Washington, DC
  - NCTAMS EASTPAC Pearl Harbor, HI
  - NAVDAF Corpus Christi, TX
Marine Corps Sites
MCAS Cherry Point, NC
RASC Camp Pendleton, CA
RASC Camp Lejeune, NC
MCAS El Toro, CA

Air Force Sites
CPSC San Antonio, TX
FMPC Randolph AFB, TX
7th CG, Pentagon, VA
RPC McClellan AFB, CA

Defense Logistics Agency Sites
IPC Battle Creek, MI
IPC Philadelphia, PA
IPC Ogden, UT
IPC Richmond, VA

Defense Information Systems Agency Sites
DITSO Indianapolis IPC, IN
DITSO Columbus Annex (Dayton), OH
DITSO Kansas City IPC, MO

Recommended Megacenter Locations
• Columbus, Ohio
• Ogden, Utah
• San Antonio, Texas
• Rock Island, Illinois
• Montgomery, Alabama
• Denver, Colorado
• Warner-Robins, Georgia
• Huntsville, Alabama
• Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
• Dayton, Ohio
• St. Louis, Missouri
• Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
• Jacksonville, Florida
• Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
• Cleveland, Ohio

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
A DPC is an organizationally defined set of dedicated personnel, computer hardware, computer software, telecommunications, and environmentally conditioned facilities the primary function of which is to provide computer processing support for customers. The DPCs to be closed were transferred from the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) under the guidelines of Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 918. Rapid consolidation of these facilities is necessary to accommodate a significant portion of the DMRD 918 budget savings totaling $4.5 billion while continuing to support the mission and functions of DoD at the required service levels.

Consolidation of DPCs is one of several cost saving initiatives underway within DISA. Best industry practice in the private sector has established the viability and desirability of this approach. It will position DoD to more efficiently support common data processing requirements across Services by leveraging information technology and resource investments to meet multiple needs. In the long term, it will increase the Military Departments’ and Defense Agencies’ access to state-of-the-art technology while requiring fewer investments to support similar Service needs. This is an aggressive plan that will ultimately position DoD to support business improvement initiatives, downsizing, and streamlining through the efficient use and deployment of technology. DISA has undertaken an extensive evaluation of candidate megacenters to ensure the facilities, security, and ongoing operations will support an efficient and flexible Defense Information Infrastructure capable of meeting the requirements of the Defense community.

During the evaluation process the IPC at McClellan Air Force Base rated high enough to be selected as a megacenter site. However, with the Air Force’s recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base the McClellan IPC was removed from further consideration.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS

Communities questioned DoD’s selection process and the accuracy of collected data. Specifically, they questioned the requirement that a megacenter candidate have raised floors of at least 18 inches and the reason DoD did not take into account a facility’s efficiency. Several communities contended erroneous data misrepresented their facilities’ physical condition, floor space, security arrangement, communication bandwidth, or regional operations cost. Communities also questioned the statistical methodology used to rate the data on each site.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found errors and inconsistencies among the data on the 35 sites, which affected the relative ranking of the megacenters. Corrections in the total power capacity of Resource Management Business Activity, Cleveland, Ohio, changed its rank to below the threshold for becoming a megacenter.

The Commission also found the security of future megacenter sites to be a central issue. Security was a key concern of the Secretary of Defense, and the communities questioned the security rating of individual sites and scoring methodology. Analysis showed the initial security ratings of a few megacenter candidates were inaccurate. Corrections were made, but these changes did not impact the final megacenter selection list.

The Commission agreed with the Secretary that the 18 inch floor requirement for conditioned space was a valid criterion for megacenter candidates, as it ensures space for potential growth. The Commission used a statistically robust methodology to determine the overall ranking of the various sites. These efforts led to Multifunction Information Processing Activity San Diego, California, being added to the list of recommended megacenter sites.

DoD’s initial analysis ranked Regional Processing Center, McClellan Air Force Base, high enough to be considered a megacenter candidate. However, RPC McClellan was excluded from the DoD recommended megacenter sites because DISA assumed DoD would recommend closing McClellan Air Force Base, the RPC’s host. But neither DoD nor the Commission recommended closing McClellan AFB. Therefore, RPC McClellan should remain open.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the 43 DISA information processing centers listed below:

**Navy Sites**
- NSC Charleston, SC
- NSC Puget Sound, WA
- NSC Norfolk, VA
- NAWC AD Patuxent River, MD
- NAWC WD Point Mugu, CA
- NSC Pearl Harbor, HI
- NAS Whidbey Island, WA
- TRF Kings Bay, GA
- NAS Key West, FL
- NAS Oceana, VA
- NCTAMSLANT Norfolk, VA
- NCTS New Orleans, LA
- CRUITCOM Arlington, VA
- NARDAC San Francisco, CA
- NCCOSC San Diego, CA
- ASO Philadelphia, PA
- NCTS Pensacola, FL
- NAWC WD China Lake, CA
- FISC San Diego, CA
- FACSO Port Hueneme, CA
- TRF Bangor, WA
- NAS Brunswick, ME
- NAS Mayport, FL
- EPMAC New Orleans, LA
- BUPERS Washington, DC
- NCTS Washington, DC
- NCTAMS EASTPAC Pearl Harbor, HI
- NAVDAF Corpus Christi, TX
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**Marine Corps Sites**
- MCAS Cherry Point, NC
- RASC Camp Pendleton, CA
- RASC Camp Lejeune, NC
- MCAS El Toro, CA

**Air Force Sites**
- CPSC San Antonio, TX
- AFMPC Randolph AFB, TX
- 7th CG, Pentagon, VA

**Defense Logistics Agency Sites**
- IPC Battle Creek, MI
- IPC Philadelphia, PA
- IPC Ogden, UT
- IPC Richmond, VA

Defense Information Systems Agency Sites
- DITSO Indianapolis IPC, IN
- DITSO Columbus Annex (Dayton), OH
- RMBA Cleveland, OH
- DITSO Kansas City IPC, MO

Consolidate the information processing center workload at the following 16 megacenters:

**Recommended Megacenter Locations**
- Columbus, Ohio
- Ogden, Utah
- San Antonio, Texas
- Rock Island, Illinois
- Montgomery, Alabama
- Denver, Colorado
- Warner-Robins, Georgia
- Huntsville, Alabama
- Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
- Dayton, Ohio
- St. Louis, Missouri
- Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
- Jacksonville, Florida
- Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
- San Diego, California
- Sacramento, California

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.
CHAPTER 2
ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

Several issues which surfaced during the Commission's review and analysis process were particularly noteworthy. While the Commission is specifically charged with transmitting its recommendations for military base closures and realignments to the President, the Commission believes it can offer valuable insight and guidance regarding the base closure process based upon its intimate involvement and first-hand experience. The Commission believes it would be remiss if it were to forego the opportunity to share its concerns.

Interservicing

The Department of Defense has been attempting for approximately 20 years without significant success to interservice depot maintenance workload. In his testimony before the Commission in March, 1993, the Secretary of Defense stated DoD did not have adequate time to address the interservicing issue or to compile the necessary data to submit recommendations to the 1993 Commission. However, the Secretary indicated he would welcome any Commission actions which would result in increased interservicing of DoD commodities.

Committed to streamlining depot maintenance workload to achieve maximum efficiencies, the Commission determined the following five commodities should be reviewed for interservicing potential: wheeled vehicles, rotary-wing aircraft, tactical missiles, and ground communications; the fifth, fixed-wing aircraft, was ultimately deferred from further analysis due to a lack of reliable or comparable cost and capacity data. The results of the Commission's review are presented in Chapter One of this Report.

The Commission's recommendations to consolidate depot maintenance workload through interservicing represent only an initial attempt at achieving cost savings. The efficiencies to be realized from interservicing dictate DoD conduct an exhaustive review and present its recommendations/actions during the 1995 round of the base closure process. The Commission strongly supports a joint organization responsible for assigning workloads to the DoD's maintenance depots. Joint oversight could mandate cost effective interservicing actions circumventing Services' parochial interests. DoD must create strong incentives for the Services to pursue interservicing. Additionally, any future consideration of interservicing must include a comprehensive review of private-sector capability.

Depot Capacity

Although the Commission took actions to make recommendations regarding the reduction of unnecessary depot activities and capabilities, the Commission fully recognizes there clearly remains excess capacity within the DoD depot system. Interservicing, as addressed in a separate issue within this chapter, and consolidation can go a long way in reducing excess depot capacity while realizing certain synergies and cost-effectiveness relating economies of scale generally attendant to consolidation. Historically, each Service has preferred to remain in control of its own depot systems; however, the shrinking defense budget and attendant downsizing of the Department simply will not allow this scheme to continue. Therefore, the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense consider during his bottom-up review of the Department, a single defense depot system with a joint responsibility. All DoD maintenance depots should come under the direct command and control of a single joint Services organization. The organization should have the authority to assign workloads between depots or private sector as appropriate and implement uniform procedures for measuring and evaluating depot performance. Accordingly, the Commission further recommends the Secretary impose a moratorium on further depot expansion relative to the purchase of new properties and the construction of new facilities until such time as the bottom-up review can determine the overall capacity requirements within the DoD depot system.
Private Sector Capability

The Secretary of Defense, in his recommendations to the 1993 Commission, did not address the issue of domestic private-sector capability to "rightsize" the overall DoD depot infrastructure. However, the issue of private-sector capability was a recurring theme during the Commission's deliberations. The Commission felt the domestic private sector could provide a potentially cost-effective option to DoD's in-house capability for repairing and maintaining its equipment, which should be exploited for potential economies. A shift to the private sector for maintenance services may also have a positive impact on maintaining the nation's industrial base. By downsizing DoD's in-house maintenance capability to the minimum necessary, operational requirements may be met in the most cost-effective manner through a different mix of public and private industrial support. Therefore, the Commission strongly recommends the Secretary of Defense address the private-sector capability, within the context of an integrated national industrial philosophy, in his recommendations for the 1995 round of base closures. In so doing, the Secretary must recognize he will meet an understandable bias of the various service depots against private sector contracting because of their own need to maintain volume as their workload shrinks.

Implementation of the Commission's Recommendations

The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) in the Department of Defense assists local communities' economic transition following military base closures and realignments. Despite statistics showing local communities often thrive after base closures with OEA assistance, environmental study and cleanup requirements have resulted in a slowdown in the disposal process, causing local communities to report severe delays in land reuse. A delay in beginning the reuse process leads to deteriorating facilities, loss of community benefits, waning fiscal and human resources, and may be the largest single impediment to affected communities successfully transitioning their local economies.

During the 1993 investigative hearings, the Commission heard testimony from affected communities and several reuse groups regarding recommendations on improving the property-disposal process. The groups offered a comprehensive array of integrated recommendations to expedite the disposal and conversion process. These included strengthening and coordinating the federal role through a single DoD "reuse czar" to oversee the property-disposal implementation authority and responsibility vested in the Military Departments. Additionally, these groups recommended DoD foster a truly community-oriented disposal attitude with "community-friendly" policies relative to creative real estate marketing techniques, credit sales, interim civilian use through leases, and parcelization of uncontaminated lands. These proposals can ensure an early transfer to and use by affected communities. The Commission endorses such recommendations and, in particular, believes an accountable Assistant Secretary of Defense-level "reuse czar" with control of departmental reuse funds would entice communities to initiate reuse planning and implementation.

Another related issue involves the Air Force Base Disposal Agency and the coordination between the Agency, the OEA, and the local communities. The Air Force Base Disposal Agency was established in 1991 to serve as the Air Force's federal real-property-disposal agent. They provide integrated management for Air Force bases scheduled for closure and serve as a liaison between reuse planners and local communities prior to a closure. After the base-closure process, the Agency works with state and local reuse commissions to develop viable reuse plans that minimize the economic impact of base closures. However, the Agency's work is independent of the OEA. In fact, the former Director of the Agency, Colonel David M. Cannan, in testimony before the Commission, urged that a "'formal liaison' between the Agency, the OEA, and the local community planners begin immediately upon approval of a base closure."

The Commission encourages DoD and Congressional oversight committees to solicit comments from impacted communities on regulatory changes to facilitate base disposal. Congressional committees with statutory jurisdiction should hold hearings and streamline the disposal process, through legislation if necessary.
The Commission also believes Colonel Cannan’s recommendations should be implemented to help reduce costs and improve service to affected communities. The Army and Navy should also look to replicate the Air Force system to facilitate and expedite base disposal to fully assist community recovery efforts. The work of the Service’s disposal agencies should be functionally supervised by the DoD “reuse czar” so as to assure process coordination.

**Leases**

The Commission’s review of Department of Defense leases shows a significant amount of operation and maintenance funds spent annually for leased office space. With the downsizing of the Military Services, excess capacity in administrative space is being created on military bases, often in close proximity to the leased space. For example, the Army currently leases office space in San Antonio, TX, while excess capacity exists in government-owned administrative space at San Antonio’s Fort Sam Houston. The Commission suggests DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities during the 1995 process to ensure a bottom-up review of all leased space.

The Commission believes DoD should review its current leases to determine whether or not excess government-owned administrative space could be used instead of leased office space. A review of leased facilities must cross service boundaries to ensure leases are minimized and use of space on military installations is maximized. The Commission endorses efforts like the Army’s public-private development plans for the Fort Belvoir Engineer Proving Ground (EPG). This initiative, authorized by Congress in 1989, permits the Army to trade development rights on the EPG in return for sufficient administrative space also on the EPG at no capital construction cost to the government.

The Commission further recommends the Department of Defense, in its bottom-up review of this area, examine all options surrounding the ownership-versus-lease issue as it relates to DoD facilities. Conventional wisdom appears to suggest ownership of facilities by the Department of Defense is more economical and beneficial to military readiness than leasing due to potentially significant savings in operations and maintenance funds. However, ownership does not come without attendant costs, and there may be instances where leased space is a better option, especially for short-term requirements. Modern business practice recognizes there should be a capital usage charge for facilities that are “owned” to avoid a bias against leasing, which often provides greater future flexibility.

Finally, during its review and analysis the Commission discovered what appeared to be DoD’s leasing of space from GSA at premium rates above the going commercial rates for like areas. The Commission thinks there may be fertile ground to pursue potential anomalies in lease rates as indicated in the foregoing, along with anomalies in the overall accounting systems of lease-versus-own space comparisons that could help avoid using flawed data.

**Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)**

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended DoD submit a consolidation plan of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to the 1993 Commission. DFAS developed a plan for locating a consolidated work force based on a site selection process known as the “Opportunity for Economic Growth (OEG). The OEG solicited proposals from communities which addressed specific mandatory and preferred requirements in the following major categories: cost to the Department of Defense, site and office characteristics, and community characteristics. In December, 1992, DoD announced that it had chosen the top 20 contenders in the competition to select new locations for further consolidated finance-and-accounting centers. The selected communities were among 112 sites from 33 states which submitted 216 proposals. The final winners of the competition were to be announced in the Secretary of Defense’s base closure and realignment recommendations submitted to the Commission on or before March 15, 1993.

The DFAS consolidation was not forwarded to the Commission as part of the Secretary’s 1993 recommendations because the Secretary of
Defense did not believe the OEG was sound public policy. On March 30, 1993, the Commission formally requested DoD provide the OEG study, the process used to determine the winners, and the results of the competition by April 9, 1993. The Secretary responded to the Commission’s request in a June 7, 1993, letter, but by that time, the Commission was statutorily precluded from considering the DFAS consolidation plan. (The Commission is required to publish in the Federal Register proposed additions to the Secretary’s list 30 days before it submits its Report to the President.) In his June 7, 1993, letter, the Secretary of Defense stated his reasons for rejecting the original DFAS site-selection process. The Secretary further stated he had directed a new site-selection process and if this new process required recommending installation closures or realignments, the Department would submit them to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission during the 1995 round of base closures. While the 1993 Commission accepts the Secretary’s new direction, we recommend he take into consideration the significant investment of time and resources the top 20 contenders have already made to this DFAS proposal.

Medical Treatment Facilities

The 1991 Commission recommended DoD confer with Congress regarding health-care policies and report in time for the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission to consider the issue of hospital closures. Section 722 of the DoD National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 requires DoD to report on alternative means of continuing to provide accessible health care with respect to each closure and realignment. It was not readily apparent DoD met this requirement in its recommendations to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

During an April 5, 1993, Commission hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs stated military hospitals were operating at only one-half of normal in-patient loads, and there was sufficient capacity to meet any readiness requirement as defined in the Defense Planning Guidance. If this excess capacity of in-patient loads truly exists, DoD has the opportunity and the responsibility to improve health care operations and cost effectiveness by aggressively taking necessary actions to restructure them into a truly joint-service medical team and system. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should continue to increase emphasis and focus efforts to improve health care operations and cost effectiveness by:

1. Examining the consolidation of resources, specified geographic areas and regions across military departments.
2. Closing medical treatment facilities operating at less than cost-effective levels, given the patient load and the cost of medical care in the catchment area.
3. Moving assets across Military Departments and into other Service facilities as necessary to increase the capability and usage of existing facilities and operating beds.
4. Creating health care programs that operate on a competitive cost basis to support all beneficiaries.
5. Upgrading substandard facilities that are still required.

The Commission again urges DoD to review its policy of closing military hospitals when bases with active-duty populations served by those hospitals are closed. DoD has the obligation to ensure medical benefits are provided to all eligible beneficiaries, and it should do so at the lowest cost to taxpayers.

During the 1993 base closure and realignment process, it was discovered that considerable funding had been identified for extensive renovation and improvement of an existing medical center. This may be inappropriate at a time when excess operating beds are available in the military health-care system. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs needs to take a strong, active role in identifying possible military medical facility consolidations and/or closures prior to any capital expenditures.

Innovative concepts should also be considered in other areas, such as formalized agreements with Veterans Administration hospitals (which will be increasingly under-utilized) or private-sector hospitals. An example of this concept is
a "hospital without walls," where military doctors practice at Veterans Administration and/or private sector hospitals, and do not require a military medical facility.

In meeting its obligation to provide health care services to both active duty and retiree populations, DoD should pursue the lowest-cost option to the taxpayer (i.e., not necessarily the least-cost option to DoD). This may include the closure and consolidation of facilities on active Service installations. The Commission understands DoD policy is to maintain hospitals and clinics to support active-duty populations. The Commission feels it is incumbent upon the Department of Defense to plan in concert with the appropriate government agencies, including the Veterans Administration, as well as private-sector health-care providers, to ensure availability of necessary health care for veterans and their dependents, keeping in mind the Administration’s expected new medical program.

**Cumulative Economic Impact**

The Department of Defense measured community economic impact by reviewing the direct and indirect effect on employment at closing, realigning, and receiving locations. In addition, DoD also calculated the cumulative economic impact if more than one base was affected within a given area. Additionally, effects of commission decisions from 1988 and 1991 base closures were factored into this cumulative economic analysis. The economic area was defined by DoD as the area where most installation employees lived and where most of the economic (or employment) impacts would occur. The economic area was either the county where the installation was located, a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

The cumulative economic impact estimates led to the establishment by DoD of threshold criteria to justify removing a base from the proposed closure list. For example, the Secretary of Defense reversed an Air Force recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base, CA because the economic impact, for this and other actions, was five percent or greater, and the employment population of the impacted community was 500,000 or more. Although DoD provided reasons for creating this standard, the Commission believed, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) concurred in its April 15 report, that this standard was arbitrary and discriminatory. The Commission was unable to validate why these exact figures of five percent and 500,000 were chosen as discriminators. Additionally, economic impact was just one of the eight criteria. The first four military-value criteria were required to be given priority consideration. To remove a base as a closure or realignment candidate based solely on cumulative economic impact in isolation of the military value criteria could be inconsistent with DoD’s and the Commission’s mandate.

Therefore, in future base-closure recommendations, the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense make clear that cumulative economic impact alone is insufficient cause for removing a base with inadequate military value from consideration for closure or realignment. Economic impact should be given weight only when analyzing candidate bases with comparable, sufficient military value. The Commission recommends, in assessing cumulative impact, clarifying and standardizing geographic areas of measurement.

**U.S. Army Corps of Engineers**

In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended the realignment of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, eliminating a number of division and district management headquarters. The Commission’s 1991 Report recommended the realignment to begin in July, 1992 and to conform to the 1991 Corps of Engineers Reorganization Study, unless Congress passed an alternative plan before that date.

However, Congress believed the Commission had not given appropriate consideration to the Corps’ realignment proposal. Therefore, in the fall of 1991, Congress retroactively removed the Corps from the Commission’s jurisdiction. Although the Corps of Engineers announced in November, 1992, the approval of the Secretary of the Army’s reorganization plan for its headquarters and field structures, the Secretary of Defense placed the reorganization on hold.
The Commission is concerned sufficient emphasis is not being placed on the Corps of Engineers reorganization as a result of Congressional pressure and resistance. Both the 1991 and 1992 reorganization proposals were estimated to result in significant savings to the Department of Defense; however, these reorganizations and savings have not been realized.

The Commission encourages the Secretary of Defense to act promptly to approve a reorganization plan so significant savings can be realized and unnecessary facilities can be closed.

**Classified Programs**

Several bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense in both 1991 and 1993 conducted classified missions or activities. While the merits of such programs were not issues for the Commission’s consideration, the Commission had to be made aware of the existence of such activities in order to fully assess closure and realignment implications.

Therefore, the Commission believes the Department of Defense should maintain an audit trail of the discussions conducted during its recommendation process regarding classified missions. While it may not be necessary to provide to the Commission the minutes of these discussions, the Commission must be assured appropriate agencies participated in the decision-making process, e.g., service intelligence agencies and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Furthermore, if a DoD agency provides classified support to a non-DoD organization, it is imperative DoD coordinate with that agency prior to making its final recommendation. The responsible Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should enhance oversight in this area.

**Measures of Merit**

During its review and analysis of depot issues, the Commission discovered the measures of merit tended toward facility results which perhaps were not always the best measures for such activities. Results can be a snapshot measurement of a constantly moving target affected by any number of factors. The Commission suggests the measure of facility capacity would be a better representation of overall excess capacity within the DoD depot system.

Additionally, the Commission noted during its analysis the Department measured productivity, generally speaking, in man-day rates, which some argue is an improper measure due to regional variations in man-day costs. The Commission suggests perhaps the cost of performance, and reliable measurements thereof, is a leveling, more reflective measure of ‘merit for productivity. Therefore, the Commission suggests DoD pursue this or a like approach for reasonableness and appropriateness during future base-closure exercises.

The Commission noted several instances during the Services’ data-call process where information that was passed from installation-level to Service and Secretariat-level seemed to become less reliable. It is easy to see how unwitting human errors of omission, commission, and display differences can occur as information is passed through channels. To avoid this during future rounds, the Commission suggests base commanders and field respondents providing raw data and information to higher headquarters be allowed to review the overall input in its final format before it is sent by the respective Service to the Commission.

**Community Preference Consideration**

In the base closure and realignment process, it is a rare occasion when a local community actively petitions the Department of Defense to consider a military installation for closure or realignment. For this reason, Section 2924 of Public Law 101-510 directs the Secretary of Defense to “…take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.”

The clear intent of Congress is for the Secretary of Defense to provide added emphasis to any request by a local government for the closure or realignment of a Department of Defense installation. However, the decision to close or
realign a military installation must be based on the force-structure plan and the final criteria established by the Department of Defense. Due to the nature of the military and its national mission, the force-structure plan and military operational missions may not allow the Department of Defense to accommodate a local government’s request for closure or realignment.

The Borough of Marcus Hook, PA, petitioned both the 1991 and 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions to close the Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center because the Army and local community have been unable to reach any agreement, and the community would like to obtain the property for development.

Because of this example, the Commission is concerned the Secretary of Defense may not be placing sufficient emphasis on a local government’s request for closure or realignment of an installation. Therefore, the Commission recommends the Secretary of Defense place special emphasis on all local government requests for closure or realignment of installations.

With regard to the Borough of Marcus Hook request, the Commission urges the Department of Army to negotiate in good faith with the Department of Navy and the Borough the possible transfer of the Marcus Hook activities to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to accommodate this below-threshold request.

Environmental Cleanup Cost

DoD’s guidance to the Services provides direction on the use of environmental costs in the BRAC process. This guidance states that the Services are not to consider environmental restoration (cleanup) costs in the cost of closure, since DoD is obligated to clean up bases regardless of whether they close or remain open. While it is true that all bases will be cleaned up, it doesn’t follow that the restoration costs at a given base will remain the same if that base closes. Subsequent to the 1991 Commission, there have been new laws passed, intended to facilitate reuse of closing bases that impose unique environmental requirements on closing bases. These laws require the acceleration of investigatory work, and documentation on the presence of uncontaminated land at closing bases. As a result of these requirements, restoration costs can be incurred at closing bases that are not incurred at active bases. Additionally, it is possible that a given base’s cleanup may need to be more extensive if that base closes, given possible changes in land uses. This can result in significant increased cleanup costs at closing bases. Because of the potential for increased environmental restoration costs at closing bases, it is requested the Secretary of Defense consider incremental environmental restoration costs at closing bases in his recommendations to the 1995 Commission.

Unexploded Ordnance at Fort Monroe, Virginia

The Commission has concerns with the Army’s approach in considering unexploded ordnance at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and by implication at all Army facilities. Unexploded ordnance at Fort Monroe was raised as an impediment to closure of this facility due to potentially high cleanup costs when the base is turned over to the State of Virginia. An implication was made that the base is safe for military personnel and their families but would not be safe if civilians took over ownership of the base. In the Commission’s opinion, there is an uncertainty over Fort Monroe due to an inadequate assessment of the extent and threat of unexploded ordnance. The Commission recommends the Army comprehensively investigate the extent of unexploded ordnance and ensure public health and the environment are protected from current and potential future exposure to unexploded ordnance at Fort Monroe and other Army facilities containing unexploded ordnance. The Commission requests the Secretary of Defense provide information on the status of this request to the 1995 Commission.

Rightsizing DoD - Service Initiatives

Although the legislative history of base closure seems replete with statutes limiting just what the Department of Defense can do without Congressional approval, the Services do have some latitude to independently downsize by closing down relatively small installations. Since the first base-closure process of 1988, the
Services have, upon their own initiatives, taken a number of these smaller actions that do not break the threshold of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act.

At present the Army has underway 22 separate initiatives to close, realign, or transfer facilities which when implemented will result in per-annum savings of approximately $67 million. Since 1988 the Navy has disposed of 14 domestic and 29 overseas activities and installations with a very conservative estimate of over $70 million. Just since the 1991 base-closure round, the Air Force has begun, and in some cases completed, the inactivation and consolidation of 12 major commands into 8. Additionally, 12 air divisions and 5 communications divisions were inactivated, and 25 wings were eliminated.

The Commission applauds these independent efforts and charges the Secretary of Defense to continue to encourage the Services in their ongoing efforts in this area.
CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND

HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE

Many military installations were closed to reduce military overhead in the early 1960’s, and hundreds were closed in the early 1970’s after the end of the Vietnam War. Members of Congress, eager to protect the interests of their constituents, enacted Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code. This statute required the Department of Defense to notify Congress if an installation became a closure or realignment candidate. This law also subjected proposed closure actions to time-consuming environmental evaluations which effectively halted base closures.

As a result, in the late 1980’s, as the force-structure steadily declined, the base structure became bloated. Readiness was threatened as the Services struggled to pay the operating costs of unneeded bases. The Secretary of Defense, in close cooperation with Congress, proposed a base closure law to close obsolete military bases and bring the base structure in line with the declining force structure.

The 1988 Commission

Public Law 100-526, enacted in October 1988, created the Secretary of Defense’s Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The law charged the Commission with recommending installations for closure or realignment based on an independent study of the domestic military base structure. The 1988 Commission recommended the closure of 86 military and the realignment of 59 others with an estimated savings of $693.6 million annually.

Despite the accomplishments of the 1988 DoD Commission, additional base closures were necessary with the declining force-structure brought on by the end of the Cold War. Since the 1988 Commission charter expired by this time, the Executive Branch attempted to propose further reductions on its own. In 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney announced additional base closures and realignments. Congress protested the Secretary’s proposals were politically influenced. To overcome the potential stalemate and to ensure a fair process, Congress created an independent five-year Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with the passage of Public Law (PL) 101-510 under Title XXIX.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Congress created the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission “to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States”. Lawmakers intended this Commission to be a model of open government. Unlike the 1988 DoD Commission, PL 101-510 required the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to conduct public hearings on the Secretary of Defense’s list of closures and realignments and on any proposed changes to those recommendations. In addition, its records were open to public scrutiny.

Procedurally, the 1988 DoD Commission and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission differ substantially. The 1988 Commission, working for the Secretary of Defense, generated its own list of recommended closures and realignments. Under the new law, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission independently reviews and analyzes the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations and submits its findings directly to the President. To insure an independent process, the law requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide a detailed analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations and selection process to the Commission. The GAO also assists the Commission in its analysis of the Secretary’s recommendations.

closures and 48 realignments, with estimated FY 1992-97 net savings of $2.3 billion and recurring savings of $1.5 billion annually after one-time costs of $4.1 billion.

Using lessons learned from the 1991 round of base closures, Congress amended the Commission’s statute in 1992 to provide a more deliberate, auditable, and accountable process for future base-closure rounds. The legislative changes are annotated in italics in Public Law 101-510, as amended, contained in Appendix A.

**Composition of the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission**

The Commissioners chosen to serve in the 1993 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in public service, business, and the military. In accordance with the enacting statute, four commissioners were nominated in consultation with the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and two with the advice of the House and Senate Minority Leaders. The two remaining nominations were made independently by the President.

The Commission staff was drawn from divergent backgrounds encompassing government, law, academia, and the military. In addition to those hired directly by the Commission, other staff were detailed from the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the General Services Administration. The expertise provided by the detailees from these diverse government agencies contributed significantly to the Commission’s independent review and analysis effort.

The Commission’s review and analysis staff was divided into four teams — Army, Navy, Air Force, and Interagency Issues. A direct-hire civilian managed each of the teams in accordance with the amended law which also limits the number of Department of Defense detailees on each team to two.

**THE 1993 BASE CLOSURE PROCESS**

**Key Provisions of the Law**

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission by March 15, 1993. (see Appendix A) In accordance with the statute, these recommendations must be based upon a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department of Defense budget request for Fiscal Year 1994, and upon final criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress. For the 1993 Commission process, the Secretary of Defense announced in December, 1992, that the final criteria would be identical to those used during the 1991 base closure round.

The Secretary of Defense based the force-structure plan on an assessment of the probable threats to national security during the six-year period beginning, in this case, 1994, as well as the anticipated levels of funding that would be available for national defense (see Appendix B).

The final criteria cover a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental considerations. The first four criteria, which relate to military value, were given priority consideration. The remaining four criteria which address infrastructure, environmental, and economic impacts, are important factors that may mitigate against the military value criteria (see Appendix C).

The law requires the Commission to hold public hearings on the Secretary of Defense’s base closure and realignment recommendations and on any changes proposed by the Commission to those recommendations. The Commission must report its findings to the President by July 1, 1993, based on its review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. To change any of the Secretary’s recommendations, the Commission must find that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria.
Once the President receives the Commission’s final report, he has until July 15 to approve or disapprove the recommendations. If approved, the report is sent to the Congress which then has 45 legislative days to reject the report by a joint resolution of disapproval or the report becomes law. If the President disapproves the Commission’s recommendations in whole or in part, he must transmit to the Commission and the Congress his reasons for disapproval. The Commission then has until August 15 to submit a revised list of recommendations to the President. At that point, the President either forwards the revised list to Congress by September 1, or the 1993 base closure process is terminated with no action taken to close or realign bases. The law prohibits Congress from making any amendments to the recommendations, thereby requiring an “all-or-nothing” acceptance of the recommendations.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Guidance to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided policy guidance to the Services and Defense Agencies specifying procedures to ensure compliance with the base-closure law. The OSD issued several memoranda establishing policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for the Military Departments and Defense Agencies in the selection of bases for realignment and closure, including the following requirements: studies must be based on the January, 1994, force-structure plan and the same eight final criteria used in 1991; all installations must be considered equally; comprehensive record-keeping, internal-control, and certification policies and systems for data requirements and sources definition, justification of data changes, and verification of accuracy must be implemented; installations must be grouped into appropriate categories and subcategories based on missions, capabilities, or affiliates; excess capacity must be determined; and, the “Cost of Base Realignment Actions” (COBRA) model must be used to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment of proposed closures and realignments.

Criteria 1 - 4: Military Department and Defense Agency Assessments

THE ARMY PROCESS

The Army established the Total Army Basing Study (TABS) Group of 10 full-time Army Staff members to make recommendations for potential base closures and realignments to the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army. TABS employed a two-phased process to make recommendations on base closures and realignments. First, the TABS Group arranged installations into 11 categories based on the primary mission, and then analyzed the military value of each installation within its category. Military value was based on five measures of merit — mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiency, quality of life, and expandability.

From this analysis, the TABS Group identified its candidates for further study. Next, the TABS Group developed closure and realignment alternatives which they subjected to a cycle of analysis based on feasibility, affordability, socioeconomic impacts, environmental impacts, and the subjective pros and cons of each alternative. Finally, the TABS Group used these assessments to determine its recommendations which were ultimately delivered to the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff who forwarded the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

THE NAVY PROCESS

The Navy established an eight-member Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC) to formulate closure and realignment recommendations, with the Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) providing support to the Committee. The analysis process began by categorizing installations according to the support they provided to Navy and Marine Corps operational forces: personnel, weapon systems and material support, and shore support. These three categories were further divided into subcategories and subelements. The analysis began with numerous data calls to installations to
determine excess capacity and military value. Military value was based on the assessment criteria of readiness, facilities, mobilization capability, and cost and manpower implications.

The BSEC then developed closure and realignment scenarios using a computer model designed to achieve the maximum reduction of excess capacity and, to the maximum extent practicable, achieve an average military value equal to or greater than all installations currently in that subcategory. Finally, the BSEC applied military judgment to the results achieved with the computer model to develop a final scenario.

Once the BSEC developed candidate bases for closure or realignment, they evaluated them against final criteria five through eight. The final Navy recommendations were submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, who, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Navy and with the advice of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment.

THE AIR FORCE PROCESS

The Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) comprised of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service-level civilian personnel to implement the base-closure law and the OSD guidance regarding base closures and realignments.

Based on data received from questionnaires, the Air Force performed capacity analyses on 99 bases and on-site surveys at 48 installations to evaluate the ability of each base to accommodate increased force-structure.

Next, the Air Force categorized bases according to their mission followed with an excess-capacity analysis to identify beddown opportunities for activities and aircraft that would relocate. Next, the BCEG developed a color-coded rating scale for approximately 160 subelements in order to examine specific data points related to the eight final selection criteria; “green” indicated a base was more desirable for retention, “red” was least desirable, and “yellow” was between the two.

For each category under consideration, the BCEG discussed the options and voted by secret ballot on closure and realignment recommendations. The BCEG then briefed the Acting Secretary of the Air Force who nominated the selected bases to the Secretary of Defense.

THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA) PROCESS

The Director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) established a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Executive Group comprised of both executive-level civilian and military personnel and a BRAC Working Group of full-time members and support staff from specific DLA technical areas. The BRAC Working Group collected data that had been analyzed and certified, developed and evaluated recommendations for Executive Group consideration, conducted sensitivity analyses, and compiled documentation to support the final DLA recommendations.

The Working Group categorized activities based on general DLA missions and functions, in four categories: regional headquarters, distribution depots, inventory control points, and service/support activities. Excess capacity was evaluated through a series of questions to determine the physical space and throughput capacity available and used at each location. Their evaluation also considered projections for drawdowns in the force-structure plan, changes in basing and effectiveness, and initiatives expected to improve DLA operational efficiency and effectiveness.

The Executive Group next analyzed military value to determine the relative ranking of an activity compared to other installations in the same category, and then developed weighted measures of merit — mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiencies, and expandability — to complete their analysis of military value.

Using the excess capacity and military value evaluations, the Executive Group identified potential candidates for closure or realignment. From these candidates, scenarios and alternative options were evaluated against the force-structure plan, as well as the COBRA model, to assess costs, savings, and return on investment. After the Executive Group considered the impacts of the scenarios, recommendations were made to the Director of the DLA for realignment or closure.
THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) PROCESS

The Director of the Defense Information Technology Services Office (DITSO) established the Defense Data Center Consolidation (DDCC) team to begin the consolidation of data processing centers under the base closure and realignment process. The DDCC team used the significant amount of work already performed by the Services to consolidate Service/Agency data processing centers into larger, more efficient “megacenters.” The DDCC team developed a site selection process to identify existing sites with the greatest potential to serve as megacenters.

The DDCC team, with the assistance of experts from various Defense Agencies and the Services, judged the relative merits of megacenter candidates using the criteria categories of facilities, security, and operations, and through data obtained from questionnaires and site visits to megacenter candidates. Of the 36 megacenter candidates scored, 15 were recommended in rank order as megacenter sites. The number of sites required was determined by first calculating the total processing workload requirements of those sites being consolidated, and then distributing the requirements beginning with the top-ranked site, until all the requirements were satisfied. An analysis was performed to determine how much the site ranking order depended on the weights assigned to each criterion and the inclusion or exclusion of a specific criterion.

Criteria 1 - 4: Commission Review

The Commission set up four teams within its Department of Review and Analysis—one team to review each respective Service application of the military value criteria to the base closure process, and an Interagency team which reviewed the Defense Agencies’ application of the military value criteria to the base closure process. The Interagency team also reviewed criteria five through eight for all of the Services and Defense Agencies. Each team analyzed its Service’s methodology to ensure general compliance with the law, to confirm accuracy of data, and to determine if base-specific recommendations were properly offered by the Secretary of Defense.

In accordance with PL 101-510, all of the information used by the Secretary of Defense to prepare recommendations must be sent to Congress, the Commission, and the Comptroller General. Within the Commission, each team began its review and analysis with an examination of the documents provided by the Services. First they determined whether the recommendations were based on the force-structure plan and eight criteria, and whether all bases were considered equally. Next, the teams considered if categories, subcategories and base exclusions were reasonable.

Each of the teams reviewed the process the Service used to assess military value, as well as the reasonableness of the data they used. Each team examined the capacity analyses performed by the Service and highlighted installation categories that required additional scrutiny. Specific data analyses included a review of the COBRA input data and military construction cost estimates, as well as the capacity of receiver installations to accept missions.

Throughout the review and analysis process, the Commission staff maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with the communities who made significant contributions to the entire process. Staff members also accompanied Commissioners on base visits, attended regional hearings, and visited closure and realignment candidates and receiving installations.

UNIQUE CHALLENGES CONSIDERED BY THE COMMISSION

The Commission addressed several unique challenges presented by each of the Services’ implementation of the base closure and realignment process.

ARMY

Based mainly on a comparative review of facility requirements and available assets, the Commission believed the Army may not have taken a sufficiently close look at excess capacity within its infrastructure. Therefore, the Commissioners voted to study additional bases for further consideration as closure or realignment candidates.
NAVY

The Commission shared the concerns of the General Accounting Office that the Navy's process could result in the closure of bases with higher military value scores than those recommended to remain open. Therefore, the Commissioners voted to study additional bases for further consideration as closure or realignment candidates in part because the computer model used to assess alternative scenarios was designed to maximize the reduction of excess capacity, and then to evaluate average military value. The Commission performed a thorough and exhaustive review to ensure the evaluation process used to determine whether the bases recommended for closure or realignment conformed to the force-structure plan and selection criteria.

AIR FORCE

Because a lack of documentation made it difficult to verify the Base Closure Executive Group’s (BCEG) rationale for closure and realignment decisions, the Commission’s Air Force team conducted an independent analysis of criteria 1, 2, and 3. The study was performed to validate Air Force base operational groupings, and to analyze a base’s ability to support other missions that were not rated by the BCEG.

The Commission staff reviewed the Air Force questionnaires to determine which questions were relevant to operational military value within each mission area. Questions chosen for inclusion in the staff’s independent analysis focused on operational areas for generating training sorties (e.g., fuel, ramp space, and weather) as well as the training airspace and ranges to support training once airborne. Next, the staff scored and analyzed the bases in four mission areas: airlift, bomber, fighter, and tanker. The staff then determined score values and a point score for each question response. The scoring and analysis of questionnaire data for operational aspects provided relative values among bases across a wide spectrum of mission aspects, rating more question responses than the BCEG. The staff then performed a base-by-base comparative analysis and scored all bases claiming a mission capability for the mission areas in question. This analysis provided Commissioners with alternatives to the Air Force’s more subjective and less quantifiable ranking methodology. The analysis was provided to supplement, not replace, the Air Force methodology. The analysis was not a stand-alone or sole determinant in the Commission’s closure and realignment decisions.

DEFENSE MAINTENANCE DEPOTS

In the past, the Military Departments developed depot maintenance capabilities to suit their own mission needs. Recently, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study determined defense depots collectively have 25 to 50 percent more capacity than necessary. The estimated depot excess capacity would be even higher if certain private sector capabilities were included in the analysis.

The Departments’ attempts to eliminate duplicative depot operations in Service-controlled depots have been largely unsuccessful. The Commission found that similar work was conducted at multiple locations primarily as a result of the Services’ parochial interests. For example, the Commission found: (1) tactical missile maintenance activities were performed at nine locations; (2) wheeled vehicle maintenance was performed at three locations; (3) rotary wing maintenance activities at three locations; and (4) ground communications maintenance at four sites. These inefficiencies could be avoided through interservicing of like commodities.

The total cost of depot-level repair programs exceeds $13 billion, but only two percent of the total is expended through interservicing arrangements. The JCS study estimated DoD could save between $2 billion and $9 billion over the next 10 years if unneeded depots were closed and similar workloads were consolidated.

In December, 1992, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Services to develop integrated base closure and realignment recommendations, taking full advantage of all possible interservicing options. According to OSD officials, the Services decided there was insufficient time to consider all possible interservicing options and, instead, attempted to eliminate excess depot capacity within Service boundaries. Consequently, the Secretary of Defense suggested the Commission examine the interservicing possibilities.
The Commission analyzed and evaluated the potential for increased interservicing of rotary-wing aircraft, wheeled vehicles, tactical missiles, and ground-communications and electronics systems workloads. Private sector capability was not assessed. The interservicing categories were selected from a matrix of duplicate repair functions included in the JCS study, from potential savings estimated by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council, and from suggestions made to the Commissioners during initial site visits.

The Commission analyzed depot capacity within the Navy and Air Force fixed-wing depot structure. However, no attempt was made by the Commission to analyze fixed-wing interservicing due to a wide range of problems and a lack of reliable comparative information.

Potential interservicing arrangements for the rotary-wing aircraft, wheeled vehicles, tactical missiles, and ground communications and electronics-system commodities were analyzed by analyzing comparative information and visiting potentially-impacted depots. Additionally, information was analyzed regarding: unique depot maintenance functions, related military value, investment in depot plant and equipment, depot capacity, projected workload and utilization rates, operating costs per hour, and cost per unit.

AIRSPACE

In evaluating airspace, the Commission received expert analysis support from a full-time Federal Aviation Administration detailee who reviewed criterion 2 which specifically addressed the availability and condition of associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

The detailee served as the liaison for the Commission with the FAA Washington headquarters, regional offices, and field facilities. Specific matters addressed included air traffic control operational, procedural, and equipment issues; military and civil airspace; and, airport and air and ground encroachment.

The FAA detailee provided valuable assistance by obtaining and reviewing data and information including current air traffic control services, aeronautical charts and publications, growth trend statistics, information on civil airports near military airfields, information on civil and military facilities and equipment, and planned or proposed airspace expansions.

Additionally, airport and airspace data submitted by the Services relative to recommendations regarding a military airfield were reviewed, verified, and validated. Data prepared by the Commission such as aeronautical charts depicting military and civil airports, special military use airspace, training areas/routes, and the structure of the national airspace/route system were discussed and reviewed for accuracy and completeness.

The detailee and members of the Interagency Issues, Air Force, and Navy teams prepared and reviewed detailed and consistent airspace briefing maps for each base. These maps were developed to clearly depict ground encroachment, the airspace structure around military and civil airports, and the availability and accessibility of military special use airspace and training areas. Examples of the maps prepared are on the following pages and show ground encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB, the airspace structure around military/civil airports in Southern California, and the availability and accessibility to military special use airspace and training areas on the East Coast from Virginia to Florida.
Chapter 3

Criteria 5 - 8: Military Department, Defense Agency and Commission Review

While the first four selection criteria assessed military value and were given priority consideration, the remaining criteria were also applied in base closure and realignment evaluations. Because these criteria were not driven by military considerations specific to a Service, the Commission’s Interagency Issues team evaluated criteria application across all Services to ensure process uniformity and compliance with the legal requirement to evaluate recommendations based on the final selection criteria.

CRITERION 5: RETURN ON INVESTMENT

As prescribed by OSD policy guidance, the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) model was used by the Services and Defense Agencies to calculate costs, savings, net present value, and return on investment for base closure and realignment actions. Return on investment was the expected payback period in years for each proposed base closure or realignment. COBRA input data consisted of standard factors, which generally remained constant, and base/scenario factors which were unique. Standard factor examples included civilian pay, national median home price, discount rates, and costs per mile of moving personnel and equipment. Examples of base/scenario factors included the number of authorized personnel at a base, the size of the base, the number of personnel moving, and construction costs required by the move. The output data was used by each of the Services and Defense Agencies in their decision-making process.

All of the COBRA runs used by the Services and Defense Agencies in formulating their recommendations were provided to the Commission with the Secretary’s list. Other COBRA runs were submitted by the Services and Defense Agencies by request from the Commission. Review of the data by the Commission continued throughout the Commission’s evaluation process.

CRITERION 6: ECONOMIC IMPACT

OSD policy guidance instructed Services to measure community economic impact including the direct and indirect effect on employment at closing, realigning, and receiving locations.

To estimate indirect job losses in the communities (the economic area), indirect employment multipliers developed by the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) were used in conjunction with direct job loss. Based on the size of the community affected and the type of personnel located at the installation, the multipliers were conservatively developed to reflect the worst-case scenario, and were affirmed by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. Indirect employment losses resulted from base contracts to local businesses, as well as spending by DoD personnel in the local community for housing, utilities, and services.

Each of the Services provided direct-employment figures which included proposed personnel changes for military and civilians (including contractor personnel employed on the base or in the immediate vicinity) and military trainees at each base. Manpower changes directly associated with changes in the force structure were excluded from the economic analysis.

If more than one closing or realigning base was located in the same economic area, regardless of Service, OSD calculated the cumulative impact of all the proposed actions on a community. Employment impacts resulting from the 1988 and 1991 base-closure process were also included in the cumulative-impact calculations by including personnel losses scheduled to occur in the future as a result of past base-closure actions. The July 1992 Bureau of Labor Statistics employment data captured job losses which had already occurred due to previous base closures.

The Commission’s Review and Analysis Interagency Issues team, with the assistance of Department of Commerce economists, validated
the methodology used by the Services. The Services generally complied with the OSD guidance to estimate economic impact. Verification of the data and methodology was accomplished by confirming DOD personnel impacts, documenting indirect employment multipliers, reviewing the process used to select impacted communities (economic area), validating employment levels within the community, and documenting calculations used to estimate installation and cumulative economic impacts. The Commission also made independent employment impact assessments, with the assistance of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and collected additional economic data for the 31 major bases included in the Secretary’s recommendations.

CRITERION 7: COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Absent specific policy guidance from OSD regarding criterion seven, “the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel”, the Services took varied approaches in their evaluations.

Common community infrastructure factors evaluated included housing, health care, education, transportation, and recreation. The Army and Defense Logistics Agency compiled military value assessments, which included community infrastructure components for each installation eligible for closure and realignment. The Navy and Air Force collected data pursuant to this criterion in community infrastructure data calls for each installation eligible for closure and realignment. Neither the Air Force nor DLA specifically addressed community infrastructure in their analyses of impacts from specific recommendations.

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) activities are generally small tenants on larger military installations. Therefore, DISA concluded its consolidation would not have significant community infrastructure impact since an entire base community would not be affected by a small tenant’s dislocation.

In conclusion, while little direction was given to the Services by OSD, the Services did evaluate community infrastructure in their decision-making process in compliance with this criterion.

CRITERION 8: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

OSD guidance required a summary statement and status for each of the services’ recommendations which addressed: threatened or endangered species, wetlands, historical and archeological sites, pollution control, hazardous materials/wastes, land use and airspace implications, and programmed environmental costs/avoidances. Each Service had a different perspective when they considered the relationship between closure and realignment actions and the seven environmental attributes.

Although each Service and the Defense Logistics Agency, provided environmental summaries for eligible installations, the Army and the Air Force did not address programmed costs/avoidances. The Army’s recommendation report and installation summaries provided inconsistent information regarding this attribute. In response to questions from the Commission, the Army stated they did not use this attribute in return on investment calculations. The Air Force was unable to document that these costs were considered.

OSD’s guidance was sufficiently general to allow the Services to apply varied perspectives to the environmental attributes. The documentation provided by the Navy and DLA addressed all seven environmental attributes found in the OSD policy guidance. While the Army and the Air Force base closure decisions did not consider programmed environmental costs/avoidance, each fully addressed the remaining six attributes. It is reasonable to believe that a more complete evaluation of this attribute would generally not have altered their recommendations.

The Commission did not agree with the Army’s position that the high cost of environmental cleanup precluded their recommending the closure of Fort Monroe, Virginia. The Commission does not support the implication that Fort
Monroe real estate is environmentally safe enough for Army soldiers but will not be safe enough for the Commonwealth of Virginia if the installation was returned to the state.

ADDITIONS TO THE SECRETARY’S LIST FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

During the Commission’s review and analysis process, several concurrent activities provided information to the Commission. First, the Commission thoroughly analyzed all of the information used by the Secretary of Defense to prepare the recommendations. The Commission also held seven investigative hearings in Washington, DC, where Military Department representatives directly responsible for the Secretary’s recommendations testified to the Commission. Several defense and base closure experts within the federal government, private sector, and academia testified about the specifics of the base-closure process and the potential impacts of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. The Commissioners and staff members also conducted over 125 fact-finding visits to activities at each major installation recommended by the Secretary of Defense and considered by the Commission for closure or realignment, held 17 regional hearings to hear directly from communities nationwide, heard from hundreds of Members of Congress who testified before the Commission, and received over a quarter of a million letters from concerned citizens across the country. Additionally, the Commission received input from the General Accounting Office, as required by the base-closure statute, which included a report containing its evaluation of DoD’s selection process.

Based on the information gathered and the analyses performed, alternatives and further additions to the Secretary’s list were considered. To perform a thorough analysis and consider all reasonable options, the Commissioners voted on March 29 and on May 21 to add a total of 73 installations for further consideration as alternatives and additions to the 165 bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense (see Appendix E).

As required by law, the Commission published the required notice in the Federal Register to inform communities that their bases were under consideration by the Commission for possible closure or realignment. Public hearings were held for each of the installations the Commission added for consideration and each major base was visited by at least one Commissioner.

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO)

Under Public Law 101-510, as amended, GAO evaluated DoD’s selection process, provided the Commission and Congress a report containing their detailed analysis of the process, and assisted the Commission in its review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations.

Nine professional staff members were detailed by the GAO to serve full-time on the Commission’s Review and Analysis teams. The GAO detailees participated fully in each phase of the review and analysis effort. They verified data, visited candidate bases, participated in local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its public hearings. Additionally, GAO field personnel visited bases to gather information first-hand and verify data solicited by the Commission.

GAO reported to Congress and the Commission that the Services’ selection process was reasonable, and the Secretary of Defense’s recommendations appropriate, even though some were singled out for additional review. GAO was concerned the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) did not exercise strong leadership in providing oversight of the military Services and Defense Agencies during the process, and had generally ignored government-wide cost implications.

The GAO reported that the Army’s methodology and decision-making process used to evaluate and recommend installations for closure or realignment complied with legislation, was well documented, and generally supported by accurate data and appeared reasonable.
While the GAO report agreed with the Army’s selection methodology, the GAO took exception with the Army’s decision to retain Fort Monroe, Virginia. The GAO report also noted the Secretary of Defense’s action to remove the Army’s recommendation to close the Presidio of Monterey, California, because intelligence community concerns generated conflicting points of view within DoD on this issue. The GAO also questioned the cost and savings projections raised questions of this recommendation.

The GAO concluded the Navy process was well documented. However, GAO noted senior military and civilian officials’ judgements and assumptions were part of the decision-making process, and several reasonable questions could be raised about some of the final recommendations.

Although the Air Force process appeared reasonable and the data used generally accurate, the GAO found the process difficult to verify and noted some judgements which were not clearly documented. In some cases, Air Force decisions could not be verified using existing documentation.

The GAO certified the accuracy and completeness of data and found the Defense Logistics Agency’s selection process complied with statutory requirements, although some estimated cost savings appeared questionable.

Finally, GAO reported the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) process and implementation was generally sound. The GAO concluded the approach DISA used to select megacenter sites were reasonable.

TITLE XXIX - DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

PART A—Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) Short Title. - This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) Purpose. - The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) Establishment. - There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) Duties. - The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) Appointment. - (1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission —

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

“(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominations for appointment to the Commission on or before the date specified for 1993 in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated”.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with —

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.
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(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) Terms. - (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.


(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) Vacancies. - A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual’s predecessor was appointed.

(g) Pay and Travel Expenses. - (1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) Director of Staff. - (1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) Staff. - (1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in

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excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the
Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

“(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may
be persons detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission.

“(ii) No person detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission may be
assigned as the lead professional analyst with respect to a military department or defense
agency.

“(C) A person may not be detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission if,
within 12 months before the detail is to begin, that person participated personally and
substantially in any matter within the Department of Defense concerning the preparation of
recommendations for closures or realignments of military installations.

“(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no officer or employee of the Department of
Defense, may —

“(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the per-
formance on the staff of the Commission of any person detailed from the Department of Defense
to that staff;

“(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or

“(iii) approve or disapprove such a report.”

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency
detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to
assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, includ-
ing the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement
entered into with the Commission.

“(6) The following restrictions relating to the personnel of the Commission shall apply
during 1992 and 1994:

“(A) There may not be more than 15 persons on the staff at any one time.

“(B) The staff may perform only such functions as are necessary to prepare for the
transition to new membership on the Commission in the following year.

“(C) No member of the Armed Forces and no employee of the Department of Defense may
serve on the staff.”

(j) Other Authority. - (1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent
funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants
pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent
funds are available.

(k) Funding. - (1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission
such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall
remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second
session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year
1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Ac-
count established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain
available until expended.


“(m) Prohibition Against Restricting Communications. - Section 1034 of title 10,
United States Code, shall apply with respect to communications with the Commission.”

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE
CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) Force-Structure Plan. - (1) As part of the budget justification documents
submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for
each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan —

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) Selection Criteria.-(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than "January 15" of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before "February 15" of the year concerned.

(c) DoD Recommendations.-(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, "March 15, 1993 and March 15, 1995," publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation.

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or
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realignment by the Department.

“(4) In addition to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommend-
ations under this subsection available to Congress (including any committee or member
of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such information available to the Commission
and the Comptroller General of the United States.”; and

“(5)(A) Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the
Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military
installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that
person’s knowledge and belief.

“(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following persons:

“(i) The Secretaries of the military departments.


“(iii) Each person who is in a position the duties of which include personal and substantial
involvement in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations con-
cerning the closure or realignment of military installations, as designated in regulations
which the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, regulations which the Secretary of each
military department shall prescribe for personnel within that military department, or regula-
tions which the head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe for personnel within that De-
fense Agency.

“(6) In the case of any information provided to the Commission by a person described in
paragraph (5)(B), the Commission shall submit that information to the Senate and the House
of Representatives to be made available to the Members of the House concerned in accor-
dance with the rules of that House. The information shall be submitted to the Senate and the
House of Representatives within 24 hours after the submission of the information to the
Commission. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to ensure the compliance of
the Commission with this paragraph”.

(d) Review and Recommendations by the Commission. - (1) After receiving the
recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the
Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the
Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the
President a report containing the Commission’s findings and conclusions based on a
review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the
Commission’s recommendations for closures and realignments of military installa-
tions inside the United States.

(B) “Subject to subparagraph (C), in making” its recommendations, the Commission
may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the
Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-struc-
ture plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommenda-
tions.

“(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made by
the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission —

“(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B),

“(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final
criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1);

“(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 30
days before transmitting its recommendations to the President pursuant to paragraph (2); and

“(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.

“(D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change by the Commission in the Secretary’s
recommendations that would —

“(i) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the

Public
Reports.
Sec. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) In General. - Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall —

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) disapprove the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary’s recommendations and selection process.

(e) Review by the President. - (1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President’s approval or disapproval of the Commission’s recommendations.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.
date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) Congressional Disapproval. - (1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of —

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

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SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) In General. - (1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may —

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide —

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation, if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and ‘Shall” use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense. The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of
Defense and available for such purpose.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

(b) Management and Disposal of Property. - (1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part —

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 USC 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 USC 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 USC App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 USC 66713).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with —

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 USC App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(c) Applicability of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. - (1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 USC 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secret-
tary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider —

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) Waiver. - The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to —

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

10 USC 2687

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

(a) In General. - (1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the “Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990” which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account —

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(C) proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part.

(b) Use of Funds. - (1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905(a).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) Reports. - (1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

“(d) Account Exclusive Source of Funds for Environmental Restoration Projects. - Except for funds deposited into the Account under subsection (a), funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for purposes described in section 2905(a)(1)(C). The prohibition in this subsection shall expire upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part.”.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congres-
sional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of —

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress —

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary’s assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary’s assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

“Report on Environmental Restoration Costs for Installations to be Closed Under 1990 Base Closure Law. - (1) Each year, at the same time the President submits to Congress the budget for afiscal year (pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the funding needed for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, and for each of the following four fiscal years, for environmental restoration activities at each military installation described in paragraph (2), set forth separately by fiscal year for each military installation.

(2) The report required under paragraph (1) shall cover each military installation which is to be closed pursuant to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510).

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) Terms of the Resolution. - For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and —

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on ______”, the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.”.

(b) Referral. - A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) Discharge. - If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such a resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such
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resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) Consideration. - (1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of

"the resolution. A member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House concerned the Member’s intention to make the motion, except that, in the case of the House of Representatives, the motion may be made without such prior announcement if the motion is made by direction of the committee to which the resolution was referred.”.

The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) Consideration by Other House. - (1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House received from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution-

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) Rules of the Senate and House. - This section is enacted by Congress —

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
Appendix A

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

10 USC 2687

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) In General. - Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) Restriction. - Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a) —

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) Exception. - Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out —

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

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SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

As used in this part:

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility.

“Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.”.

The amendment made by paragraph (4) shall take effect as of November 5, 1990, and shall apply as if it had been included in section 2910(4) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 on that date,”.

(5) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
PART B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) Sense of Congress. - It is the sense of the Congress that —

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) Residual Value. - (1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term “fair market value of the improvements” means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term “improvements” includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) Establishment of Special Account. - (1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Any amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States. Funds in the Account shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) Uses of Facilities. - Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 USC 2391 note) is
amended —

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities”;

(2) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and”.

(b) Effective Date. - The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) Authorization of Appropriations. - There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of $100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) Exclusive Source of Funding. - (1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(b) Base Closure Account to be Exclusive Source of Funds for Environmental Restoration Projects. - No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title.”.

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to the availability of funds appropriated before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) Task Force Report. - (1) No later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning —

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.
(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.
(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.
(G) A representative of a State Attorney general’s office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.
(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

(a) Norton Air Force Base. - (1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) General Directive. - Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

10 USC 2687 SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES

(a) Establishment of Model Program. - Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) Administrator of Program. - The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environmental as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) Applicability. - This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) Program Requirements. - In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary
shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 USC 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor’s breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) Application of Section 120 of CERCLA. - Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC 9620).

(f) Expedited Agreements. - The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) Report. - The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) Applicability of Existing Law. - Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 USC 9601).
APPENDIX B
FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

This appendix is taken verbatim from Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, March 1993.

Background
Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress and to the Commission on March 12, 1993.

The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1994 through 1999 period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:
- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version of the plan.

Section I: Military Threat Assessment
The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic antagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. Also, the collapse of political order as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the destruction of property, and re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the United States to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts.

The United States faces three types of conflict in the coming years: deliberate attacks on U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose costs in lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will play a leading role.

Across the Atlantic
The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union will be a source of major crises in the coming years, as political-ethnic-religious antagonism weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These countries may resort to arms to protect narrow political-ethnic interests or maximize their power vis-a-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly increases the potential for these local conflicts to spread. Meanwhile, European NATO allies will continue to grapple with shaping an evolving regional security framework capable of crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as responding to out-of-area contingencies. These countries will develop closer relations with the central East European countries of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, but they will be reluctant to admit the republics of the former Soviet Union into a formal collective defense arrangement. Attempts by these former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly and could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war. Unsettled civil-military relations, unstable relations between Russia and Ukraine, and retention of significant numbers of nuclear weapons even after the
implementation of START II, the continuation of other strategic programs, and relatively indiscriminate arms sales will remain troubling aspects of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute to deteriorating living standards and encourage social unrest. The requirement for the United States to maintain a major role in Persian Gulf security arrangements will not diminish for the foreseeable future.

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in subversion and propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would precipitate U.S. intervention.

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat depending on what sanctions remain in place and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait. Its military capabilities to threaten other Gulf Arab states will grow. These states will nevertheless continue to depend largely on the U.S. deterrent to forestall a renewed Iraqi drive for regional dominance.

A prolonged stalemate in the Middle East peace process may lead to further violence and threats to U.S. allies and interests, perhaps accelerating the popularity of anti-Western and Islamic radical movements.

Across the Pacific

The security environment in most of Asia risks becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense policies to adapt to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pressures upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence. Virtually every nation will base its strategic calculations on the premise of a declining U.S. military presence. The lesser nations of Asia will become increasingly concerned about security in areas characterized by national rivalries.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.

China's military modernization efforts of the last two decades will produce a smaller but more capable military with modern combat aircraft, including the Su-27/FLANKER. China will also have aerial refueling and airborne warning and control aircraft before the end of the decade. The Chinese Navy will have significantly improved air defense missile capabilities, anti-ship missiles, long-range cruise missiles (120 km range), and a new submarine-launched cruise missile. By the end of the decade China also will have improved its strategic nuclear forces.

Japan's major security concerns will focus primarily on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a nationalistic Russia.

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. While the conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors, India and Pakistan will still have nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization covers regions not addressed above and is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe and the Pacific.

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences and factors that could easily derail it. Virtually every country in the region will be victimized by drug-associated violence and crime.
Over the next few years, the capabilities of almost all of the militaries in the region will remain static or decline despite planned or ongoing measures to upgrade or modernize existing inventories or restructure. A single exception may be Chile, which may see some force structure improvements through the mid-1990s.

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will dominate U.S. relations with the region: non-combatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping, and logistic support for allied military operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts will test the growing reputation of the United States for negotiation and mediation.

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that would require a significant military response in the near future are those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in Southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would not require military responses on the order of DESERT STORM, but they would pose unique demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to maintain stability and provide the environment for political solutions. Finally, there will be a large number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in concert with the United Nations. The current number of international crises is unlikely to diminish before the end of this decade, as many regions of the world continue to suffer the ravages of failed economic programs and nationalistic violence.

Section 11: Justification for Overseas Basing

As we reduce forward-presence forces globally, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental roles of forward-presence forces essential to deterring aggression, fostering alliance relationships, bolstering regional stability, and protecting U.S. interests abroad. Forward-presence activities such as forward basing, rotational and periodic deployments, exercises and port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, combating terrorism, combating narcotrafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain central to our stability and U.S. influence will be promoted through emerging forward-presence operations. These include roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.

Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national interest has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis-response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the numbers of U.S. forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crisis will continue to depend on judicious forward presence. Forward presence is also vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States works with its friends and allies to protect our security interests, while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

Atlantic Forces

U.S. interests in the Atlantic Regions, including Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia, require continuing commitment. There will be forces, forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States and the means to support deployment of larger forces when needed.

The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe, and our continued support of the Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our stake in long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength.
Our forward presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force of 1 Army Corps with 2 divisions and 3(+) Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) is a direct response to the uncertainty and instability that remains in this region. In addition, maritime forces committed to Europe will be one Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and one Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU(SOC)). These forward-deployed forces provide an explicit commitment to the security and stability of Europe, and pre-positioned equipment provides an infrastructure for CONUS-based forces should the need arise in Europe or elsewhere.

The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was built on the foundation of previous U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime deployments, coupled with pre-position, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, as well as European and regional enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, enhanced the crisis-response force buildup. Future presence in Southwest Asia will be defined by ongoing bilateral negotiations with the governments of the Gulf Cooperative Council. Our commitment will be reinforced by pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, bilateral planning, periodic deployments and exercises, visits by senior officials and security assistance.

**Pacific Forces**

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, require a continuing commitment. Because the forces of potential adversaries in the Pacific are different than the Atlantic, and due to the maritime character of the area, U.S. military forces in this vast region of major importance differ from those in the Atlantic arena. As Asia continues its economic and political development, U.S. forward presence will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence and a restraint to potential regional aggression and rearmament.

Forward presence forces will be principally maritime, with half of the projected carrier and amphibious force oriented toward this area including one CVBG, ARG, and Marine Expeditionary Force forward-based in this region. The improving military capability of South Korea has enabled our Army forces to be trimmed to less than a division. One Air Force FWE in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are to be forward-based in this region. In addition, presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be maintained.

**Elsewhere in the World**

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of the world’s oceans, American military men and women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, security assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect and extend our political goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly critical in an era of reduced forward presence, when forces deploying from the United States are more than ever dependent on enroute and host-nation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining forward presence through combined planning and exercises, pre-positioning and service agreements, and combined warfighting doctrine and interoperability could spell the difference between success or failure in defending vital regional interests.

**Contingency Forces**

The U.S strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service and the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINC must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and
rapidly deliverable heavy forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, particularly when access ashore is contested, which includes on-station MEU(SOC) and Maritime Pre-positioning Ships; and the unique capabilities of the special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation. In regions where no U.S. forward presence exists, these contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed as required by heavier forces and long-term sustainment.

**Section III: The Force Structure and Implementation Plan**

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DoD Personnel
(End Strength in thousands)

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APPENDIX C
FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA

Military Value
(given priority consideration)

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense’s total force.

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.

7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.

8. The environmental impact.
APPENDIX D
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE’S CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School
Fort McClellan, AL

Commodity Oriented
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Vint Hill Farms, VA

Army Depots
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Tooele Army Depot, UT

Command/Control
Fort Belvoir, VA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Shipyards
Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA

Operational Air Stations
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL
Naval Air Station, Midway Island

Training Air Stations
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN

East Coast Naval Bases
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI
Naval Station Charleston, SC
Naval Station Mobile, AL
Naval Station Staten Island, NY
Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT

West Coast Naval Bases
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA

Training Centers
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA

Navy Depots
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL

Inventory Control
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA

Technical Centers (SPAWAR)
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, CA
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton, NJ
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, St. Inigoes, MD
Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center, Washington, D.C.
Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD
Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, VA

Technical Centers (NAVSEA)
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach
Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA
Naval Undersea Warfare Center -
Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, VA
Planning, Estimating, Repair and
Alterations (CV), Bremerton, WA
Planning, Estimating, Repair and
Alterations (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA
Planning, Estimating, Repair and
Alterations (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA
Planning, Estimating, Repair and
Alterations (Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA
Sea Automated Data Systems Activity,
Indian Head, MD
Submarine Maintenance, Engineering,
Planning, and Procurement,
Portsmouth, NH

Reserve Air Stations

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA

Supply Centers

Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA
Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL

NCR Activities

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA
( Including the Office of Military Manpower
Management, Arlington, VA)
Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Alexandria, VA
Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA
Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA (Including Defense Printing Office,
Alexandria, VA and Food Systems Office,
Arlington, VA)
Security Group Command, Security Group
Station, and Security Group Detachment,
Potomac, Washington, D.C.
Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA

Other Bases

1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, NY
Department of Defense Family Housing Office,
Niagara Falls, NY

Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Western Engineering Field Division,
San Bruno, CA
Public Works Center San Francisco, CA

Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:
Gadsden, AL
Montgomery, AL
Fayetteville, AK
Fort Smith, AK
Pacific Grove, CA
Macon, GA
Terre Haute, IN
Hutchinson, KN
Monroe, LA
New Bedford, MA
Pittsfield, MA
Joplin, MS
St. Joseph, MO
Great Falls, MT
Missoula, MT
Atlantic City, NJ
Perth Amboy, NJ
Jamesburg, NY
Poughkeepsie, NY
Altoona, PA
Kingsport, TN
Memphis, TN
Ogden, UT
Staunton, VA
Parkersburg, WV

Naval Reserve Facilities at:
Alexandria, LA
Midland, TX

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:
Fort Wayne, IN
Billings, MT
Abilene, TX

Readiness Command Regions at:
Olathe, KN (Region 18)
Scotia, NY (Region 2)
Ravenna, OH (Region 5)

Hospitals

Naval Hospital Charleston, SC
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA
Naval Hospital Orlando, FL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Large Aircraft
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI
March Air Force Base, CA
McGuire Air Force Base, NJ

Small Aircraft
Homestead Air Force Base, FL

Air Force Reserve
O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station, Chicago, IL

Air Force Depots
Newark Air Force Base, OH

Defense Logistics Agency

Inventory Control Points
Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH
Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA
Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, PA

Service/Support Activities
Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, Philadelphia, PA
Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, MI
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, Battle Creek, MI

Regional Headquarters
Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA
Defense Contract Management District Northcentral, Chicago, IL
Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, CA

Defense Distribution Depots
Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA
Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA
Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL
Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT

Defense Information Systems Agency

Navy Data Processing Centers
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC
Enlisted Personnel Management Center, New Orleans, LA
Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA
Fleet Industrial Support Center, San Diego, CA
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, MN
Naval Air Station, Key West, FL
Naval Air Station, Mayport, FL
Naval Air Station, Oceana, VA
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, CA
Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, San Diego, CA
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, New Orleans, LA
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Pensacola, FL
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Washington, DC
Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX
Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA
Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco, CA
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA
Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA
Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA
Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA
Appendix D

Marine Corps Data Processing Centers
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC
Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA
Regional Automated Services Center,
Camp Lejeune, NC
Regional Automated Services Center,
Camp Pendleton, CA

Air Force Data Processing Centers
Air Force Military Personnel Center,
Randolph AFB, TX
Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX
Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, CA
7th Communications Group, Pentagon,
Arlington, VA

Defense Logistics Agency Data Processing Centers
Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI
Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT
Information Processing Center,
Philadelphia, PA
Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Data Processing Centers
Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH
Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Indianapolis Information Processing Center, IN
Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Kansas City Information Processing Center, MO

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations
Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX (704th Fighter Squadron and 924th Fighter Group redirected from Bergstrom AFB to Carswell AFB cantonment area)
Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB, maintenance training function redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB)
Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB)
Chanute Air Force Base, IL (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis)
Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, CA (Retain no facilities, dispose vice outlease all property)
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems Integration Management Activity - East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA vice Rock Island, IL)
MacDill Air Force Base, FL (Airfield does not close. 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) is reassigned from Homestead AFB and operates the airfield. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill AFB vice relocating to Charleston AFB)
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA (Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of Marine Corps Air Station Tustin’s assets)
Mather Air Force Base, CA (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB)
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA, into available Air Force space vice new construction)
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA)
Navel Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, NM (Retain as a tenant of the Air Force)
Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army relocates to NASA Ames, CA vice Fort Carson, CO)
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker AGB instead of Wright-Patterson AFB. Rickenbacker AGB does not close)
Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL)
APPENDIX E
BASES ADDED BY THE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Anniston Army Depot, AL
Red River Army Depot, TX
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA
Army Information Processing Center
   Chambersburg, PA
Army Information Processing Center
   Huntsville, AL
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX
Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL
Fort Gillem, GA
Fort Lee, VA
Fort McPherson, GA
Fort Monroe, VA
Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA
Presidio of Monterey & Annex, CA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL
Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA
Naval Air Facility Johnstown, PA
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN
Naval Air Station Miramar, CA
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA
Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC
Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL
Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Portsmouth, VA
Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC
Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL
Naval Hospital Millington, TN
Naval Ordnance Station Louisville, KY
Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center
   Lawrence, MA
Naval Reserve Center Chicopee, MA
Naval Reserve Center Quincy, MA
Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA
Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME/NH
Naval Station Everett, WA
Naval Station Ingleside, TX
Naval Station Pascagoula, MS
Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA
Ships Parts Control Center
   Mechanicsburg, PA

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Fairchild Air Force Base, WA
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND
Tinker Air Force Base, OK
McClellan Air Force Base, CA
Kelly Air Force Base, TX
Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA
Gentile Air Force Station, OH
Ogden Air Logistics Center
   Hill Air Force Base, UT
Defense Distribution Depot
   McClellan Air Force Base, CA
Defense Distribution Depot
   Oklahoma City, OK
Defense Distribution Depot
   San Antonio, TX
Defense Distribution Depot
   Warner-Robins, GA
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Kelly Air Force Base, TX
Regional Processing Center
Tinker Air Force Base, OK
Regional Processing Center
Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Defense Contract Management District
Northeast, MA
Defense Construction Supply Center
Columbus, OH

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
Defense Information Technology Services
Organization Cleveland Information Processing Center, OH
Defense Information Technology Services
Organization Columbus Information Processing Center, OH
Defense Information Technology Services
Organization Denver Information Processing Center, CO
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Presentation of the Secretary’s Recommendations
2118 Rayburn House Office Building

March 16, 1993
Policy and Methodology in the Secretary’s Recommendations
2212 Rayburn House Office Building

March 22, 1993
Environmental Issues, Methodology, and Policy
334 Cannon House Office Building

March 29, 1993
Base Closure Account and Execution, Budget Impact and Public Policy
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

April 5, 1993
Strategic Defense/Chemical Issues, Military Family/Retiree Issues
1100 Longworth House Office Building

April 12, 1993
Economic Issues
1100 Longworth House Office Building

April 19, 1993
Presentation of GAO’s Analysis of the Secretary’s Recommendations and Selection Process for Closures and Realignments
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

May 21, 1993
Commission Deliberations/Vote on Additions to the Secretary’s List for Further Consideration
1100 Longworth House Office Building

June 14-16, 1993
Congressional Testimony on Military Facility Closures and Realignments
216 Hart Senate Office Building

June 17-18, 1993
Commission Deliberations
325 Russell Senate Office Building
216 Hart Senate Office Building

June 23-27, 1993
Commission Final Deliberations
216 Hart Senate Office Building
2167 Rayburn House Office Building
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

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April 20-21, 1993
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Gunston Arts Center

April 25-26, 1993
Oakland, CA Regional Hearing
Henry J. Kaiser Convention Center

April 27, 1993
San Diego, CA Regional Hearing
Holiday Inn on the Bay

May 1-2, 1993
Charleston, SC Regional Hearing
Gaillard Municipal Auditorium

May 3, 1993
Orlando, FL Regional Hearing
Orlando Expo Center

May 4, 1993
Birmingham, AL Regional Hearing
Boutwell Municipal Auditorium
May 9-10, 1993  
Newark, NJ Regional Hearing  
Symphony Hall

May 11, 1993  
Boston, MA Regional Hearing  
Gardner Auditorium

May 12, 1993  
Detroit, MI Regional Hearing  
McGregor Memorial Conference Center

June 1, 1993  
Columbus, OH Regional Hearing  
Whitehall Civic Center

June 2, 1993  
Grand Forks, ND Regional Hearing  
University of North Dakota

June 3, 1993  
San Diego, CA Regional Hearing  
Holiday Inn on the Bay

June 4, 1993  
Spokane, WA Regional Hearing  
City Council Chambers

June 6, 1993  
Corpus Christi, TX Regional Hearing  
Bayfront Plaza Convention Center

June 8-9, 1993  
Atlanta, GA Regional Hearing  
Russell Federal Building

June 11, 1993  
Norfolk, VA Regional Hearing  
Chrysler Hall

June 12, 1993  
Boston, MA Regional Hearing  
Gardner Auditorium
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Anniston Army Depot, AL
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Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Red River Army Depot, TX
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA
Tooele Army Depot, UT
Fort Gillem, GA
Fort Huachuca, AZ
Fort Lee, VA
Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort McPherson, GA
Fort Monroe, VA
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Vint Hill Farms, VA
Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA
Presidio of Monterey Annex
Presidio of Monterey Annex/Fort Ord, CA
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

NAVY
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA
Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station
Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA
Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center,
29 Palms, CA
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS
Naval Air Station Miramar, CA
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA
Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV
Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division,
Patuxent River, MD
Naval Air Warfare Center–Aircraft Division,
Trenton, NJ
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA
Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC
Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA
Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL
Naval Education and Training Center,
Newport, RI
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center
Portsmouth, VA
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center
St. Inigoes, MD
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center
San Diego, CA
Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC
Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX
Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL
Naval Hospital Millington, TN
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA
Naval Hospital Orlando, FL
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA
Navy Radio Transmission Facility,
Annapolis, MD
Naval Shipyard Charleston, SC
Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA
Naval Shipyard Mare Island, Vallejo, CA
Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME/NH
Naval Station Charleston, SC
Naval Station Ingleside, TX
Naval Station Everett, WA
Naval Station Mayport, FL
Naval Station Mobile, AL
Naval Station Pascagoula, MS
Naval Station Treasure Island
San Francisco, CA
Naval Station Staten Island, NY
Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA
Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL
Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren)
White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD
Naval Surface Warfare Center–Carderock,
Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD
Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk
   Detachment, Norfolk, VA
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA
Planning, Engineering for Repair and
   Alterations (Surface) Pacific
   San Francisco, CA
Public Works Center San Francisco, CA
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, WA
Ships Parts Control Center
   Mechanicsburg, PA
Submarine Base New London, CT
Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA

AIR FORCE
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Fairchild Air Force Base, WA
Gentile Air Force Station, OH
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND
Greater Rockford Airport, Rockford, IL
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY
Homestead Air Force Base, FL
Kelly Air Force Base, TX
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY
MacDill Air Force Base, FL
March Air Force Base, CA
McClellan Air Force Base, CA
McGuire Air Force Base, NJ
Newark Air Force Base, OH
Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill
   Air Force Base, UT
O'Hare International Airport Air Force
   Reserve Station, Chicago, IL
Tinker Air Force Base, OK
Travis Air Force Base, CA
Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT LETTERKENNY, PA
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT MCCLELLAN
   Air Force Base, CA
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT NORFOLK, VA
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT OKLAHOMA CITY, OK
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT RED RIVER, TX
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SAN ANTONIO, TX
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT SAN DIEGO, CA
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION DEPOT WARNER-ROBINS, GA
DEFENSE ELECTRONICS SUPPLY CENTER, DAYTON, OH
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER, PA
DEFENSE LOGISTICS SERVICE CENTER
   Battle Creek, MI
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY CLOTHING FACTORY
   Philadelphia, PA
DEFENSE PERSONNEL SUPPORT CENTER
   Philadelphia, PA
DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING SERVICE
   Battle Creek, MI

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
Army Information Processing Center
   Chambersburg, PA
Computer Services Center, San Antonio, TX
Defense Information Technology Services
   Organization, Columbus Information Processing Center, OH
Defense Information Technology Services
   Organization, Cleveland Information Processing Center, OH
Regional Processing Center
   Kelly Air Force Base, TX
Regional Processing Center
   Tinker Air Force Base, OK
Regional Processing Center
   Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA
Seventh Communications Group
   Pentagon, Washington, DC

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Defense Construction Supply Center
   Columbus, OH
Defense Contract Management District
   Northeast, Boston, MA
Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA
Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL

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**APPENDIX H**

**COMMISSIONERS’ BIOGRAPHIES**

**Jim Courter** has been Chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission since 1991. Prior to that, he represented the 12th district of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979 until 1991. While in Congress, Congressman Courter chaired the House Military Reform Caucus and served on the following subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee: Military Installations and Facilities, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, and Research and Development. In 1987, he was appointed to the joint select committee charged with investigating the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan democratic opposition in the “Iran-Contra Affair.” Chairman Courter is senior partner of the law firm he founded, Courter, Kobert, Laufer, Purcell, and Cohen, in Hackettstown, New Jersey.

**Peter B. Bowman** is Vice President for Quality Assurance for Gould, Inc., a diversified manufacturing company in Newburyport, Massachusetts. A career naval officer, Mr. Bowman attended the U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School and the Naval Submarine School. He served aboard three separate nuclear submarines and later at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. After tours at the Naval Sea Systems Command and Mare Island Naval Shipyard and 30 years service, he retired in 1990 as the Shipyard Commander at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Mr. Bowman was an instructor for the Center for Naval Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School from 1990 through 1991.

**Beverly B. Byron** was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives representing the 6th District of Maryland from 1979 until January 1993. While in Congress, she served as Chairman of the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. In this capacity, Congresswoman Byron directed Congressional oversight for 42 percent of the U.S. defense budget and played a key role in overseeing the drawdown of U.S. forces overseas. She also served on the Research and Development Subcommittee. From 1983 until 1986, Mrs. Byron chaired the House Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament and served from 1980 until 1987 on the U.S. Air Force Academy Board of Visitors.

**Rebecca G. Cox** is Vice President for Government Affairs for Continental Airlines. Mrs. Cox formerly served as Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Public Liaison for President Ronald Reagan. Concurrently, she served as Chairman of the Interagency Committee for Women’s Business Enterprise. Prior to her service in The White House, Mrs. Cox was Assistant Secretary for Government Affairs at the Department of Transportation. She had previously served at the Department of Transportation as Counselor to the Secretary. Mrs. Cox began her career in the U.S. Senate, where she was Chief of Staff to Senator Ted Stevens.

**General Hansford T. Johnson, U.S. Air Force (Retired)** served in the Air Force for 33 years and was Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and of the Air Mobility Command, leading these commands in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. During his career, he served in South Vietnam, commanded the 22nd Bombardment Wing, was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Strategic Air Command, Vice Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command and Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Johnson is now Chief of Staff of the United Services Automobile Association.

**Harry C. McPherson, Jr.,** is a partner in the law firm of Vemer, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand in Washington, D.C. He served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs and later as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. He then served as Special Counsel to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Mr. McPherson served in the U.S. Air Force and was President of the Federal City Council. He was General Counsel for the John F. Kennedy Center for the...
Performing Arts from 1977 until 1991 and is currently Vice Chairman of the U.S. International Trade and Cultural Center Commission.

Robert D. Stuart, Jr., was U.S. Ambassador to Norway from 1984 to 1989 after serving as President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of The Quaker Oats Company. Ambassador Stuart is President of Conway Farms, a real estate development company. He is also a Director of the Atlantic Council, the Washington Center and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, he was President of the Council of American Ambassadors and Vice Chairman of the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public Service. He served in the U.S. Army in Europe during World War II. He also served as a Commissioner on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991.
APPENDIX I
COMMISSION STAFF

Matthew P. Behrmann
Staff Director
Col Wayne Purser, USAF
Senior Military Executive

Benton L. Borden
Director of Review and Analysis
Edward A. Brown III
Army Team Leader
S. Alexander Yellin
Navy Team Leader
Francis A. Cirillo, Jr.
Air Force Team Leader
Robert Cook
Interagency Team Leader

Caroline Cimons
Director of Administration
Sheila C. Cheston
General Counsel
Mary Ann Hook
Deputy General Counsel
Thomas Houston
Director of Communications and Public Affairs
James P. Gallagher
Director of Congressional Affairs
Tobias G. Messitt
Executive Secretariat
James K. Phillips
Director of Information Services

PROFESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Catherine M. Anderson
Jacqueline Grace Arends
Jennifer Nuber Atkin
Hugh Bale
Virginia S. Bauhan
William E. Berl
William F. Bley2
Joseph C. Bohan2
James Boucher3
Jeffrey C. Buhl
H. Donald Campbell2
Jeffrey A. Campbell
Francis X. Cartwell
Jill C. Champagne
Christine K. Cimko
David F. Combs2
Lynn M. Conforti
Duffy D. Crane
CDR Gregory S. Cruze, USN'
Richard A. DiCamillo1
MAJ Kurt B. Dittmer, USAF
LTC Brian J. Duffy, USA'
William D. Duhnke III
Charles T. Durgin
David S. Epstein2
MAJ Gary L. Evans, USA'
Edward J. Foley
Barbara A. Gannon2
Kara M. Gerhardt
James K. Goldfarb
John A. Graham

Renee Hammill
Penney M. Harwell2
David K. Henry3
Roger P. Houck
Robert G. Howarth
Lawrence Burton Jackson
Roy B. Karadbil2
Mitchell B. Karpman2
Robert C. Keltie, Jr.
John Kemmerer4
Paul D. Kennington
M. Glenn Knoepffle2
Mary Ellen Kraus5
Marni Langbert
Lt Col Jeffrey A. Miller, USAF
Gregory S. Nixon2
Jeffrey L. Patterson, Esq.
Daniel E. Quaresma
Mark L. Randolph
LTCOL R. G. Richardson, USMC1
Howard A. Salter
Michele T. Sisak
Daniel Smith
Sean K. Trench
Althnett Turner
Mary E. Woodward

1 Detailee from the Department of Defense
2 Detailee from the General Accounting Office
3 Detailee from the Department of Commerce
4 Detailee from the Environmental Protection Agency
5 Detailee from the Federal Aviation Administration
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<td>Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia</td>
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- K: Defense Distribution Depot, Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
- L: Defense Distribution Depot, Oakland, California
- M: Defense Distribution Depot, Pensacola, Florida
- N: Defense Distribution Depot, Tooele, Utah
- O: Defense Electronics Supply Center, Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio
- Q: Defense Logistics Services Center, Defense Electronic Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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- T: Defense Logistics Services Center, Defense Logistics Services Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- U: Defense Logistics Services Center, Defense Logistics Services Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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- W: Defense Logistics Services Center, Defense Logistics Services Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
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